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Vindiciæ Mentis.

AN
ESSAY
OF THE
Being and Nature
OF
MIND:

Wherein the *Distinction* of *Mind* and *Body*, The *Substantiality*, *Personality*, and *Perfection* of *Mind* is Asserted; and the *Original* of our *Minds*, their *Present*, *Separate*, and *Future State*, is freely enquir'd into, in order to a more certain *Foundation* for the Knowledge of *God*, and our *Selves*, and the clearing all *Doubts* and *Objections* that have been, or may be made concerning

THE
Life and Immortality
OF
OUR SOULS.

In a New METHOD,

By a Gentleman.

Be not afraid of them which kill the Body, but are not able to kill the Soul.
Matth. 10. 28.

Sic habeto Te non esse Mortalem, sed Corpus hoc: nec enim is es quem Forma ista declarat: Sed Mens cuiusque. Is est quisque, non ea Figura quæ digito demonstrari potest, Cicero in Som: Scipion.

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T H E
Epistle Dedicatory,
To the Right Honourable
Thomas EARL of Pembroke
and Montgomery, &c.
President of Her Majesty's
Most Honourable Privy
Council.

My Lord,

I*F it be a fault in me to Dedicate this Treatise to your Lordship, your former Favourable Acceptance of a small Paper Present, must bear the blame. How I came then to lay aside my natural distrust, and venture your Lordships Censure of a weak Performance, I know not. But the easiness of Access to your Lordship I then found, and your Readiness to take that which, perhaps was but inconsiderately done, in the favourable sense; has not only given me some Assurance of another Pardon now, but even laid an Obligation on me to acknowledge the Former.*

It might have been more becoming the Author, I confess, to have Dedicated any thing of his to some Person of a lower degree,

and less Learned, but the Subject of my Discourse, Life and Immortality, is so Noble, that a Vindication of the Truth thereof, as it cannot need any Mortal Patronage, so it may well be a Present to the most Elevated Mind, and Noble Person. My Lord, I cannot have the vanity or boldness to think to shelter the faults I may have committed in this Essay, under your Great Name; I rather submit it to your Lordships Censure, as to a Person, the most likely of any I have the Honour to know, to pass a Just and Impartial Judgment on it. Nor will I do that which I know would not be at all acceptable to a truly Noble Mind, and would be but Impertinent to the World, harrangue your Lordship with a transcription of your Noble Character, tho such a thing may be customary in our Parasitical Age. One might have a Just Obligation from a Person obscure, to Publish his latent Merits; but here no such thing can be thought on. Yet one thing I must needs say of your Lordship, That I may propose you as a Pattern to our English Nobility. That notwithstanding all the Difficulties accompanying the great Publick Posts your Lordship has bin in, you have bin always so Able, Faithful and Disinterested, that I never heard any one Person of whatsoever Faction (tho we have some very malignant) speak evil of
your

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your Lordship in any thing; which Unblameable Reputation, not very many in Publick Stations have merited. But your steady constancy to our common Interest, and Prudent Prosecuting of the same, hath bin such, that you could not fall under the Censure even of those that oppos'd it. And the confidence the best Men have had in your Lordship, has bin so great, that they have always wish'd you in the most Important Administrations. How were we satisfied when your Lordship was, Plenipotentiary for settling ours and Europes Peace; which might have bin both happy and lasting, had it bin made with any but a Faithless French Prince? What hopes did we conceive when you was our Admiral? What did we promise our selves in your Conduct of ours, and the best Fleet in the World? His late Majesty thought none so fit as your Lordship for these great Trusts, and Her present Majesty, who could not want you to preside also in Her Councils, would trust no other as Lord High-Admiral of England, but only His Highness, Her faithful Consort.

But while I think on these things, I have almost forgot my self, and the Present I am making, to so Noble a Person; which makes my Address but Rude, and Homely, like the Dress I have ventured to put the highest Truths

in: But I question not, my Lord, but your Judgment will separate the Truths themselves from any defects in me, that may chance to give them a disadvantageous appearance; and accept a few Diamonds, tho roughly Enchas'd, from your Lordship's most

Humble Servant,

T. E.

THE

THE PREFACE.

TH O' I think it as unnecessay to promise my Reader in a Preface *what* I will do in my Book, as impossible for me yet to say, *how great things* I have performed therein; yet I Judge it not amiss, to premise a few Lines to my intended Discourses: which shall not be to bespeak my Readers Indulgence for any Fault he may find, his favourable Construction, or civil Answer. For I shall be contented that every one think, and speak his Pleasure of me. But it may be convenient, to give some short account of the Reason of my intended Undertaking, and to engage my Reader, if I can, only to Read with as much Freedom, as I am about to Write with; to satisfie his Mind (will he but give me common Credit) that I have as little Prejudice as Heart can wish, having never bin initiated in any

particular System of *Philosophy* or *Divinity*, or ever put under my Tutorage, where by I was forbidden to *Read*, *Think*, or *Speak*, whatsoever I could judge Convenient. That I have bin led into no private or vulgar Opinion by any Humane Authority, no, not by a Father, or inherited a Tenet on any Friendly Obligation, but have hither enjoyed an entire Liberty of choice, of whatever seems most like *Truth* to me. Interest or vogue have rarely Tempted, but never prevail'd to bias my Mind, either in Natural, or Divine things, to any Profitable, or Creditable Opinion. Apparent *Truth* in it's Naked Beauty to me, hath bin still most Charming, and *Truth* as I take it, doth now engage me to attempt its Defence against the Opinions of the *Materialists* and *Mortalists*, which I take to be both Great, and Growing Errors. Yet I will not begin, as too many Writers do and the *Materialists* have done, with Haughty, and Confident Assertions of the Goodness of my Cause, or Invincibleness of my Arguments: I will not Endeavour to prepossess my Reader that I am Unanswerable, I'll leave that to be discovered in my Book, whether so, or no. Much less will I Reproach my Adversaries with

with Wilful Ignorance, or Wicked Opposition of Truths they know. For I know that the Mind even of a well meaning Man tho' of Considerable Capacity, may be strangely led aside by some unheeded Rub, or Biase, and receive such an odd turn of Thought from some Occasional Conversation, or Reading, &c. that I do not much Wonder at him, who would perswade us that our Minds are of a different Species; tho I cannot at all allow of his Opinion, thinking I have greater Reason to believe that our strange Differences of Mind are grounded on no *Necessity*, but are truly owing to some Happy, or Unhappy Occasion, tho perhaps *what* hath bin long forgot, and therefore cannot be in particular easily Assign'd. But whatever Mens Opinions may be, or how Unreasonable I may think them, can I but see the least colour of Truth in them, or likely pretence of Conscience for professing them, I can allow that they should be Tolerated (as I would be my self) to speak freely, and heard without prejudice, answered as they deserve, or Slighted if they are trivial and inconsiderable. Now were the Opinions of the *Materialists* which I am about to Oppose, and the contrary Notions which

which I rather intend to Assert, things of little or no Moment, whether true, or false, and but meer Speculations, I should leave them to others that know not how to spend their time to purpose: But whereas the *True Notions, Distinctions, and Tendencies* of *Beings*, are very necessary to be understood, in order to the Regular and Blameless Actings of our *Wills* about them, I cannot content my self without Attempting something concerning *Mind* and *Body*, having for some Years had such a Design, being under some sort of promise to the World, and of late, having had fresh Occasions given me of Thinking on these Matters. But yet, I might perhaps well Excuse or rather Check my Self, in striving to run before, or beyond my Betters; those of larger Capacities, and greater Leisure, may do more than I can Promise, and to such I would willingly resign my Task, were I sure they would but Resolve to Undertake it. But some may think, what has bin done already may well Suffice, and so perhaps should I, if the Scarcity. Language, and Length of some certain Authors, did not make them less useful than I could with something for my *English Reader*, in whose Lan-

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Language I know nothing yet that doth well Answer my Design, or that is altogether consistent with the Notion of the *Mind*, as a *Distinct*, *Substantial*, and *Immortal Being*. But whatever may have bin done by others, whereof I am Ignorant, I may well do my Duty by casting in my Mite together with the Rest, and Appearing, tho it were among a Cloud of Witnesses, for *Mind*, against the many *Gross Bodily Doctrines*, of the Present and Former Ages.

But what I can readily Design to do in this, is not so easy presently to Perform; the *Subjects* are of Sublime, and Uncommon Consideration. Nor should I Attempt any thing in this Matter, had I not bin much Exercis'd in the Consideration of these Things, and had some Assurance in my Self, of an Entire Disengagement from Interests, Parties, and Prejudice; and were I not conscious of my Aversion, and even Incapacity of being very Voluminous, which in a Writer, on this Subject at least, I take to be very Necessary, and Considerable Qualifications. Therefore lest I should seem long, Loitering in the

Preface, I will come to the Discourse
it self, that the Reader may see how
well or ill, I can perform my present
Undertaking.

Vindiciæ

Vindiciæ Mentis

CHAP. I.

*Some Self Evident, and Undeniable Truths,
necessary as Principles, in order to all
Inquiries.*

IT is most certain that there are some Self-Evident, and Undeniable Truths necessary as Principles, in order to all Inquiries. But I know there are Men so fond of Scepticism, that they will even offer to deny every thing; and I have met with a Man ere now so very unreasonable, as still to reply to whatever I could affirm, tho never so plain, *That I had no Reason for it*; who (tho' I suppose he thought himself Witty) to me seem'd Unworthy, as well as incapable of any better Answer than to have it Reported, *That he had no Reason for saying so*. But all Men of Sober Sense will readily agree with one another, in some Principles, which they see, cannot without Folly, and Absurdity be denied, or controverted: And without such Principles, all Discourse would be vain, and Arguments whatever wholly insignificant; instead of Demonstrations, there would be nothing but endless Affirmations, and Denyings,

and there could be no Faith, nor honest Conversation among Men. But now where such Self-Evident Truths appear, there will be a ground of Discourse, and Proof of other things not so apparent. Some such I presume, even our Materialists, and Mortalists will allow that they may deserve and be capable of better Answers, than *Bellarmino* thou liest. And *First Principles, or First Truths*, must needs be no less than *Self-Evident Propositions*: For being the First, they can have no other before them, from which they may be Deduced, or made out to be True. If they be not Self-Evident, they will not be Evident at all, and then there could be no possibility of Evidence.

And of all Self-Evident Propositions, those that are Identical are most apparently Self-Evident. These Truths are the Elements of all others, and whatever Propositions are not resolvable into some or other of these, will hardly ever be found demonstrable. Now whatever we would make out must be proved to be True; either by Reason, or by Revelation. Reason, is to no purpose, without some Ground to Reason on; and the Scripture is no Infallible Testimony, if it be not the Word of God: And we must be First assured that there is a God, before we can suppose a Revelation from him. But we are sure of his Being, if this Identical Proposition be true, that *Self-Existence, is Self-Existence*. But this Proposition if the Words *Self*, and *Existence* be understood, is a Truth supremely self-Evident, and the Ground and Foundation of all other Truths; which Proposition in other Words is, *That God is God*. And all Inferior Truths

Truths, are what they are, because God is what he is. Indeed this Proposition, *Self-Existence* is *Self-Existence*, could not be True, if there were no such Being to verifie it. But the Notion, or Meaning of *Self-Existence*, or *Self-Sufficiency*, being the most perfect Notion that can be thought of, and farthest from non-existence, or a Contradiction, or but a meer possibility of Being, it is apparent that there actually is *Self-Existence*, or a God. As it could not be true, *That Man is Man*, If there were not such a thing as Man to verifie that Proposition. But yet Man may be suppos'd not to be, there being no necessary Existence in the Notion of Man, as there is in *Self-Existence*, without which nothing could be. Moreover *Self-Existence* being the most simple Notion that can possibly be conceived, and more actual then any other Notion of Existence, and necessarily agreeing but to one, it can be no Abstracted Notion; but the Word *is*, must signifie Real Existence, unless the Word Existence could signifie a Contradiction, Chimera, or a Negation of Being. Now on this Bottom, that *God is God*, or *Self-Existence* is *Self-Existence*, we must Build All, or we shall have but a Tottering Fabrick. And from the Attributes necessarily suppos'd and included in the Notion of a *Self-Existent* Being, we have a firm Basis to Build upon, a superstructure of Truths, relating to the Creatures *Mind* and *Body*, both as to their Beings, and Duration. Now our Materialists, and Mortalists must own that *Existence* is *Existence*, and

that there is some *Necessary*, or *Self-Existence*; or that there is actually some *Necessary*, *Self-Sufficient Being*. Neither will they deny that *That which is, is*. That a thing is what it is. That a thing can't be, and not be at the same time. That *That which is not, cannot be Changed*. I need not ask them to grant, That *Body is Body*, or that *Extension is Extension*, nor can it be suppos'd they will be affraid of Affirming That *Mind is Mind*, and *Thinking is Thinking*, or that of *Nothing, Nothing can be Affirmed, or Denied*; or that *Attributes cannot be given, where there is nothing to which they can be Attributed*; but must have actual *Being*, or some *Existence* to be *Attributed unto*. That where *Being Ceases*, all the *Affections* or *Properties of Being* cease. That a thing is the same with it self, and cannot be the same, and not the same. That *Cessation of Being* is most incompatible with *Sameness*. That the whole is more than a part, or That the whole is all the parts taken together. That *One is not Two*, nor *Two but One*, That *Two and One makes Three*, &c. But I will mention no more. Such as these are the Cynosures we must Sail by, to the Haven of Truth; without which, if we steer never so well, we shall split upon the Rocks of Absurdities and Contradictions; and to these we must have a due regard, in the Prosecution of our following Discourse.

C H A P. II.

That a clear Distinction of things is Necessary, in Order to the True and Certain Notions of them; and that the Distinctions most necessary to be made, are the Distinction between God and Creature, Mind and Body.

IT will be apparent by a little Consideration that nothing Clouds and Darkens Truth more than the Confounding, and blending things together which are distinct, and ought to be distinctly and separately considered. As on the other Hand, the wary Distinction of one thing from another, whereby the mistaking of one thing for another, and the giving to one that which belongs to another, is avoyded, tends very much to the clearing of Truth, and begeting adequate Notions of things. Now it is very Necessary that we distinguish not only *Substances*, which are properly call'd things, from meer *Accidents*, but also *Substances* from *Substances*, that is, one thing from another.

And that we never forget the difference between those *Properties* or *Attributes* that are *Essential* to a thing, that is such, without which it cannot be considered, and such as are meerly *Accidental*, or those without which the thing may be, and be considered. Now of all the Differences and Distinctions of *Substances*, the most Eminent and necessary Distinction is to

be made between God, and the Creatures; That is, between the *Self-Existent*, or *Self-Sufficient Being*, and those Things that are *Insufficient in themselves*, and dependant upon him; that we may not unjustly attribute that unto God, which belongs only to the Creature; or that to the Creature, which belongs only to God. Which some not minding, have run into an extream and dangerous Error, perswading themselves that there is nothing but God, or that the whole Universe of things is God. To suppose no God, or nothing but Creatures, they found neither Possible, nor Desirable, any more then it could be to suppose Effects without a Cause, Dependents not Dependent, or to desire not to be. But on the other Hand, had they Reflected upon themselves a little, they would have found themselves so Insufficient for some things, that require infinitely less perfection than Self-Sufficiency or Self-Existence imports, that they would easily have seen that they are but Dependent Beings, and so Infinitely Distinct from that which is Self-Sufficient, and Necessary. Had they but Tryed the Efforts of their Wills, and the Retch of their Understandings, they would have found themselves not always able to satisfie themselves in some, even small things, which they cannot but see, may be done even by Limited Power, and have seen themselves ignorant of things they are sure may be known, even by imperfect Understandings, which imperfections cannot belong to the Self-Existent, or Self-Sufficient Being. Nor can those small Portions of
Being,

Being they find Themselves, or the little Mass of Matter, to which they belong, be parts capable of helping to make up All, or Absolute perfection. Let these Men but tell us *How long they have been*, and they can give us but a *late* account, or *How long they shall be what they desire to be*, and they can give us but a very *Short Insurance*, which is enough to convince them, that they are but Caused, and Dependent Beings, and that there must be some Cause of which they are but the Effects; which Cause and Effects cannot possibly be the same, but must necessarily be distinguished, and that by the greatest Distinction imaginable betwixt Being and Being. But here it is to be Noted, that tho' the Distinction of Beings into *God and Creature*, is the greatest Distinction and Difference, we cannot call it a *Generical Distinction*; for God being but *One necessary Being*, he cannot be said to be of a Kind, or so properly termed a *Divine Being*, as the *Divine Being*, Or a *God*, as *the God*; his absolute Sufficiency admitting of no other such Being, *One Sufficient*, rendering all others unnecessary; and whatsoever is unnecessary, or may be supposed not to be, as another than *One* that is necessary and sufficient may, is not God. Now let us exert our whole Activity, and strain our selves to the utmost, we can have no *Notion*, no, nor *Imagination* of any *Substance*, or *Thing*, but it is either God himself, or a *Creature*; there is no Medium, or Middle Being between these Two, *Self-Existent*, and *Dependent*. Nor can any one *Substance*, or *Being* be

both *Self-Existent*, and *Dependent*, *Self-Sufficient*, and *Insufficient*. To suppose such a thing would be no better than to suppose a Being, to be God, and not God; or *What it is Not*, and *what it is*, at the same time.

As none of the Notions proper to God, or such whereby he is said to be God, can belong to a Creature, so those proper to a Creature cannot belong to God. *Existence*, indeed may be predicated both of God and Creature, yet not equally, or alike, or the same manner of *Existence*; for God is infinitely more *Existent* than Creature, which is merely *Dependent*, and of it self, tending to nothing, or *Non-existence*. And the same Distinction must be made when we say God is a Substance and a Mind. Now Created Substances, or Beings, while they are many, and differing one from another, (tho not so vastly as from God) may be distinguished into Kinds, and the Prime General Distinction whereby all Created Substances can be distinguished, is *that of Mind and Body*. viz. That some Substantial Beings are *Minds*, and others are *Bodies*. Of these Two kinds of Beings we have clear Notions, but of any other Kinds of Substance that comes not under one of these Two, we have no Notion at all, or so much as Imagination, and consequently no Reason to suppose any such Third sort of Being, nor can we with either Wit, or Modesty Affirm it.

And now I must begin to look about me, for here our *Materialists* will tell me, I begin to beg, which I am indeed very unwilling to do

do, especially of those hard Gentlemen, any thing but their Patience, which I hope they will grant me so far as to let me lay down my Assertions before I endeavour to prove them, and they are these. That *Minds and Bodies are Substances, and that of Two Kinds, wholly Distinct and Different.*

That there are Bodies our Materialists, unless they should very much forget themselves, cannot be suppos'd to deny, nor did I ever hear of above one or two Mortals that had attain'd to such a Sense-Denying Conceit as to suppose that there is no material Substance, which Paradox of theirs, deserves to be took notice of only for its oddness, or to shew that there is nothing so evident, but some may be so Foolish as to deny it. Such a Pretty fellow was he who denied that there was Motion, and both these Merry Whims might be confuted alike Merrily. But as the Materialists are the most likely Men in the World, to own the being of Matter, so I believe they will readily grant, That *Bodies in General are Substances*, unless some who are of the most Gross Conceit, and Vulgar Education, who will not have any thing to be a Substance but what is *Thick*, or *Hard*; that is, that which is compos'd of Particles which lie snug, or close together, so that with them a piece of Gold, or Lead, or a Stone is a Substance; but a Feather, or Air, is not a Substance. Indeed a Cube of Gold for Instance, has certainly more of Being than a Cube of Water, or Air of the same Dimension, but these are Beings that come under the Head of Substance, or Thing, as much as that:
And

And we say *Mind is more a Substance, than any or All, Body*. Taking Substance, as all Men that have cultivated their Reason by Liberal Education do, for a *Being, or Thing*, in distinction from accidents, or certain considerabilities of a Thing, and especially those modes of our considering a thing without which the thing may be, and be considered.

As an Apple, for Instance, is a Material Substance, or Subject of Divers Qualities, as suppose Yellowness, Redness, Smoothness, Sweetness, ness, Roundness, &c. without some of which we may have the Notion of an Apple. But it must be considered by some certain Notions, or other which make it what it is, or are Essential to it, and without which it cannot be considered, which Notions are not divers from it, but are only our divers ways of considering the thing, (not being able to have one single Notion of it) and are nothing but certain Modes of Extension, or Quantity, which must be considered as Essential to an Apple, or that wherein its being an Apple consists, and which cannot be pared away from it as meerly accidental, without paring away its very Being. Now the *Essence or Being of a Thing consists in That which is so conceived in the thing, that altho nothing else were conceived in it, it may nevertheless be conceived as Existing; and that so, as That only being suppos'd, there will follow a Series of Modes, and Attributes of which That it self is the immediate Subject*. As Extension, or Quantity is so the Essence of what we call Body, that it cannot be considered without it; but that being considered, will be the subject

subject of all the Varieties of matter, and of some things not Essential to it, as Motion, or Rest, for instance, without which Body may be considered.

C H A P. III.

The Being of Mind proved, and that Mind and Body are not the same, but Distinct : That the Notion of Substance agrees as well to Mind, if not better to Mind than to Body.

WE now come to prove the Being and Substantiality of Mind.

In the *First Place*, I say this Proposition,

That Mind is, or that there is Mind ; is to me and others most certain, if I have a certainty of my own Being. Some will say perhaps I am deceived, I do but suppose ; I am uncertain whether I am or no. Well, if any can suppose so, let them, and let me be deceived, let me but suppose, and that what they will, let me believe Fancies for Truth, it matters not, this will infallibly remain a Truth to me, *That I am.*

If I am not, I cannot be deceived, I cannot suppose, or believe either Truth or Falshood. But I do suppose, and believe, whether Truth, or Falshood, it matters not ; or whether Men say I
am

am deceived, or no, it is nothing against this one Self-Evident Truth, *I am*; or *my own Being is self-evident to me*; and they confess it whoever say *I am something*; deceived perhaps or but supposing: For there must be some Being of which all these things are said, or that but supposes. For of *nothing*, *nothing can be Affirmed, or Denied*; of *nothing there can be no Action, or Pation*. So that now I have found my self so far infallible, that there can be no possibility of Doubt to me of my own Being, or Deception in this Proposition, *That I am*; and *I cannot so much as suppose that I am not*, nor can any one else, without Contradicting himself, who says you are mistaken; for the *You*, that is supposed the subject of the mistake, he Affirms, *must be something*, or he says *nothing*. Now as *I am infallibly sure of some Truth*, or have some certain knowledge of one Truth at least, viz. *That I am*:

The Next thing to be Considered is *What I am*.

And *I cannot possibly have a more certain knowledge of what I am*, than by the Experience of what *I may find my self to be*. And what is it that *I find my self to be*? Why, according to all the Experience I have of my *Self or Being*, or that *I see my self capable of having*, I am *Cogitation or Mind*, and nothing else; whilst *I was but supposing, Imagining, Fancying, or Believing*, what was *I but thinking*? Supposing, Imagining, &c. are nothing but

but Thinking and what was *I* when *I* knew or understood my self to be, but thinking truly that *I* was? What is an Intelligence, or Understanding, but a Mind, or Thinking? And what is desiring, or being pleas'd with knowing, but thinking? What Understands, or is pleas'd, but Understanding or Will? And what is Understanding and Will, but Mind or Cogitation, and what is Conscience, but the experience, or reflex knowledge of all our Thoughts? And what is Sense, or the Perception of any thing, that is the Object of thought, whether received after the manner we call seeing, or hearing, or feeling, &c. but Understanding, or Knowledge? And what is that but Cogitation, or Mind? So that howsoever *I* consider my self, *I* find my self to be the one simple thing Cogitation, or Mind, variously receiving, or applying to various Objects.

Well, It is most evident to me that *I am*; and my Opponents, if *I* have any, acknowledge me to be, by opposing me, by objecting that *I* am deceived: For they oppose, or object to something. And the first thing self-evident to every Person is the reality of their own Being. And by the Experience *I* have of my self, *I* find what *I* am, and all that *I* am, and that is Mind, or Cogitation. If *I* were any thing else, *I* should be aware of it. Self cannot be unknown to Self. The Difficulty of knowing ones Self, that is us'd to be talkt of, lies in the Knowledge of Self morally consider'd, not Physically. But the Mind is known to its self, and perceives all that is in it, and
it

it is known no otherwise than as Thinking ; and by Thinking however considered.

But it may be objected by the Materialists. *That it is true that there is Cogitation or Mind, Yet perhaps Mind and Body are but two Words for the same Thing, diversly considered.* Or

Secondly, *That Mind or Cogitation is not a Substantial Being or Thing the Subject of Properties, Modes, Accidents, Qualities &c. but it self only a Mode, Property, Accident, Action, or Passion of something else which is more properly a Substance or Thing, and that it is most probably an Action, or Passion, accident, or mode of the Substance or Thing call'd Body, or Matter ; and if not so, yet of some unknown Thing, of which we have no Notion.*

To the answering of which Objection, we shall endeavour to make good these following Propositions.

First. That Mind and Body are not the Same, but two Things wholly different, and distinct.

Secondly. That the Notion of Substance, or Thing, agrees as well, if not better, to Mind than to Body.

Thirdly. That Mind, or Cogitation is not a Property, Mode, Accident, Action, or Passion, or the Effect of the Body, or some other thing unknown. And that Body can do nothing, especially

specially that it cannot think; but is universally Inactive, and caused as to Being, and Modes, And that all Sense is Thought, and not inherent in Body.

That Mind, and Body are not the same.

If Mind, and Body were the same we were but in a poor Condition having talked hitherto to no purpose, but how shall we know, you will say, that they are distinct? Very well. As easily as we can know any two Things, a Horse and a Hand-saw for Instance, not to be the same; and much more easily may we perceive the difference between Mind, and Body than that between any two Bodies, by a little attention. As for a meer verbal difference or agreement of things, there is many times little or nothing in it. We all know that thro' the Imperfection of Languages one thing is often call'd by divers Names, and divers things have but one word, or Name, to denote them, And that in one and the same Language, And that words are often used without any regard to their Etymologies, from whence there arises some Confusion, especially to those that stick in words, and suppose they naturally signifie things. For Instance, the adorable Self-existent Being in Hebrew is call'd *Jehovah, Jah, Adonai, Elohim, Heljon, Schaddai* &c. and most or all these Names have been given to some Creatures or other. So that kind of Being which I find and affirm my self to be, has been commonly call'd in English Soul, Spirit, Mind, without making any distinction or having any different Notions of the words and the Hebrew words *Nepheesh, Neshemah, Ruah, Leb,* and

and the Greek *Pseuche*, *Pneuma*, *Nous*, have been likewise indifferently used, as we shall have occasion to consider when we come to the Scripture light in this matter. The English word *Cock* is given to divers things which have little or no relation. Now to those that are somewhat skill'd in Languages these things will be but of little difficulty, and it is certain that as words signifie nothing but by use, so we may have the Notion of things without them, tho' we cannot communicate our Notions, or discourse together without words either sounded, or written.

But the Difference of things is to be taken from the different Notions or Conceptions we have of them. And it is certain that men have a long time used the words *Mind*, and *Body*, and those that answer to them in other Languages, and that by them they have not meant one and the same thing, but have had two very different Notions of *Mind* and *Body*, at least if they attended to what they find in their own thoughts, they might see, that they do not think of the one, as they do of the other. The Notion of *Mind* being compleated, and exhausted in Cogitation, or Thinking, and having nothing else in it; That of *Body* in Quantity or Extension, which is all it has essential to the Notion of it. Now if we consider the thing we shall find that whether *Mind receive*, or *suffer Knowledge, Notices, Perceptions, Sensations, Imaginations &c.* they are all the one Thing, Cogitation, or Mind diversified only, as to the manner of reception
or

The Distinction of Mind and Body. 17

or of the thing received into the Mind. Or whether Mind *Act*, viz. will, or determine it self to, or against any thing it perceives, or imagines, &c. It is still nothing but the one thing Cogitation, or *Mind*, so or so determining it self. *Mind*, as it receives, or suffers, and as it acts, or does, is still, the one thing, Thinking, differently Suffering or Acting. On the other hand, consider *Body*, how you can, as Much, Little, Hard, Soft, White, Black, Angular, Round, Conick, &c. all these Considerabilities are but divers Modes of the one thing Quantity, or Extension. But now if you should endeavour to change these Considerations which are the Properties of *Mind*, and *Body*, you would find nothing but Absurdity, and Nonsense. You cannot say a *Mind* an Ell long, or a Pound of Thought, a Triangular Understanding, or Round Desire, &c. Nor can you with any better Sense say a Loving Square, or a Knowing Globe, or the Like. So that we find that the Notions of *Mind*, and *Body*, or *Thinking*, and *Quantity*, agree in nothing but Existence; unless, as they are both Created Beings, Passiveness may be considered in both; yet this Passiveness must be understood to differ as much as sensible Perceptions, or Knowledge, do from Motion, or being stirr'd without any Perception at all, of which perhaps we may have occasion to say something before we have done. By these Considerations I think it is apparent that *Mind* and *Body*, or Cogitation, and Quantity, are not the same thing under Two Names, but things of different kinds, and so different that the Notion of the One, is not contained in, or at all be-
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18 *The Distinction of Mind and Body.*

longing to the Notion of the Other. And any Materialist must acknowledge, if he is Ingenious, that he does not mean the same thing by *Body* and *Mind*. When he says, *I am of the Mind*, or *I think that the Immateriality and Immortality of the Mind, or of Thinking, is a Mistake*; he does not mean that he is of the *Quantity*, of the *Figure*, or of the *Motion*, or that he is *so much*, *so extended*, or *so stirr'd*, that the Immateriality, and Immortality of the *Matter* or the *Quantity*, or the *Body*, is a mistake; no, he has no such Absurdities in his Notions; he does not mean by *Mind* a *Machine*, or a parcel of *Pipes*, and *Bladders full of Liquors*, tied to one another and hang'd upon *Stakes*, and Bound up in a *Leathern Bag* together. No, he can at worst but suppose that the *Mind*, or *Thinking*, is some *Trick* or other, this *Engine*, or *Fardel of Stuff*, performs; or that the *Engine* is the Substance in which are the *Accidents*, *Actions*, or *Passions*, or *Properties*, call'd *Understanding*, and *Will*, that is, *Cogitation*; and not that *Mind*, or *Cogitation*, is the Machine it self.

In Answer to which I say, that *Mind*, or *Cogitation* is it self a thing, or Substance; which brings me to the Second thing I propos'd.

That the Notion of Substance, or thing, agrees as well, if not better, to *Mind*, than to *Body*; and if so, *Mind* it self is at least, as likely to be a Substance or Thing, as the *Body*, and not an Accident of it, or of any other Substance. Now if we take Substance, or Thing, for the Subject of Modes, or Accidents, what is there that we can conceive more so than *Mind*, or *Cogitation*? The various *Actions*, and *Passions*
about

That Substance agrees to Mind, &c. 19

about Innumerable Particular Objects, the Qualities, and Habits, &c. *Mind* may be the Subject of, are so many, and so experimentally known to us all, that methinks it can be no Question to any whether *Mind* be the Subject of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, Anger, Fear, Hope, &c. or whether it be *Cogitation* that suffers such various Perceptions of Innumerable Objects, and determines it self so variously about them. That *Mind* is the Subject of these Modes, or Accidents, I say I should think can be no question to any, unless to such who think the questioning, what they best know, will make them appear Wittily singular. But now if the being a Subject of Modes, and Accidents, makes a Substance, that which is a Subject of the most Modes, and Accidents, is therefore most properly a Substance; but who does not see that *Mind*, is capable of more Modifications than *Body*; especially if they consider that all the Modes or Accidents of *Body* conceivable, may become the Objects of *Mind* modified according to all those various perceptions; and moreover, that *Mind* has innumerable Actions, and Passions, about another sort of Objects wholly abstracted from matter; as is apparent to all that have been conversant in Metaphysicks, Logicks, Ethicks, and Divinity; and the one Object God, with his Infinite Perfections, is an Object of Everlasting Cogitations; from and about whom, the *Mind* is capable of innumerable Perceptions, and Actions, were there no matter, or *Body* in being.

But if any should be discontented with the Notion of Substance, or Thing, laid down, we will undertake to admit any other that we can make good Sense of, and yet prove *Mind* the most Substantial sort of Being. Indeed if by Substance we must mean nothing but that which is *Hard*, or Matter, the particles whereof lie close together in rest, then we will readily grant that the greatest part even of Bodily Nature is not Substantial, and Mind nothing less; but if on that account we might not argue the *Mind* a Substance, yet it would be nevertheless a *Thing*, or *Being*, in distinction from a meer Accident. Farther, if by *Substance*, or *Thing*, we mean that which is real in opposition to Imaginary, then *Mind* will appear to be the most real of All things; for we may suppose *Body* not to be, or that we are deceived, and have but a false imagination instead of a real Notion of any thing but *Mind*; but we can never suppose that there is no such thing as *Mind*, or *Thinking*, for when we but Suppose, or Imagine, we are certain we do Suppose, or Imagine, and Supposing, or Imaging, is nothing but Thinking, or *Mind*, so and so varied; so that whatever we may suppose not *Real*, we can never suppose *Mind*, or *Thinking*, not *Real*; and that which we cannot suppose not *Real*, must needs have the Title of *Reality*, rather than that which we can suppose not *Real*. So that if *Real*, and *Substantial* be the same, the *Mind* is more a Substance than the *Body*. But again, if that which is most Durable, or Unchangeably the same, be meant by Substance, then *Mind* will have the Prerogative; for we see Bodies

dies Changeable, and Actually changed every Day. My Body is but little of it, the same Numerical matter (if in part) that it was at my Birth ; the Quantity of it now is perhaps above Ten times more than it was then, which could not be without a Daily Addition of other matter to all parts of it, and I am sure there has been a daily wearing off, of some parts by Attrition, and Evaporation, so that tho' we should suppose it the same Organization, yet it is daily new matter Organized. But my Mind has bin the same Numerical Mind from my beginning, tho' the Objects I have thought on, have been various, and I have thought differently on them, yet I have still bin one and the same thing, *Mind*, or *Cogitation*, and have borrowed nothing of the being of another mind ; and as long as I have a Being, or can be supposed to have a Being, I shall be the self same simple Being, *Mind*, and might well be so, if God had Created no other Being.

But again, If that may be thought a Substance which is most Perfect or Capable of Perfections, and that most Substantial which is capable of most Perfections, then I say the Mind on this account is more Substantial then Body.

Whatever Perfections Body is capable of, as far as I can see, or have ever heard made out, lies in the Varieties and Agreements of insensible Figures, and Motions, which in themselves are neither better nor worse, but so, or so, in relation to Mind, as capable of being the occasions of more or less Pleasure to it. But Mind is capable of Innumerable Perfections.

22 *That Substance agrees to Mind, &c.*

The Self-Sufficient, or Self-Existent Mind, is the Subject of Absolute, and Infinite Perfections; and the Created, or Dependent Mind of very many, as *Wisdom*, and *Goodness*, the Knowledge of Truth, and Due, or Just Actions of the Will thereon; the Consciousness of it self, and of all things that occur as Objects to it, with the resulting pleasure of Truth, and Goodness experienced; and above all the Contemplation and Love of the All-perfect Authour of all things; which are Perfections Body, or Matter is incapable of, but Mind properly adapted to. Therefore if Perfection entitle a thing any whit to be a Substance, or Thing, Mind is more, or rather such, than Body. But methinks I hear my Materialists still murmuring, That Mind, or Thinking, may possibly be but a Mode, Property, Accident, Action or Passion, or Effect of our Dear Body, some way or other organized, or at least of some unknown thing; which brings me to the Third thing I propos'd, in order to the Distinction of Mind and Body.

C H A P. IV.

*That Mind or Thinking is not a Property,
Mode, or Action, or Passion of Body, or,
of some unknown Thing.*

Self is first, and best known of any thing.

Mind a more Perfect Being than Body.

*Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking
given it.*

All Sensations are Thoughts.

WHAT has bin said already of the Distinction of Mind and Body, whereby it is apparent that by Mind and Body, is not meant one and the same thing. That the Notion of One, is not included in the Notion of the Other, or Essential thereto; and so neither, an Essential Mode or Property of the other, and that the Notion of Substance or Thing, is Applicable to Both, might be enough to obviate or excuse what I may say farther on this Third Head. Yet in as much as I take the clear Distinction of Mind and Body, or the Truth, whatever it be in this matter, to be of great Moment; and I find the Materialists very tenacious of their Opinion, and not very apt to draw the true natural Inferences of Premises laid down against them: I think it not unnecessary to proceed a little farther in this matter, or at least Argue still on what has bin laid down in the former Propositions.

If Mind and Body are not one, and the same thing, as is apparent, they must be either Two *Divers Substances* or *Things*, or *Divers Modes*, or *Accidents* of one *Substance*, or *Thing*; or *Divers Modes*, or *Accidents*, of more *Substances* or *Things*. But it is apparent by what has bin said, that they are both *Substances*, or *Things*; and Consequently *Mind*, which is not only a *Substance*, or *Thing*, but rather to be called so, than *Body*, cannot be a *Mode*, or *Accident* of *Body*, unless one *Substance* could be an *Accident* of another; which would be no better than to say, a *Substance* may be, not a *Substance*, or something else than what it is. But it may be said (and I shall not only grant, but affirm it) That some *Modes* or *Properties* of *Things* are *Essential* to the *Things*, or such *considerabilities* of the things as are not different from their *Essence*, but in our manner of considering them under more *Notions*; but then it is most apparent that those *Modes* or *Properties* are such as are included in the *General* *Notion* of the thing, and such without which we cannot consider it. But *Mind* and *Body* are no such *Notions* as are included in one another, but are as different as possible in the whole *Consideration* of them, and therefore the one cannot be an *Essential* *Mode* or *Property* of the other.

But perhaps after all we have said, some may persuade themselves that *Mind* and *Body* are but *Modes* of one *Thing*, viz. of *Being*. To which we answer, That *Being* as undetermined to this or that particular *Thing* existing, is most but a *Capacity* to *Being*, and no real

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Existence; and so cannot be the Subject of Properties, or Modes that actually are. So the Fancy that some have had of *Substance* as an abstract Notion undetermined to this or that, to which they have added, *Cogitation or Extension*, I believe has bin the occasion of much Confusion in this matter; whereas this undetermined Substance is not, but in the Minds of inconsiderate Men (and not so much in reality as the *undetermined matter* of the *Hermettick Philosophers*) arising only from the consideration of particulars first, existing as such, and such. So that there must actually be *Mind* and *Body* first, before there can be a Notion of a Substance capable of Thinking, or being Extended, for abstract notions are taken from particulars. Now if Mind, and Body cannot be different Modes of one thing, much less can they be Modes or Accidents of more things: For as there is nothing conceiveable existing but particulars, and there being but two Kinds of them, *Minds and Bodies*, to be found, or so much as imaginable; *Bodies* and *Minds* cannot be supposed to be the Modes, or Accidents of Divers unknown things without the greatest Folly in affecting to be Ignorant, where we have, or may have the clearest Knowledg; like some who believe, or value nothing in Religion like that which is Unintelligible, or Incomprehensible. *Credunt quia est, impossibile.* But yet some will deny Mind to be a Substance or Thing, because Mind is well known; but *Substances* or *Things*, they fancy we know nothing of: Accidents say they, are the only Objects of our Understanding. I answer, That
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Accidents or Modes of Things, are not distinct Beings from the Things, but various Considerations of the Things, or the Things diversly considered, and some or other such Considerations are Essential to the Things, and make them what they are, and differ only Notionally.

But to Proceed, It is supposed by some that God may give a *Power of Thinking*, to matter some way or other fitly dispos'd ; at least that none has ever demonstrated the Contrary, and whether it be demonstrable, is to them a Question ; But if God can give a Power of Thinking to *Matter*, it may be he has done it, and then what need we suppose any thing else to think but matter. I Answer, Those that say none has demonstrated that matter can't have a Power to Think, I believe are not sure of it, not certainly knowing all that has been writ, or said on this Subject. But I am minded to examine a little what there is in the Question, and to try whether there be such a mighty difficulty in it or no : And I am apt to think that the meer stating the Question aright, or enquiring into the meaning of it, may be enough to decide it without any Mathematical Demonstration, or nice Pair of Compasses.

Quest. Whether God can give a Power of Thinking to some System of Matter?

Ans. I do not love to say God cannot do so, or so, or to Question what he can do ; tho
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some Scripture Expressions would excuse it. But I will rather put it, *Whether God can be supposed to give a Power of Thinking to some System of Matter.* And I say God cannot be suppos'd so to do, by any that take the true Sense of the Question. And it will be acknowledged by all men of sense that God can't do, or be suppos'd to do, any thing that is absurd, or implies a contradiction, or is unbecoming him.

But let us see what is in this Question: And that we may do so, There are three Things in it to be considered apart; and then when the sense is put together, we shall have the Soul and Strength of it. And the Three things are *Matter, Thinking, and Power.* As to the two First, Matter and Thinking, we must needs be so far agreed, the very Question supposing it, that they are not one and the same, that is, that we have two distinct Notions, of Matter, and of Thinking, and that the Notion of the one, does not contain or necessarily imply the Notion of the other; If it did, the Question would be chang'd, and be no other than *Whether God may be supposed to give a Power to matter to be, or have, what is Essential to matter, which would be impertinent.* That matter is a Substance, or thing, is own'd on both sides; and that Matter is Quantity, some how or other figured, I believe will not be denied; but tho' I think I have said enough to make it appear that *Mind, or Thinking* is also a Substance or Thing, yet because this Question seems to suppose Thinking but an Action or Passion, and enquires whether

whether it may not be an Action, or Passion of Body, I will here pass by the Consideration of the Substantiality of Thinking, and will not say that Matter, and Thinking are two distinct Substances, and argue thence the Impossibility of one created *Substance* having a *Power* to be, or cause another, but I will only say *That Matter is a Substance*, which may be consider'd without considering that somewhat else, whether *Action*, or *Passion*, call'd *Thinking*; and *Thinking* is a Somewhat else, whether *Action*, or *Passion*, that may be consider'd without considering, or implying Matter. By the third Thing, *Power*, must be meant some sort of Capacity of being an Efficient, or Cause, in relation to an Effect. So that the Sense of the Question is, *Whether God may be supposed to cause Matter, or a Thing that has nothing of the Notion of Thinking in it, by something or other it has in it to be the cause of Thinking; or have the Notion of Thinking necessarily annexed to it (being Figur'd and moved so or so) as an Effect to its Cause.* And who now may not see the Absurdity of this Question? That God should cause *That*, which at the same time has nothing in it of the Nature of the Effect, or implying the Effect, to be the Cause of that Effect: That which has nothing of Agency in its Notion, at the same time to be an Agent, is to suppose a thing may by the Will of God, *be what it is, and what it is not also at the same time.* Whatsoever is Essential to the Notion of Matter, is some *Figure*, or other; and what is properly Accidental to it, is Motion, or being stirr'd. Let us take what Figure you please, or
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how many Figures you please conjoy'nd ; divide them and unite them, or move them, however can be imagin'd, here is nothing of Casualty or Agency at all in the whole Notion of the matter, especially to such a suppos'd Effect as Thinking; or more in one Figure or sort of Motion than in Another, or in one Quantity of Body more than in all. And if there be nothing in the Notion of matter, or Extension, but Matter or Extension, and nothing can be supposed to be in a thing but what is in it, while it is what it is, and *no Creature can give what it has not* : Then Matter cannot be supposed to give or cause Cogitation or Thinking. So that if thinking be, God is the Cause of it ; and his Power, not another Power given to Matter, produces the Effect: And if there be Thinking, it will be its Self an Agent, and sensible Patient distinct from matter, and Matter from it; and the one still may be supposed without the other, as independent on it. But if Matter loses the Notion of Matter, it ceases to be Matter; and consequently ceases to be ; and what ceases to be, cannot be another Thing, any more than the Cause of another Thing. But to yield as much as possible, Let us suppose that there may be some System of matter first, to which God may add or give a Power of Thinking, it can be no more than this, God first made a System of Matter, *Adam* for Instance, and then he added to make a Power of Thinking, that is a Mind, and caused it to be concern'd with that System of matter ; but there is nothing of Matter's Thinking in all this ; and matter is no more but matter still, and Thinking no less than

than Thinking; two Things still essentially distinct, and different.

But some perhaps will say, That tho' we can see nothing of Agency possible to be suppos'd in Matter, yet there must sure be Passions; yea that they experience it, while their Senses are Passions, &c. and are received by the Eyes, Ears, &c. material Organs. I answer, If by Passion be meant a sensible Reception of Impressions; that is not in the Organs but in the Mind; for Seeing and Hearing, &c. is no less than Thinking of the things seen. and heard; as the seeing a Tree, or House, is no less than having the Tree or House in the Mind, or knowing that there is a Tree or House. All Matter is indeed Passive viz. *caus'd to be, and may be stirr'd, or divided*, but has no sensibility of its *Being, Motion, or Division*. The Notion of it has no connexion with Objects; But *Mind*, or Thinking, always implies Object; we cannot say think, but we must imply thinking of something, *God, Self, or something else*. But there is yet a Sort or two of Accidents, or Modes of Being above all the rest, that the Materialists are strongly perswaded that the Mind, or Thinking, ought to be referred to, which makes them most unwilling to think Mind it self to be a Substance, and that is Action, or Passion; perswading themselves that there can be no Action or Passion, but there must be some Agent, and Patient, as a Thing distinct, in which these are. To which I answer, That the Mind is indeed *Active and Passive*; *Passive* as receiving Sensations, or perceiving or understanding

standing the being of its Objects ; and *Active*, as the Will determines it self, in relation to those Sensations, or the being of those its Objects. But an *Action*, or *Passion* is properly the determination of the *Will* about, or reception of some particular Object, and in this Sense *Mind*, or *Thinking*, is not properly call'd an Action, or Passion ; because by *Thinking* or *Mind*, we do not mean any such particular determination, or reception : But *Mind*, or *Thinking*, is that which necessarily has, some Objects or other, (tho' not necessarily this or that) about which it is determined, and such variable Action, and Passion, is essential to created *Mind* ; and we must not forget all *Substances* have some Modes or Properties, or if you will Accidents without which they cannot be consider'd, being but more ways of considering the same Things, and not such as may or may not be in them. So we say, and without all absurdity, that it is essential to *Mind* to perceive and act, or that its Essence consists in Action and sensible Perception ; or that these are Modes without which *Mind* cannot be conceived ; and if *Thinking* must be conceived as an Action or Passion of something, it is very proper to say *Mind thinks* or *perceives*, and *determines* it self to *this*, or *that* ; and much more proper than to say *Quantity*, or *Extension*, or *Figure*, or *Motion*, *Round*, *Square*, *Swift*, &c. *Thinks*, when the Notion of *Mind* implies *Thinking*, or *Perception*, and *Determination of Thinking*, to some Object ; but *Quantity*, or *Figure* implies no such thing ; nor is it so
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very strange that there should be an Attribution of Identity (if I may use such an Expression) to wit when the Something is Attributed to the Same, whilst all Considerate Men hold with good Reason, that *whatsoever* is in God, *is* God; so that it is properly said, that it is Almighty Will, that wills Almightily, and Omniscient Understanding, that Understands all things, and not something that is neither of these, that is called God. Besides, if it be urg'd that Mind cannot be consider'd but as an Action or Passion of something else that is not Thinking (as has bin said) it must be Body, or Matter that thinks ; where-ever there is Thinking, there being no Notion of any thing else besides *Mind*; and to suppose any thing else, is but to feign ; and then it will follow that God is matter, or some Fiction, and what Absurdities will be the Consequents of such a Supposition, those that see not, I hope will be informed, ere we have done, when we come to Assert that God himself is pure Mind.

Moreover, Mind cannot be said to be but an Action, or Passion of something else, the Agent or Patient, because Mind or Cogitation acts upon it self, and receives Perceptions of it self, and is its own Object, which is most apparent; and which could not be well said of meer Actions and Passions.

C H A P. V.

The Objection of the Materialist, and inconsiderate opinion of some others, that we do not always Think, Fairly stated, and Answered. The Absurdity of the Supposition, that Thinking sometimes wholly ceases, discovered. That we Think when Asleep, Demonstrated.

BUT there is another Objection which the Materialists have raised and seem to keep as their strongest hold, which if not demolished, I confess all we can say will signify nothing, and that is, *That we do not always Think; But if Mind or Thinking were a Substance, or Thing, it ought to be always in Actual Being: For if it Cease wholly but for a Moment, tho' Thinking should be the next Moment, it would be a new Mind, not the same numerical Mind. and this is not only urged by the Materialists but thought to be demonstrated by some that disown the opinion, of those who think that there is no Substance but Matter: And the Materialists reckon it so much the stronger against us, because some others of considerable Note, have happen'd to be so far of their Opinion. But I think on*
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the other Hand, that if *I* can utterly overthrow this Objection, and the ground of it, it will go a great way towards proving *Mind*, or *Cogitation*, to be a *Substance*, or *Real Being*; when tho' it be changeable as to its different Applications to its different Objects, yet as to its Continuance of Being, it is unchangeable, and durable, Uninterrupted Thinking. Or to speak as plain as possible, I may truly say that I have bin between these Thirty and Forty, Years, and never did in all that time cease to think one Moment, or ever shall while I am *I*. But before I go to prove this point, it will not be unnecessary to examine the Arguments us'd for the Materialists, whereby they perswade themselves that we do not always think. Whilst we are Awake, they Confess and Grant that we always think; but whilst we are Asleep, say they, we do not think, unless in Dreams, and then we are not soundly or truly Asleep: But when we are asleep and don't dream (as some never do) we do not think, because we are not sensible, or conscious that we do, and it is impossible we should think, but that we must be Conscious that we think. But I Answer, That it is not necessary that even whilst awake, we should be always *actually* sensible, or Conscious of our own Thoughts; for we may be so strongly affected by the Perceptions of some Objects, that we may not reflect presently on our own Perceptions; and some perceptions may be so slight, and remis, and our Wills so little determined by them, that they may pass

pass almost as if we had had no such Perceptions; as every slight touch of the Body, tho' really a perception or Thought, is not Reflected on. But this is not all that is to be said; they say we are not Conscious, or sensible that we Think in Sleep. Well: Must I mean *I* am not to Day at Twelve of the Clock, for Instance, conscious that *I* Thought at Twelve last Night? This is nothing to the purpose. *I* cannot be Conscious to Day what *I* Thought last Night, such a time, unless I remember what *I* Thought, but I am as little Conscious, or do as little Remember, what *I* thought t'other Day at Twelve of the Clock, as of what *I* Thought when Asleep the last Night. Will it follow, I did not think the other Day such a time, because *I* don't remember it? Not at all. I may as well say I did not Think, till *I* was Three, or Four Years Old, because I remember not that I did; the Impressions *I* then had, being but Weak, or the Notices I took of things but small, those I have had since; more considerable, are apt to be remember'd, and the other not; yet my Mother, who took greater notice of me, than I did of things then, has told me I asked Questions, and was sensibly affected with things within that time. And I have known a Person Asleep (with Eyes fast, and so the Objects of sight shut out, a Sound Sleeper, and so under all the disadvantages of the greatest Remission of Sense in Sleep) Answer Questions, and Discourse Rationally, even of visible Objects, as long as I thought fit to continue the Dialogue; who yet never Dream'd,

or Remembred what Thoughts then pass'd. So that it is manifest that it doe's not follow I did not think, because I dont remember my slightly Transient Thoughts. But tho' it will not do to say we were not then sensible because we are not now sensible, or remember that we then were, perhaps they will yet assert, that they were not then sensible that they Thought; but then I will ask them how they know that they were not then sensible, that they Thought? Do they remember they were not sensible of any such thing? If they say Yes, they prove they did then think, because remembering, is but Thinking what one Thought before, and Thinking that one did so Think. So that this is as much as to say when they were Asleep they Thought they did not Think. To which I say, tho' it were possible to have such a false Thought, yet *That* was Thinking, and so proves against them. By these Considerations I Think the Slightness of their Arguments is not only manifest, but the contrary most likely to be true. But I shall urge something farther, whereby the Thing will be past all doubt to those that consider. It is most Evident that all Sensations, as Hearing, Feeling, Seeing, &c. are the Perceptions of Material Objects, and to perceive an Object is to Know, or Think, that there is such an Object, whether the Perception be a simple, or complex Notion, or whether we reflect on it or no, it matters not: As to Feel, is to perceive something touch our Body. Now it is certain that we
feel

feel and hear when fast Asleep ; Because it were impossible a Sound, or Stroke, for Instance, should awaken a Sleeping Man, unless he be capable of Perceiving the Impression, that is, Thinking on the Object whilst yet Asleep. For the Effect cannot go before the cause. But a Man may be awakened by a Sound, or Stroke, if the Organs have but the due Conditions upon which those Sensations are commonly to be received ; I say commonly, because certain dispositions of the Organs, are the common condition to which God does annex the Perception of material Objects. But it is not unreasonable to Think that God can give the Perception, or Knowledge of a Body, and its Qualities, to a pure Mind, if he can be suppos'd able to make one, of which something anon.

But it is farther to be considered that if the Essence of Mind consist in Thinking (and none of those that deny it, can tell us what remains to Mind when Cogitation ceases) then every time that we cease to think, we cease to be Intelligent Beings, and New Minds are made to the Body every Morning ; which is Absur'd to suppose. But they will say that tho Thinking ceases, yet a power to Think remains in something or other. I answer, it is not in Mind, for upon the Cessation of Thinking nothing of Mind is left. It cannot be in Body, because matter has nothing of Agency, or Efficiency in the Nature of it. There can therefore be a Power to cause Thinking only in God ; and to cause something to be, when there is nothing, is to

create; and so, as I said but now, there must be a New Mind Created every Morning; and yet we find our selves the same, after the soundest Sleep. But if we should suppose, with them, that when Thinking ceases, there is something in us wherein this meer Power of Thinking remains, then I ask why don't it exert that Power always, and Actually Think. Now the Reason why it don't, must needs be either because it can't, or because it won't. But then I say, If it can't Think, it has no Power to Think; and to say a Thing has Power to do, and yet don't do, because it can't, is a Contradiction. Well then it must be because it won't Think, and if it don't Think because it won't, it Wills not to Think, and Willing is an Action, and Thinking it Self, which cuts the very Throat of the Supposition. So that nothing can have a Power to Think, but whilst it actually exerts that Power.

There is another argument for the Actuality of Thinking in Sleep, that will be of more Force with some Materialist, than any Reason, or Demonstration; but being from Scripture, we shall pass it till we come to the Scripture Light in these matters.

To Conclude this Point, If it be True that a Man may think whilst Asleep, and does sometimes so as all confess, or must own (if what we have said be considered) he may Think
always,

always, as well as at sometimes, and must be suppos'd so to do, without Admitting the greatest Absurdities.

Hitherto we have been Endeavouring to Prove that Mind is a *Substance*, or *Thing*, and as much a Substance as *Matter*, if not more: And that *Mind* is a more *Real*, and *Perfect Being* than *Matter*. Now,

We come to make it out, That *Mind* is the *Most Perfect Being*, or that The *Most Perfect Being*, viz. *God himself*, is *Meer* or *Pure Mind*.

D 4

C H I A P.

CHAP. VI.

That God is meer Mind, with the Absurdity of supposing otherwise.

Infinite Space beyond the World, Absurd.

God not Infinitely Extended, or Locally Omnipresent.

A Being capable of all Real Perfection, can be nothing but a Mind.

God Represented more by Mind than by Body, and thence the Being, and Perfection of Mind Argued.

Mind and Body only Dependent on God, as to Being, and Continuance.

The Business of Generation Stated.

How far the Parent is a Cause in Generation.

The Mind not Generated.

THE Materialists are of Opinion I know, some of them, that God is Body, and all of them would Think so, if they were consistent with themselves: For if it be Body that Thinks in us, why not in God? He, they may suppose, is a more Curious Machine producing most Admirable fine Thoughts. But I must tell

tell them, especially those that believe him to be an Infinite, or All perfect Being. (for some Materialists do so believe) that he can never be so, if he be not pure Mind, having nothing at all Material in him. Some of them, seeing that to make him Material as the Anthropomorphites do, is to limit him, and confine him, as contain'd in some certain place ; because they could not deny him to be Infinite, they suppos'd him to be *all Matter*, that is, that the Universe of Matter, (for they would acknowledge no other Beings) is God. But this would not do neither, unless the Universe were infinite, and therefore they stretch'd out matter boundlessly and made themselves a Bulkey Idol instead of the *Living God*. But had they enlarged their Understandings by using their Reason instead of stretching out Matter by their Faney, they would have seen that whatsoever consists of Parts, as Matter does, and will do in spite of their Teeth, must have a whole, and the whole is all the Parts taken together, just so much and no more ; and where we can say here is All, we can say it is but so much ; we have determin'd it as to some quantity or other, so it cannot be Infinite : The Parts taken singly are all Finite, whether we make them Inches, Yards, or Miles, it is all one, and Infinite can never be made of finite Parts, no Addition will do the Business ; all Number will be even or odd, which will be a determinate Number, and so cannot make an Infinite. But some that could not make the World an Infinite Bulk, have fancied an infinite

nite Space beyond it, and call'd it their God ; or his Container, which are still worse imaginations; for this Space is Something, or Nothing; if Nothing, it is no infinite Thing ; and to say an infinite nothing is nonsense. But if it be something, it must be *Mind*, or *Body* ; the Materialist's wont say 'tis *Mind* (the thing they abhor) nor I neither ; For *Mind* cannot be bounded by a Line, or Superficies, or be suppos'd (if it please you) to be a hollow Box containing the world of Matter ; that would lend it the Notion of Matter, and so make it Matter, not *Mind*, against the Supposition : But if it be Matter, it is still but a Part of the whole World however stretch'd outwards, not infinitely, but own'd to be bounded at least inwardly by the World in its Belly ; and so indeed to suppose it not the World it must be but an infinite Nothing ; and to make an infinite God of an infinite Nothing, or to make an infinite Nothing, yea, or an infinite Something, to contain an infinite Being, is to make no infinite God at all, or an infinite Nothing, (or a Something if you will) larger than an Infinite God, which is infinitely Absurd, and foolish ; for the Container must be larger than the Contained : So that if God be supposed in an Infinite Space he cannot be himself Infinite. But Space is nothing, indeed but the consideration of two Bodies Separated from one another by a Body or Bodies interpos'd between them : So that where there is no Body, there can be no Notion of Space. Limitation is an Imperfection. Body is Limited, therefore imperfect

perfect. But God is all perfect. *Body* is imperfect. Therefore God cannot be *Body*, or have Matter essential to his Being. If God be Infinite, and *Body*, or Extension cannot be Infinite, God must be some other way Infinite than extendedly, or not infinite at all. Those that hold the World not to be God, can as little make out God's Infinity by Extension, as his Omnipresence. For they must suppose him but a great porous Mass with the World in its pores, and the World a Porous *Body* fill'd with God, like a Sponge in the Sea full of Water. As *Augustine* once fancied *Conf. lib. 7. Cap. 5.* Now it is manifest the Sponge is inwardly bounded by the Water, and the Water outwardly by the Sponge, or the Water inwardly bounded by the Sponge, and the Sponge outwardly bounded by the Water, both or which you please; the Water is not where the Sponge is, nor the Sponge where the Water, the same Space or Dimension can't be wholly filled, by Two Bodies. A Cubick Inch, for instance, of Water cannot be in the same Space or dimension as a Cubick Inch of Sponge is; for it would be to suppose two Cubick Inches to be but one Cubick Inch, or that Two is not Two. But we need say no more to shew the Absurdity of an extended Infinity. But those that say God is infinite, and know what they say, have quite another Notion of Infinity. I confess the word Infinite is but a negative Term, and so not so proper to express what is in God, it only denies something of him; or rather denies our capacity to comprehend

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all his Perfections. But if by God's being Infinite, we mean he is so very Good, so very Wise, so very Powerful, so very Just, so very Happy, &c. that we cannot comprehend, or come to an end of all his Perfections, and say that he is but so Good, but so Wise, but so Powerful, and there is no more or nothing farther in these Perfections; we have a more noble Notion of God's Infinity, than can be in a Bulky Brutal Extension. But to say that God is All-perfect, or rather absolutely perfect, implies more than to say he is Infinite; for we may not be able to come to the end and to see all that is even in limited Perfection: To say that he is All-perfect, or rather absolute perfection, affirms all that is, or can be, viz. *Self-Existence*, or *Self-sufficiency*, which excludes all Passiveness, and is absolute Goodness, absolute Wisdom, Absolute Power, Absolute Justice, Absolute Happiness &c. and that necessarily in the self-same Being. Now what is Goodness, but *good will*? what is Wisdom but *Perfect Understanding*? What is Power but *Efficacious Will*? What Justice but the *willing what becomes him*; what Happiness but *Satisfaction of Will*? And what are all these *good Will*, *Perfect Understanding*, *Efficacious* and decent or becoming Will, what Satisfaction of Will? But various Considerations or Modes of Thinking; and what is *Thinking*, or to *Think* (if you please) but Mind? what can be conscious, or know, all that is in it Self or other things, but Mind? So that we see that to suppose a Being All perfect, or Absolutely perfect, we must suppose a Mind. But if any should

should still be so fond of *Body*, or perverse against all reason, as to say all these Perfections are but the Effects of *Body*, or done by *Body*. I answer, *Body*, and *Mind* not being the same kind of Beings, and *Body* including none of these Perfections in its Notion, an imperfect Being would be the Giver of the Perfections it self has not, yea and the cause of all Perfection, which is absurd. Besides, whosoever can be perswaded that God is One, and a Superlative Being, cannot without contradiction say he is both *Body* and *Mind*, which are two Things, and when ever they club together make but a compound of Two still specifically distinct Beings, and cannot be one Simple Being. Besides, those that believe that there is *God*, and *Creature*, cannot with any reason hold God to be *Body*, or to have a *Body* belonging to his Being, because he cannot on that supposition be sufficiently distinguish'd from Creatures; Particular Bodies, as his must be, if he has a *Body*, being but parts of the whole Universe of Matter.

NOW if it appears that an all-perfect or Absolutely perfect *Being* must be a *Meer Mind*, and *Mind* if Almighty, and All-wise may be suppos'd to effect whatever is not contradictory, repugnant, or unbecoming it self, it will follow, that God may *imagine* or *represent* Himself in some *Effect* of his Will. But it is not contradictory, repugnant, or unbecoming an All-perfect Being that his Perfections should appear, and that they should appear to Some thing besides *himself*, and *something besides himself* will be a Representation, or Image of Himself. If Almighty Will,
and

and All-wise Understanding, that is God, be represented or imagined, it must be by Something distinct from himself, and caused by Him; for nothing can be the *Image* of it *Self*. Now if God represent himself, he cannot represent himself more than by creating Minds; he being a Mind, a Mind will be more like him than that which is not Mind: If God should create a Body, and nothing else, that would somewhat represent him, in as much as it would be a sign of a Cause able to give *Being*; but it would only represent him to Himself, a Body being not Understanding, to which this representation can only be made. But if God cause a Mind, the representation of God will be to that Mind also; It self will be a sign to it self that there is a God, and what he is, and consequently there's a double representation, which will be more than a single one; as well as an intelligent voluntary Representation will be a more perfect Representation than an Unintelligent Unvoluntary representation. Now as God can make more Representations of Himself, a Greater, and a Lesser, it is apparent that he can make the Greater without the Less, or the Lesser without the Greater, and thence it is evident that the one Representation does not depend upon the other, nor result from it, much less is caus'd by it. That there is a Mind that is not God, I am as infallibly sure, as that I am; I find my self Imperfect, Impotent, and Limited, Ignorant, and Changeable, and consequently Insufficient of my self; and yet as I find my self a Mind; that I under-

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derstand somethings, and can do or determine my Will to act something about Objects. I Understand, I am some sort of Image or Representation of the All-perfect Unlimited Understanding and Will, or of All knowing, Understanding, and Almighty Will. I see *That Being* is much more vividly represented by Understanding and Will, that is Mind, tho' limited, than by that which is not Understanding, and Willing, viz. Body. Man is incomparably more like to God in Wisdom, Goodness, Justice, Mercy, Truth, &c. which are Properties of Mind; than in Hands, Legs, Stomach, Guts, Head, &c. the Nature of which consisting in nothing but certain Figures and Quantities, they do not import Thought essential to them but they may be without it, as the Materialists themselves will own; and do affirm them to be without any such thing in dead men. Now there can be no reason to suppose the most vivid, and greater Image of God, should be but an Effect of the Lesser, or an Accident resulting from it. Besides, if *Mind* it self is a *Being*, Substance, or Thing, (and it were strange that *that* which is most like God should be least a Being or Thing.) It cannot be suppos'd one Created Being should give Being to another: That would be to make a Creator of a Creature. I find my Will is not able to give Being to the least Atome or Dust, much less can a Particle of matter, or ever so many club'd together, give Being to *Wisdom*, and *Understanding*, and *Will*; and we rob God of his peculiar Prerogative, if we suppose Creature's the Authors, or Causes of one Another.

But

48 *Of the Method of Generation.*

But it is most apparent that both the beings of *Body* and *Mind* are only the Effects of Divine Power or Omnipotent Will, and are dependent as to their Being and continuance only upon him.

But here will come in an Objection by those who are not willing to look upon Creatures as such impotent Things as I would make them.

That One Creature begets Another, and is not begetting some sort of Causing, or Giving Being?

I answer No; and the Supposition of such a Power in Creatures of begetting as Materialists urge, shews but their Ignorance of what Generation is, and how it is brought about. Generation is, it must be Confess'd, a Production of a New Animal, whether Brute or Man, but the manner and causes of Generation are to be considered, and that on a Twofold Account.

First, As to the Production of the Body. And Then as to the Causation of the Mind, where there is a Mind.

First As to the Body it is too certain to be proved by Reason, that the Seed of all Animals is properly from, and Originally in the Male, and is the very Organical Body in Miniature, or Small. Experiment, even Occular Demonstration proves this. And what does the Man, or Beast, to the Production of this little curious Machine? The matter of it is indeed
from

from the Fathers Body, but not so much as given, but taken rather by the Framer of the Fine Mechanism. And who is that? Is it he that is Ignorant both of it's Being, and Contrivance, till after it is form'd? Is it he that not so much as Wills that there should be any such thing? No, surely, it can be no such Blind Cause that produces so Admirable a little Structure as the Body. With as little Reason, or less, can it be supposed to be the less knowing new Mind, (if it had being soon enough) to whom this structure belongs, that forms it for it self; or some blind Form that does it as some have blindly Philosophiz'd. No, it must be something far Wiser, and something that wills the thing, and whose Will is sufficient. Matter is moved indeed at the Creatures Will, (whether by it, we may have occasion to enquire e'er we have done) but according to certain limits and Bounds, beyond which nothing follows the Creatures willing. If I should will that a Quantity of Brass, and Steel, should move into the Machine call'd a Watch, it would not follow that there would be such a thing produced; I must apply hands, and Instruments to the matter, and take away and add, Separate and conjoyn; but a Humane Body is incomparably a more Curious Machine, than a Watch, and the parts of it when first form'd abundantly more small, and it is formed in the dark within the mans own Body, without Hands; and therefore not by him surely that

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knows

knows not where, nor how, nor what is to be done, but by him that knows, and can do all things. The Father Animal does nothing but convey the little Creature into the proper place for its Nourishment and Growth; and that not so much, or at least not only, from a Design for its Preservation, and Perfection, as from a certain Stimulation to the Pleasing Sense, accompanying the Action by which it is Transplanted into the Maternal Field: Which Stimulation and Pleasure, is not the Effect of the Genitors Will, any more than he is the Cause of that Inviting Aspect which determines him to the peculiar and proper Garden, wherein he should plant. On the other Hand, that which allures the Mother to Receive, and the Satisfaction she has, or may have in Reception, is not the effect of the Creatures Will, but is owing only to the God of Nature, who not only causes the little Machine, but strongly instigates to that which is a necessary means of its Preservation, and Increase. But,

Secondly, As to the Mind, there is no Reason why it should result from such an Organization, rather than from any other Figures. If the Fathers will, and Mothers too, and all they can do, cannot ignorantly produce the little Machine they know not the Mechanism of; Can it be suppos'd that little parcel of Stuff can produce Understanding, and Will, something more nobler than Matter (however Figur'd

Figur'd) between which, and Mind there is no natural Connection or Likeness? But if Mind could be thought to be produced by any Natural Agent, the fairest Supposition would be that Mind the suppos'd Offspring, should proceed from the Mind as the Parent. But this has also too many difficulties. For we should be at a loss to know from whence it sprang, whether from Father or Mother, or Both, or when, and how; since neither is conscious, nor always desirous of any such Production. And how an Agent should produce any, especially such a considerable Effect, totally Ignorant of, and sometimes not at all willing such a Production, and unable to do that which is much less, I cannot conceive. And farther, Minds having no parts, nor Quantity, nor young Minds, as distinct Beings in them, they can lend none to make Other Minds. But the easiest Thought is, that God the Omnipotent Mind, can and doth produce both Body and Mind, and that he being the only Agent in producing Mind, is the only *Father of Spirits*, or Minds, or *He that gives them*. So that the matter in short is to be understood thus: That the Author of Nature, after a convenient Number of Years, causes in the Man a Number of little Animals, in places conveniently prepared, and by an Acrimonious Liqueur in which they Swim, stimulates the parts whereby he is urged to do his part towards their Ejection into their convenient prepar'd receptacle, wherein when any one fixes it is in a capacity to receive nourishment to the designed growth; Then after a

52 *God the Efficient cause of Generation.*

Convenient time God causes, or begins a Mind, and gives it various Sensations by the occasion of this sort of Machine which we call our Body, and grow afterwards so Mightily in Love with, as if it were the chief Part of our Being.

But here I must tell my Reader, I desire to make one Exception, and that is, Christ, who tho' he was, *Υιος του Ανθρωπου*, The Son of Mankind, yet he was not *Υιος του Ανδρου*, The Son of the *Man*, or *Male*; but was the Seed of the Woman; God causing in this one Instance, the Seed or little Animal to grow in the Woman, from her Substance (that he might not be begotten of the Will of the Flesh, or of the Will of Man) and then in due time creating a Spirit to Act it. Wherefore Christ is called the Son of God, as on other accounts, in this eminently, because neither Man, nor Woman had any Agency towards his Conception. And that God is the efficient cause of Generation, Job tells us, Cap. 10. 10, 11, 12. *Hast thou not poured me out like Milk, and Curdled me like Cheese? Thou hast Clothed me with Skin, and Flesh, and hast Fenced me with Bones and Sinews, &c.* He does not say his Father did all this. And Zachary tells us, Chap. 21. 1. *The Lord formeth the Spirit of Man within him.* So not his Parents. It is farther to be Noted, That in unnatural Mixtures of Man and Beast, there is never any Soul in the Product, which is a good Argument that God is the only Father of Spirits. But if the *Mind* were Generated,

nerated, those Monsters must have Minds, and so a privilege above all Brutes, the orderly Productions in Nature.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Union of Mind and Body, and of Union of Minds. God the cause of all Sensations.

I Now come to the Consideration of the Union of the Mind, and Body. And it is to be considered, that it has pleased the Almighty Mind, that he might represent himself the more, to give Being both to Minds and Bodies, the former Active and sensibly Passive Beings, the latter wholly Inactive and Senseless Passive. He could not be suppos'd to Create to encrease his Happiness, or Augment his Perfections, being *Self-Sufficient*, but to Communicate his Goodness, and manifest his Excellency, which cannot be suppos'd to be done to any, but Intelligent Beings, so that Bodies which have nothing of Understanding, or Will in the Notion of them, seem not to be Created for their own sakes, but for Minds, as Glasses, wherein they may behold the Wisdom and Power of God, out of themselves, tho' not so much as is to be seen in themselves, the more perfect Images of the All-Wise Creator. And that Bodies might be the Representations of Gods Power,

and Wisdom to other Beings; that might be affected therewith, it is necessary he should give Minds the Knowledge or Perception of Bodies, and there are some Minds to which he has not only given the notion of Bodies, and a certain Power to act with Bodies, but such a sensible Perception of them, that they may in some Sense be said to be United. But this Union, if we inquire into the Nature of it, cannot be said to be an Essential, or Numerical Union, because the very Notion of being United, implies two things, and in as much as *Mind and Body*, are not Two Words for one Thing, as has bin made appear already, and no *Two Things* (especially, when the things are of the most different Natures) can be *One Thing*, the same in Number, and Nature. The Union of Two Bodies is by *Juxta Position*, and adhesion, by butting upon one another, and there resting: The Union of Two Minds having no parts, can be no such thing, but must be some Agreement in Thinking more or less alike. But if they should always Think exactly the same Thoughts, and have the same Desires and inclinations, and be mutually Conscious most exactly, they would be still Two Minds Numerically, and Individually Two, as is Evidently seen, and the very Notion of their Union imports. But the Union of the Mind, and the Humane Body can be neither of these, but only an Union of Use, Action, and Passion. The Body being Quantitative, or Extended, and the Mind not Quantitative, they can't
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about, touch, or be enwraped in one another. And Mind and Body being not Two Understandings, and Wills, cannot be mutually conscious, or think the same. But Mind may be so United to Body, as to be desirous to act about it; and to some System of Body peculiarly, rather than to another, and so as to receive and be desirous of Receiving Perceptions by the Occasion, or Position of it thus, or thus, so as to have some Motions, or Alterations of the Body, on the condition of its Desire, and to be Affected at such and such Motions, Alterations, and Conditions of the Body. But there is a certain Order, Law, and Limit, in this matter, according to which this Action and Passion, is Carried on so far forth, and no farther. Of which I shall not now Discourse particularly, but only Note farther, That Understanding, and Will, or Thinking, that is Mind, having no Dimensions, Quantity, or Parts, can have no Local Relation, or Stowage, with any Body, no not its own; it cannot be said to be extended with it, Contain'd in it, or in any part of it, or lying by it, or jogging after it. The Mind cannot be placed in the Heart, Liver or Maw, as some having no distinct Notion of Mind and Body Fancied; nor in that little Flabby piece of Stuff, the Brain, or in that little bit of it call'd the *Glandul Pinealis*, nor can any of the Marrowey Contents of the Noddle with any Reason be thought as a Paper, Parchment, or Cloth, capable of having Thoughts writ down, or

Painted thereon, or to retain the footsteps of any Little Fairies call'd Ideas, frisking there, as some have merrily suppos'd, but none ever Experienced or made out. Yet it must be own'd that certain local Relations of the *Body* of Man are necessary, according to the common order of things, to the perception of other Bodies: As I cannot see *Salisbury Steeple*, and hear the Bells ring there, while my *Body* is at *London*. So certain configurations of parts, and motions in Mans *Body*, are that without which the *Mind* does not ordinarily perceive its own *Body*, or any other. Yet these Conditions do not appear to have any natural, or necessary connexion with the Sensations that follow them. What reason is there in the Nature of the things, that while my Blood for instance, runs briskly, I should be well pleas'd, and joyous; but when slow and dull, I'm sad and pensive; any more than that I should be affected contrarily by these Motions? What reason can we give for these things? We find by Experience these Sensations and Connexions do not depend upon our Wills, we cannot alter them, much less cause them; nay we cannot so much as hinder them: If we open our eyes we see, whether we will or no; we feel, or perceive our Bodies, and others apply'd to them, whether we desire it or not; and we know not the peculiar Motions and Figures requisite to these Sensations; and can the *Mind* be suppos'd to be the cause of what it doth neither know nor can alter? No certainly, and if the *Mind* it self does not connect

nect these Things, and effect the Sensations, it must with much less reason be suppos'd that the Body does it; and yet with the least reason that every senseless Straw, and Block, can cause the Notion of it in our Minds: Senseless and Involuntary Beings are so very unlikely to be proper Efficient Causes. I must therefore conclude (tho' I shall be counted the less a Philosopher) that God is the Author, and Connector of our Sensations with the Conditions, and the effective Cause of all our Perceptions: But I hope I shall be never the less a Christian, if I believe, and think I have good reason so to do, that *in God we live, move, and are.* Which would bring me to the next thing I Propos'd to speak a little of, *viz.* the Rule, or Dominion of *Mind* over *Body*; but it will be necessary here, not to pass by an Objection, or difficulty some may make from this that we have said, *That God is the Effective cause of all our Sensations:* If this be true, then may they say *God is the cause of all our Misery.* I answer, It does not follow, for tho' God causes those painful Sensations on the presence of the Conditions, yet he is not the cause of the Application of the Conditions, but man himself, or some other ignorant, or evil Agent. And those things that are the Conditions of Pain, are such that tend to the Destruction, or disordering of the *Body*; and the uneasiness that follows, is not for this end, that man might be uneasy, but that this uneasiness might cause him to avoid, at first touch, all Things that are hurtful to the due Order of the Body, with which God would have

have him live so as that he may be fittest to prosecute as happily as possible the ends of his being in this World. Nor are the pleasing Sensations ever absent when their Conditions are present, tho' under Circumstances wherein man acts against God's Will, of which we may have occasion to speak farther. But now we shall come a little to consider what Dominion, or Rule the *Mind* has over the *Body*.

C H A P VIII.

*Gods Will the Cause of all Motion, with
Objections Answered.*

The Body no Cause of Sinful Inclinations.

FROM what has been said, it appears that tho' the *Mind* seems to suffer from *Body*, yet that it is God himself that is the Effective cause of those Sensations. So as to the Power or Rule of the *Mind* over the *Body*, if we consider our selves, we shall find that tho' divers Motions follow in our *Bodies* upon our willing them, as a Hand is lifted up, a Leg thrust forward &c. which are call'd voluntary Motions, yet we see no reason of causality in our Wills, or that they are the true Efficient of those Motions, or why of those Motions rather than of the flowing of a Drop, or Globule of Blood, or of other Liquors thro' a vein,

vein, which seems a Smaller matter than the brisk agitation of the Legs in running, and yet we find we cannot at our pleasure cause the Blood to flow or stand still. The moving of a Straw that is not contiguous with our Body, or with some other Body that is, seems a smaller matter then to lift up an Arm with a greater weight upon it, and yet we cannot do that, which one would think one might as easily do as this, if Motion were the real Effect of our Wills. We see indeed that if One Body be thrust forward and there be Another in its way, That must be thrust also. For instance, *H I K L M* being contiguous, if *L* be thrust forward in a strait line, *M* must also be thrust forward, but *L* may be thrust by the thrusting of *K*; *K* by the thrusting of *I*; *I* of *H*; but *H* being the first Body supposed to be moved, can't be thrust by one behind it, and there must be some first moved Body, and that cannot be moved for the same reason as those are that are in its way: Therefore it must be moved from some other Cause, that is not first moved itself. Now Mind having no contiguity with Matter, cannot be the Cause of the Body's Motion as *H* is of *I*'s, and *I* of *K*'s &c. and there being no reason in Nature why the Created Will desiring Motion, it should follow, and no experience that it can cause that which is much less than the moving a Hand, it must be supposed that God who can do every Thing by a meer Act of his Will that he can be rationally suppos'd to will, is the Author, and efficient Cause of all Motion, not only of the Natural, as some motion

tion is term'd, but of the voluntary, as we call that which follows on our Will: Of the Natural without the Condition of man's Will, of the Voluntary with it, by effecting what man desires, to a certain degree, or measure, Divine Wisdom has fixed. So that man's Power and Dominion is not so great as some would think, but the Operation of God for him, much more than some imagine. But yet as God moves *Body* many ways, and to many degrees, only at the instance of the created Will, and after other ways, and in other degrees, for the Sake and Benefit of Created *Minds*, viz. to keep them right, or rectifie them, *Mind* appears to be more Noble, and excellent than *Body*, which is made for it, and is disposed of by God in a great measure at *Its* desire. But here will be two Objections I believe against God's *Being* the Author of all Motion; One, *that Motion is Change, and God being unchangeable, it cannot become him to cause Motion.* To which I answer, Tho' God is unchangeable, it is certain he wills Changes in Creatures, Or else none of them could cause them inculpably. But it does not appear that it does misbecome God to change the Situation, and Figures of *Bodies* when it is good, by an act of his own Will, any more than to will they should be so changed by any Creature, or than it does to alter the Inclinations of *Minds* from Bad to Good, or from Good to Better, which doubtless he may be suppos'd to do, and does indeed by various, and admirable ways of Perswasion. But if any one can demonstrate that a Created *Mind* can have

a Power given to cause Motion, or any real Effects out of it self by meer volition, when God does not will the Effect, or Motion, he will do something I believe has never yet been done: But if God wills the Motion, or Effect, tho' the Creature wills it also, Gods Will will be more likely to challenge the Causality, than his Will who has not Knowledge enough to understand what the Effect really is, or what mediate Motions are necessary to the end he aims at, or what is the first Body moved towards it. Such blind, and weak Causes I think have little reason to boast their efficiency of they know not what, or of the *Thing* that a *Less* is beyond their Power. But if the word Power be not used in a strict Sense for Causality, and especially if it be taken for Authority or Right, it is as a grant from the Creator to the Creature to have such an Effect produced for it, at its Will; and I can allow it, and have us'd it even in this matter. But the Second Objection is, That *if God be the Author, or Efficient Cause of all Motion, he will be the Author of Sin.* I answer, This Objection is urg'd by those that either have not understood, or do not consider, the true Notion of Sin, That Sin does not consist in Motion, or Figure, nor is inherent in Body, but in the *irregular Determinations of the Creatures Will*, which God is no way the Cause of, but hinders by all means suitable to regulate, or bring into order a voluntary Being. They are ignorant that the *Motions that follow the disorderly Determinations of the Creatures Will, are not Sins,*
or

or that wherein the nature of Sin consists, but only outward signs of the Irregular Act of the Will. And it does not disbecome God so far to concur with the Creatures Will, as to cause those external Signs to Appear, and Carry on those Motions, which are as Motions Good, and According to his Universal Laws of Motion, which Order it would not become God to break to hide from Others every Foolish Act of the Sinners Will; nor can it be, That the Sinners Inconstancy to the Rule God has given *Him*, should as it were, force God to be Inconstant to the Order he has thought fit to Act in with Bodily Nature. Now that God does indeed Concur with the Sinner, so far as to Carry on this Establisht Order in Nature, Appears in this Instance.

That when a Man lies with a Woman that he has no Right or Reason to lie with, and Commits Adultery, which God has forbidden, he gives him the same Pleasure he usually gives when the Action is most Regular; which Sensation cannot be thought the Effect of the Mans own Will, when he finds he has not the power so much as thereby to Encrease, or Diminish it in the least: And it is not more Unreasonable that God should Concur, to move the Mans Legs when he would go to a Whore, than to give him pleasure in the Abuse of her; or less becoming him to Create a Mind to Act with the little spurious Machine, tho' disorderly Transplanted, than by his Rain to Water the Tares
an

God Causing Motion does not Cause Sin. 63

an Enemy hath sown in another Mans Field. So that God concurs so far as not to interrupt the order of Nature which is Good; but all the Evil Lies in the wrong Determination of the Creatures Will, which is, and ought to be free, or else it would be incapable of Vertue and Obedience, and consequently of all that Happiness that is grounded thereon.

But some may suppose, perhaps, that this Concurrence of God to carry on the Motions he has made to be the order of Nature, may encourage Man to Sin. But I Answer, No, if God does not cease to give the good Relish he usually causes in Food, tho' it is got by rapine, or Deceit, it is so far from being an Argument that a Man may Live, by Dishonesty, that it makes the sin the more exceeding Sinfull, or the ill Action more unreasonable, because herein the goodness of God is so abused, that what he designs, and causes for his Creatures happiness, is by them made the occasion of their Sin, and Misery. Since I have bin mentioning something of the Actings of God toward the Regulation of Mans Will, a Consideration comes in my Mind which I think not fit to omit, or improper to set down in this place, which is, that inasmuch as all the Transactions of God with Man, as far as we can see, are designed for, and center in, this one thing, The Rectitude of Mans *Mind*, and the *Rectitude of his Mind is but the right Information of the Understanding, and due determination of the Will*; and all this is per-

performed entirely in Thinking, it is most Reasonable to conclude that Thinking, or *Mind*, is the most Considerable, Noble, and Essential part of the Creation, and more valuable than Brute Matter. And moreover that God does not only inform, and perswade the *Mind* to determine it self orderly in its volitions, (which would be vain, and to no purpose, if it had not a power of Determining it self) but enjoyns its Free and Regular Acts on its greatest Peril, and encourages them on the largest Promises. But now if Cogitations were Actions of *Matter*, or resulted therefrom, the Difference of Cogitations must result from the Difference of Figure, or Motion, or both: But matter does not seem capable of such Infinite variations of Figure, and Motion, as *Mind* is of variation of Thoughts, which would be requisite in order thereto, if Thought resulted from Figure or Motion. And tho' Bodies, as the Objects of Thought, are as variable as the Thoughts upon them, yet it is Evident that there are innumerable Objects of Thought, purely Immaterial, and the *Little Masses of Stuff* within the Cranium (nay, I add the whole Humane Body) can't be so infinitely Figured, or have its little *Maggots* friggle, at such an Infinite rate, as to cause or prodnce such innumerable variations as are made in Thoughts in a very short time. But that which I would principally mind is, That if Thoughts resulted from the Figures and Motions of Matter in
our

Sin, and Duty not in the texture of humors, 65

our Heads, or any other parts, when God Commands us to *Change our Thoughts, to Love him, Fear him, Believe him, &c.* from the *Contrary*, He Commands us to change the Figures, or Motions of some Particles of Matter or other, of which we are utterly Ignorant, not knowing *How Many, what Shapes, what Dances,* must go to make up Love, or Hope, or Faith, &c. Nor are we able to effect those unknown changes of Figures or Motion on Gods Command. God commands me to Love him, and Fear him, and that presently: Can I change the Texture of my Blood or Brains into I know not what other Texture in a Moment, or may I stay till I have dieted my self into a good Humor. But if none finds this Skill and Power, and if I can do nothing towards my Duty, where is Liberty, or Free-Will, yea, or where is Duty, or where the Wise, and Good Commander, of what I can do nothing to? Besides the badness of this material Hypothesis appears in this, That those Men that do not hold it so fully, as to deny all Sins, and Duty, and so to Assert an Indifference of all Actions, do yet much excuse themselves in Sin by the Supposition that their Evil Inclinations to Anger, Lust, Discontent, &c. proceed from the Humors of the Body, that it is in their Nature to be Angry, or Lustful, or Discontent, and so they can't help it; tis not, they think, from the Errors of their Understandings, and Selfishness of their Wills, that they are inclinable to these Evils, but from the Abounding of Choler, or Blood,

or the Fancied Melancholick Humor ; and these Humors are what God has caused in them at first, and so they lay their Sins upon God: the Woman, or something or other *He gave them* is in the fault, and makes them do amiss. Which could it be suppos'd consistent with the Divine Wisdom, and Goodness, God should not to mend the matter have sent Prophets, and Apostles, to Preach Repentance, and use Moral Perswasions to bring Men off their sins, but should rather have rais'd up Physitians to reform Sinners, and have revealed a Sufficient Number of Specificks to them, to purge out or change the Texture of all the Hamartio-poietick, or sinfull particles, Humors, or Masses in the Body.

But I cannot pass this without denying the Supposition that something in the Body can be the cause of Sin ; for all those Appetites the Mind has by the order of God in Nature on such, or such natural Dispositions of the Body, are good, and to be satisfied in their due order ; but it is the Self-Will of Man that would satisfy them how he pleases, without regard to the Laws of his Maker, that is the cause of Sin. It is necessary and good to have an appetite to food in order to stir up a Man to take in that which is adapted to supply the Defects of the Body, and an Inclination to the business of Generation to provoke him to what is necessary for propagating the Species of Man ; but neither Appetite is the cause of a Mans
Steal.

Stealing, or Wronging his Neighbour for its Satisfaction, or abusing himself in it, when he may more Happily do it orderly. There may be a good displeasure at Evil; but Anger, when Sinful, has nothing but the strength of Self-Will for its Cause.

F 2 CHAP.

C H A P. IX.

Of the Duration, or continuance of Mind.

An Animalversion premis'd of those witty men that say they know nothing, or not the Beings of Things. And the probable reasons of their Fancy. No Being annihilated, or appears so to be, to the skilful in Nature. Body cannot be destroyed of Being. The outward Signs of the Beings of Minds disappearing, does not infer their cessation. If God does not will the cessation of Beings, they cannot be supposed to cease. God does not will the cessation of Minds or Bodies; nor can any thing be said to cease by his Power. His Will cannot have not-being for its Object. Sin cannot be a Cause of the cessation of Minds, nor can God be thought to discontinue them on that account? God can't be suppos'd to disown his own Works, the Beings of things. Mind ought to continue in Being, if God will manifest his Perfections as much as may be.

H I T H E R T O we have been considering the evidence of the being, and Nature of Mind, as distinct from Body, and how related to the Body. We

We now come to Consider the Duration of Mind, whether it is likely to cease with the Dissolution of the Body, or continue; to be separated, or remain with the Body; and in what Condition Mind and Body are like to be, either Separate, or Reunited.

But before I go any farther, there is Some thing Occurs to my Mind, not hitherto mentioned, which I would not forget; and that is, what some say who would not be Angry to be accounted *Esprits forts*, or *Men of Great Thought*, and *Deep Penetration*, viz.

That we know nothing, and that they are so much before hand with us, that *They know they know nothing*, when we fallly suppose we know many things; we prate of *Mind* and *Body*, *Thinking*, or *Extension*, or *Quantity*, when we are wholly ignorant what *Mind*, what *Thinking*, what *Body*, what *Quantity*, or *Extension*, is, and wherein they consist. To which Penetrating Gentlemen I Answer, That Ignorance, tho we are sensible of it, is no Commendation of a Man, or of God his Author. But yet they cannot say, *They know nothing* without Absurdity, when they say they know *This*, that they know *nothing*. But as for the Quiddity, or the *What*, *Mind*, *Thinking*, or *Body*, &c. is, which these Gentlemen say they don't know, and therefore conclude none else does.

I farther Answer, One Reason why they Deny the Knowableness, or Present Knowledge of these things, I am apt to think may be, because they would know more in them than indeed there is; which because they can't find, they

70 *The Folly of saying we know nothing.*

Fancy that which they do know, is not the very thing; they would find the *Being*, or *Substance* of *Mind* to be some *Matter* or other, they know not what; and the *Being*, or *Substance* of *Matter*, to be not *Quantity*, or *Extension*, but somewhat else yet unknown, when what they do know, is *Being enough*, and needs nothing to uphold it, but God; but they don't know God neither, they'll say: No, Good Men! Not know God! Nor Themselves, nor any thing. That's strange; when the Knowledge of God, and our Selves is the most necessary Knowledge, and that which most becomes God to give: What can we be the better for God, if we can't know him? How can we love him, and Obey him unknown? But if we would needs find God to be something, which we first suppose can't be known, we must needs look, *as I may say*, beyond him, and besides him. If we won't be pleas'd, that *Self-Existence*, or *Self-Sufficiency*, or *All-perfect Mind*, which is the same in different Words, should be our God, I believe we shall make some petty *Idol*, or no God, to our selves. But what denotes *Existence*, more than *Self-Existent*, or *Self-Sufficient*, that is, all perfect Mind? And have we not the Clearest, and the most necessary Notion of such a Being, unless we shut (to speak Figuratively) the Eyes of our Minds, and will not know, or are so perverse we won't confess we do. But,

I say again, another Reason why they Fancy they don't know things, may be because men not having a single simultaneous intuitive Knowledge of things, but know them

them by considering them divers ways one after another, they make all those considerabilities of the Things, either Things themselves, or not *Essential* to the Thing, or not the same thing diversely considered; but separate them from something else, they know not what. But a Principal Reason why some make themselves so Ignorant, and that which I chiefly thought of, in making this digression, I take to be this, That whereas somethings are so well known they cannot be defined, they never the less absurdly would have Definitions, and a *Definition* being the expressing of a Notion by more, or clearer Terms we cannot without Absurdity demand that, where there can be no clearer expression of the thing, any more than we may demand a *Dennition* of the *Definition*, and so on *ad Infinitum*; for if there be nothing so known as to need no *Definition*, there can be no *Definition* at all, of any thing. But if somethings be so *Self-Evidently*, and clearly known, that no *Definition* can be given of them, to desire to have them defin'd, is Idle: And to say we don't know the thing, because we can't define it, is worse. So to ask what *Thinking is*, or what *Mind is*, or deny we know it, when 'tis that which is most known, and so Indefinable, looks not like what might be expected from Men of close Thinking, nor do they deserve an Answer, unless they will be satisfied with this, *Mind is Mind, Thinking is Thinking, as Self-Existence is Self-Existence*; which are none of the least significant Propositions. But I think they may as well deny that they know what

72 *God the Cause of the duration of things,*

the word *Is* means, or demand a *Definition* of it.

But to come to the matter intended, It is to be considered that as all Creatures have their Being by an Act of the Almighty Will, so their Duration Depends alone on Gods Willing their Continuance. He that from a meer possibility to be, gave *Existence*, or *Actual* being to Things, must be the only cause of their Duration. That which is not *Self-Existent*, or *Necessary Being*, can have nothing in its own Nature Necessitating its continuing to be. And this is the common Condition of all *Unnecessary*, or *Dependent Beings*; nor hath any kind of Creature a Title to Continuance on its own Account, as being such or such. Wherefore we must Acknowledge, yea, and Affirm, That *Minds Considered*, as *Unnecessary Beings*, may cease as well as *Bodies*, that are equally Unnecessary. But whether *Minds*, or *Bodies* (the Two kinds of Creatures we have any Notion of) when once in *Being*, do cease to be, or have ever bin Adnihilated, or can be suppos'd to loose their *Being*, considered in Relation to God, their Author and Sustainer, is now to be enquired into.

And I Affirm, in the First Place, That it does not appear that any Creature that God has made, has ever bin adnihilated, or has ceased to be. As for Body, or Quantity, it does not appear to the nicest Observers, that there has bin either more, or less of it, since the Creation. The *Alterations* of it indeed are innumer-

No Body can be found to be destroyed 73

innumerable, as to situation, and cohesion; and many particular Systems of matter, are daily dissolv'd, but their dissolution, and the separation of their parts, is not to be taken for any cessation of Being; tho' the vulgar may suppose so, from their disappearing to the eye. Let either Vegetable or Mineral Substances be subject to the rapid tearing and most Ruin-threatening Motion of Fire, their Parts either all hang together in spite of that violent hurry, or Some remain and Some fly away. Those that fly away, are as much in being, as those that abide the Fire. That which cannot be dis-united by Fire, may be made into small parts, and scatter'd among other small Bodies, so as to disappear; But yet they lie among them still in being, and often reduceable even by Art. As Gold for instance, may be collected by Quick-silver, Iron by the Magnet, tho invisibly dispers'd among other Pouders. Some Bodies may be dissolved in Liquors, and rendred diaphanous, or they may be vitrified, and hid in glasses, and yet they are still reduceable, as is so well known to the many skill'd in Chymistry, I need not go to prove it. But those parts of Bodies that fly away in burning, are carried up into the Air, from whence they return with rain either farther changed, or as they were: But they may by Art, be caught in close Vessels, whereby the dis-severed parts will appear, tho separate into divers kinds, to be the same in quantity they were before, abating for what may be lost at the Junctures, which no considerable Artiste is ignorant of. As for
Mind

74 *Minds may be tho't their Signs do cease.*

Minds, tho' their very Existence does not always appear to any but themselves, (I mean not to men, for I will not here determine of the Knowledge of other *Minds*) I say tho' their Existence does not appear to others otherwise than by certain determinate Signs made by some sorts of Motions in Matter some way belonging to them, yet it does not at all follow that the cessation of the Signs should necessarily infer the cessation of the Being they are usually Signs of; especially when there is no necessary inference from the Nature of the Signs themselves, that when they appear such a Being is, because the usual Signs thereof appear. As articulate Sounds in Birds do not certainly, or necessarily infer *Minds* belonging to those Systems of Matter, any more than an Articulate Sound it self has any natural Signification; all these Signs being significant but by a kind of compact not always inviolable. But now as none can question his own Being, or whether he thinks, but he is assur'd of the affirmative, *That he is*, and thinks; And none can very well question the Being of another *Mind*, where there are the same Signs of it as he himself would make to signify his thoughts; And that it does not appear to one *Mind* that another ceases, nor can to any that it self ceases; yet *Mind* may cease for any thing in its own Nature; The most certain Determination of this Matter must be made on God's side, I mean from what we may conclude from the consideration of *Mind's* relation to God its Author. And first it is evident That a Being

Things can't cease if God wills their Being. 75

Being that is dependent on the Almighty ; And had Existence given, and has it continued by God (Existence and continuance being alike Effects of Omnipotent Will) Cannot be put out of Being by its self or another Creature, any more than it could come into being by its own Will, unless Impotence can frustrate Omnipotence. Were the Creature so foolish as to desire to cease, or so unhappy as to look on Adnihilation as a comparative good, his desire would signifie nothing against the Divine Will that is for his continuance. So that the main Question in this matter is, *Whether it can be supposed that it can be the Divine Will, on any account, that the Existences, or essential Properties of created Minds (yea, or of Bodies) should cease to be.* To which I answer, *That whatsoever Alterations may be made either in Bodies, or Minds, we cannot rationally suppose that it can ever be the Divine Will that their Existences, or essential Properties should ever cease to be.* But that it is God's Will that they should continue in being, which will appear from divers Considerations, as we shall find by and by. The alterations of things from bad to good or from good to better, is but the taking, away Imperfection, and encreasing of Perfection, and so may well be an Effect of the divine Mind. That a *Mind* morally evil should be made morally good, or good better, cannot but be agreeable to Original good Will ; Or that a Parcel, or System of Matter, fit for some good Purpose, be changed and adapted to a better, as a Beast to augment or maintain

76 *Gods Will cant by a Cause of not being,*

tain the Body of a man; yea, or that there should be a Corruption (to use the vulgar Expression) of particular Concretes, or reduction of the finest Organizations into common Matter, according to the general Law of Circulation of Bodies for the better Order of the universal System of Matter, or Reproductions of the Particulars in a better State, cannot be suppos'd to come to pass against, or without the divine Pleasure. *But Annihilation, or cessation of Being, in the first place, is no note, or expression of Power, Activity, or Efficiency, and is an Opposition to the greatest Perfection, and so cannot be the Object of the Almighty and Best Will. If God wills, he must will Something; if he is a Cause, he must cause Being: Not-Being cannot be suppos'd to have an efficacious Cause. Again, Whatever God can be suppos'd to do, is Good, and the Effects, or Products of God's good Will, as they must be Things, must be things that are good; but there can be no goodness in Privation or not-Being. Moreover, whatever God does, must be done wisely, and justly, or as becomes him; but not doing, or doing nothing, can't be doing wisely, or justly, or becoming God the most Active Being. Again, nothing is more evident in the Notion of him that is most good, wise, just, Powerful, than that he be constantly and unchangeably so. But what is a greater Note of inconstancy than to disapprove what is well-don e, an pto undo it? God's creating things being goodwise, and just, his continuing things must be good, wise, and just, and then if he be constant he must be suppos'd*
not

God cant suffer adnihilation of Creatures, 77

not to discontinue them. But that I may not be too particular, and long; What Attribute is there in God, or rather what way can we consider him, But that we shall find Arguments on God's part for his constancy, and unchangeable Will, which cannot be for the discontinuance of his Creatures? There needs be little said to that which some are so apt to reply when they have found themselves unable to Prove that God does or can do this, or that they affirm of him, viz. That tho' he does not, or may not be suppos'd to do so and so, yet he suffers or may suffer it to be done. For in this matter, as we cannot consider Adnihilation as the Effect of a Cause, suffering Adnihilation to be caused or done, is but suffering nothing to be done, or caused; for every cause must be the cause of some effect, but nothing is no effect.

But methinks there is something yet that may run in the Minds of some, whereby they may be perswaded to believe Adnihilation of Creatures, tho' they confess there is nothing in the Consideration of God for it; yet as there is nothing in the Nature of the Creature it self inferring necessary existence (as I have confess'd) there may be some consideration in the Creature so far tending to not-being, as that God may, if not ought in Justice, to suspend his preserving Powers, and let it fall to nothing; and That is *Sin*, or the irregular Actings of the Will of man, whereby the Sinner may forfeit its Being. And as Minds only are capable of sin, Minds may, or must cease on that account, tho' Bodies continue in Being. To
answer

78 *Sin cannot put an end to Gods Works.*

answer this, if what is said already be not full enough, it is to be considered farther, That Sin, which is but the private *Act of the Creature*, a foolish and unreasonable choice for it self, without any, or a due regard to the will of the most wise Author of all good, cannot be suppos'd to put an end to the wise and good Actings of God, and make him disown his own good works. If God in creating did well and wisely, it cannot be suppos'd with any good reason that he should leave off to do so, because the Creature which he has made does foolishly, or omits to do wisely. Tho' the Creature disown God, God cannot disown himself, and change his *Mind*; he cannot repent of the good he has done; For nothing but what is ill done, can be well repented of. Altho' God is said in Scripture to repent, it is but a Speech after the manner of men not strictly and literally true, or so reconcilable to what is said in other places, *That he cannot repent, is always the same, and changeth not.* Nor can it be reconciled to Reason: For God cannot be supposed to alter his *Mind*, and cease to do what he does, but upon two accounts: *Either that he is not able to continue acting any longer; or that he can come to see that what he does is not good.* But neither of these can be suppos'd. Moreover, we see God does preserve Sinners in being a long time, and that those that appear to be the most wicked, and incorrigible; this cannot be denied; but he can never be unable to preserve them, or be inform'd that it is not good so to do.

Again,

Again, the positive Will of the Almighty cannot be frustrated, and it is his positive Will to manifest his Perfections in Creatures; but cessation of being is a cessation of all manifestation of his Perfections in them. The Happiness of the Creature indeed is conditional, depending partly, and as to the Actuality of it, on the Determination of its own Will, which is most properly its own Work: But tho' the Creature make it self Unhappy by disowning God, there is no possibility of making God disown his Works; nor reason he should cease to shew his Power, Justice, Wisdom, &c. Because the Creature by its own Will, which cannot but be Free, renders it self incapable of receiving that Happiness it might have, but is to be had but on a Condition. Now as the manifestation of Gods Perfections, as far as may be according to the Nature of things, can never be other than according to Gods Will; if we consider the Nature of *Body* and *Mind*, or *Quantity*, and *Thinking*, (to come close to my design) we may make a comparative Judgment of the Reasons for the Duration of both, and thereby see which has the strongest Title, from their Author, to Continuance; And whether the Cessation, or Alteration of One, infers the Cessation of the Other. And I say as the manifestation of Gods Perfections must be very agreeable to his Pleasure, so that wherein and whereby his Perfections can be most manifested, has Evidently the greatest Title to Duration on that Account. Now if the Question be asked whether *Matter* meerly Insensible, as it is acknowledged by the Materialists

80 Gods Perfections most manifested by Mind,

alists, and urged by the Mortalists, sometimes to be, and that which we have shewd to have nothing but Quantity and Figure in its Notion; I say whether *This*, or *Mind*, which is Intelligent, or most sensibly Perceptive, and Active, or Voluntary, is the most capable Subject for the manifesting the Divine Perfections; and it will soon appear, That *Mind* is the Being whereto, and whereby Gods Perfections can be most manifest; but *Body* is that whereto Gods Attributes cannot be known, and whereby they cannot be manifested, where there is no *Mind* to manifest them unto. It is Understanding only wherunto that which can be manifested of God can be known; and it is Will only that can actively declare him, and that to other *Minds*. Whatever is known of God, is known to *Minds*, and whatsoever is done for the sake of God, is done by Mind. And if Mind, or Cogitation could be considered not as Substantial *Being*, but meerly as Action, or Passion of Body (which we have hitherto denied, and shall still deny) yet it were necessary in order to the manifestation of Gods Perfections that Cogitation, call it Action, or Passion, or what you please, should continue, when Body it self is but a Senseless inactive Being.

C H A P. X.

Of Life and Death. The Ambiguity of what ought to be meant by Life and Death, a Great Cause of Difference of Opinions in this Matter. The Various Notions of Life and Death Stated. Thinking the Proper Life of the Mind, and Essential to it. Of Personality, and Identity. What I and MY are. Thinking not to Mind, as Motion to Body. The Ends of Creatures Argue the Immortality of the Mind. Rewards and Punishments not possible without Personal Identity.

HAVING considered in short what grounds we have for the Duration of Things,

We will now consider somewhat the State and Alterations of Minds and Bodies, commonly call'd Life and Death, and see what may be meant by them, and whether the Latter, viz. Death, Imports any Cessation of Being. And,

First, It is to be Considered, That the Ambiguity of the Notions of Life and Death have

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not

82 *Notions of Life and Death Various.*

not a little contributed to darken the matter of Mortality, and Immortality, and to give us doubtful Notions of both.

Wherefore I shall first Observe, That as is the Variety of Things, that may be said to Live, or Die, so Various, and much more, are the Notions of Life and Death. For Life and Death are not only distinguished according to the Two grand Divisions of *Intelligent* and *Material Beings*, but both of them have their Subdivisions. As of *Material Beings*, there are three Famous sorts, *Mineral*, *Vegetable*, and *Animal*, which yield their distinct Notions of Life and Death. So as to the *Intelligent Beings*, tho' there may be perhaps but one kind that can be suppos'd to Die, viz. *Men*, yet there are divers sorts of States, or Lives, or Changes, which may be called Deaths, which they may be suppos'd, or said to be in, or undergo. What may be meant by the *Life or Death*, of a *Mineral*, or *Vegetable*, we shall leave, as besides our present purpose; the meer *Animal*, and the *Thinking Beings*, are the Subjects we have here to do with.

I call the First mentioned, *Animal*, only in Compliance with the usual Distinction, not that the Word *Anima*, sometimes us'd to signify an Immaterial Being, in that sense belongs to them, so that I might rather have call'd them *Locomovable Engines*, or *Machines*: Now Their Life Consists in the wholeness of the *Hydrulico-pneumatical*, or *Water-wind Engine*, so far as is necessary to their *Motions* which drive about the *Fluids*, contain'd in them; and in the due *Texture* of the *Fluids* so
far

far as is necessary to have them capable of being drove about by the Organical parts, in order to their Growth, and State, proper for their design'd Ends. The Diminution of this Integrity, or wholeness, and of the due Motions, is Sicknes, the total breach or cessation of the one or other, and Consequently of both is their Death.

These Living Bodies are curious Engines, such as may become the Almighty, and All-Wise Author of Nature to make, which tho moving from place to place, are so link'd on to the great Engine of the World, that when once Form'd, and set agoing, at First by the Motion of a Parent Body, to which they are for some time Connected, their Course when broke off, is carried on by the Spring of the Air, the chief Instrumental cause of the Circulation of the Blood, as that Circulation is of other Motions. But we will not go on to Discourse this matter Physically. There is but little Difference between the Materialists and us about it; we all acknowledge Mans Body to be but an Engine, tho form'd to better purposes than that of Brutes. This Brutal, or Mechanical Life and Death, is much the same in Men and Beasts, and we shall not easily fall out about it Whether the thing be Dead or Alive. When it is broken to pieces, and has no visible Organical Motion in it, we all presently say it is Dead. But as for Minds, or Intelligences, which may be Actors about, or Perceivers of, or by occasion of these Machines, their Life cannot consist in Cohesion of parts, or Motion, when they have no parts to hang together, or be stirr'd; the No-

84 *Various Lives and Deaths of Minds.*

tion of Cogitation having no such things in it, their *Life* must be properly something else: Yet if any one will needs have the State of the *Mind*, whilst Acting and perceiving with the living Machine, call'd its *Life*, and Cessation of that State, its *Death*, or the Dissolution of this *Union of Mind and Body*, the Death of the Man, let them; if they will but tell us this is what they mean, and still mean the same thing. But there are other *Lives* and *Deaths* the Mind may be said to have; some of which are but Metaphorical. As a *Mind* may be said to be *Morally Alive*, when the Actings of the *Will* are according to their due and proper Order, which is called in Scripture *Death to Sin*; but *Morally Dead*, when such Actions cease and disorderly ones succeed, call'd *Death in Sin*. The *Spiritual Life* of the *Mind* is, when the Thoughts are occupied about their Proper, and Noblest Objects, and thence receive that Joy, or Pleasure the *Mind* was design'd for. *Spiritual Death*, when instead thereof, it has nothing but Anxious, Horrid, disagreeing Thoughts, &c. And when these States are fixed as to Duration, they are said to be *Eternal*, or *Everlasting Life*, or *Death*. The *Life of Man* Considered as a Compound of *Mind and Body*, or as a *Mind* with a *Body*, is the continuance of that Union, which is usually as long as the Mechanical, or Brutal *Life* of the *Body* renders it fit for the *Mind* to be concern'd with, but the proper Physical *Life* of the *Mind* is Cogitation, and whilst there is the Action and Passion of *Thinking*, there is *Being*, and that which is with more Reason

Reason call'd *Life*, than any sort of Motion, of, or in the most Admirable Machines. This is the *Life* the Materialists, and Mortalists would have to be Mortal, and we hold not only to be Immortal but also Essential to the *Mind*, or *Person*. Which we shall farther Prove by Necessary Consequents.

But before we go any farther in proving the *Everlasting Duration of Thinking*, it will be necessary to premise in short something of *Personality* and *Identity*.

Some Materialists, and Mortalists are so Inconsiderately singular, that by *Person*, they mean *That Organical System, Mans Body*: That Trunk with Two Branches downward, and Two on the sides, with a great Knob on the Top. But they may as well make Horses, or Watches, or Puppets, Persons, tho' of divers sorts, they differing but a little in figure, and motion. But this, or any Material Notion of Person will be the occasion of great Confusion, it being very hard to determine thus, what is Essential to Personality, what not. For if a Mans Leg, or Arm be cut off, it will be questionable whether there be a Person remaining, or no; and how much may be spar'd as not Essential to a Person: for we can never say a piece of a Person. I believe some Gentlemen got this Notion from the word *Personage*, us'd by us much in the *Latin* Sense of Person, for a Representative, or Representation: As a graceful, and decent Body and Dress usually Represent what a Man is as to his Capacity of Mind, and Acquisitions. Or else this Bodily Notion of Person may have bin

taken from the abuse of the Word *Somebody*, for *Some one*; *aliquid*, for *Aliquis*. But the Learned, and even the Vulgar, World have generally difus'd the Word *Person* in the Old *Latin* Sense, and when they pretend to speak properly never use it for a Body (and whatever a word is us'd for, that is its meaning) For when any one says he has spoke with a Person, he does not mean he spoke with a Representative, Representation, Actor, or Picture, with a Corps, or some Machine, or meer moving System of matter, or with a Statue, no nor with a Horse, but with something Intelligent, and capable of Communicating Thoughts, and that *an Intelligent Being, distinct from all others*. And tho' the Common People may not have a Definition ready for a Person, yet 'tis apparent they generally mean the same thing which others do, they are tho apt to put too much in the Notion, *viz. Body*, as well as *Mind*, but yet they will acknowledge there may be a Person without a Body; and if so, and yet *Body* were to come into the Notion of Person, God would be Defective as to Personality, being less a Person than Man. But tho' the Modal Circumstances, or meer Accidents of Persons may differ, as having Bodies, or not, yet they agree in this, that they are *Intelligent*, and *Distinct* from all others.

If we ask any Man of the least sense how many Persons are mentioned in this Sentence. *The Revelation of Jesus Christ which God gave him, and he sent and signified by his Angel, to his Servant John*. He will tell your Four, and understand them as *Intelligent and Distinct*, not meerly
as

Wherein Personality and Identity consist. 87

as Trunks with Arms and Legs growing to them.

Again, A Person is that which can properly say I, or reflect upon *Self*, as distinct from all other Beings, and consider *Self* Abstractedly from them, as one *Individual* thing, and so one that if any Essential consideration, or property of it ceases, the thing ceases, and cannot be considered : *Body* and *Mind* may be considered a part, as having no necessary Relation, and so can't be one thing by it self, or one distinct thing : But *Mind*, tho consider'd as Understanding, and *Will*, yet there can be no such *Being* as *Understanding* without *Will*, or *Will* without *Understanding*, but *Understanding* and *Will* are Essential Modes of the one thing Mind ; and Mind only is *Res per se una & Intelligens*, or a Person. Mens Bodies, tho Organical Systems, and tho as distinct as compounds can be, are not Persons being unintelligent ; nor can they be as distinct as Minds, being always Lending, and Borrowing from others of their Constituent parts, and so can never be the same ; which Minds cannot do, but always must remain Individually, and Numerically the same while they have a Being. Now as my Personality must consist in my being a Mind ; so my Identity, or Individuality, cannot consist in any thing whatsoever *I have belonging to me*, but in what I am, and is verified in the Truth of this, *I am I*, which must be true, tho there be suppos'd another that can say so, so like me, that we should always think exactly the same Thoughts ; yet, *I would be I*, and *He would be He* still ; and tho it is not to be

88 *Of Individuality, and Identity.*

thought that any Two *Minds*, any more than any Two *Bodies*, are indeed exactly alike; and the manifold, or variegated Wisdom of God is to be seen in this, that he has so orderd things with an infinite Diversity (to speak laxly) that others might not easily mistake us one for another, as we cannot possibly mistake our selves; yet I cannot think that Individuality, and Identity consists in those little differences in the innumerable Accidents of Things; because I can have a Notion of Two *Bodies*, or Two *Minds*, that have exactly the same Accidents, or *Modes*; As in *Bodies* two Cubick Inches of Gold may be suppos'd exactly alike; and yet they are not one: and their Local Difference, as not being capable of being in the same place, is not that which makes them Intrinsically, and Essentially Two, but their *Quantity* and *Number*; an Inch, and an Inch is not but one Inch, and One and One is Two; and tho' we could not distinguish them, on their change of *Place* which we had not seen, yet their Numerical Quantities wou'd not be changed. Much less can Two *Minds* that may be without any Relation to place, on Local Distinction, have their Individuality, or Identity consist in the Different *Modes* or Accidents of *Bodies*, they may have to do with; because as those Accidents daily alter, they would daily lose their Sameness. Besides, Body not being Essential to *Mind*, but only Circumstantial, cannot make the Intrinsical, and Essential difference. But farther, tis possible to suppose Two *Minds* may receive the same Sensations, and have exactly the same Actings
of

Fals Notion of Person from Improper Speech 89

of Will upon the Being and Modifications of one and the same Body; and yet the very Supposition makes them Two, unless you can say, *That Two is not Two*, or *That which is, is not at the same time*. They are Two Agents and Two Intelligents, as really as if they Acted and Received Sensations about the most different Objects, and as truly experience each his own Self Actings, and Sensations, each constituting one Numerical *Mind*, or *Person*; a variable, yet the same *Mind*, or Cogitation.

Another thing perhaps that has hindred many from the true Notion of *Person*, is some impropriety or mistake in common discourse amongst us, viz. We say not not only, *My Body*, but *My Mind*, or *my Soul*, *my Self*, as it were Abstracting Self from Self, as if the Possessor were neither *Mind* nor *Self*, but some unknown thing that has a *Mind* and a *Self* in its possession; when in strict Speech we should rather say, I *Mind*, I *Self*, unless where by my *Mind* is meant my particular Thought, or Inclination: And if I were asked what are you, to speak properly, I would say I am a *Mind*, & I am not a Body also, but am a *Mind* with a Body, or having a Body which I am particularly and specially concern'd with,

But as for Personal Identity, or Sameness, it is chiefly to be Noted as to our Purpose, that there can be no such thing, unless the *Being* of *Mind* continue without any Cessation. Whatever alterations may be in a Thing, and however it
may

90 Noperonal Identity unless Mind continue

may differ from what it was, or be like another, there must be some Ground or Basis still the same, unchanged, or else the Thing would not be the Thing, nor this Thing this Thing. Our Bodies are always changing and changed every day, our Countenances and Complexions may be so far altered, that they may be said not to be the same: But yet the Body I have is still my own proper Body, whether bigger or less. But if it had at any time totally ceas'd, or been wholly changed, tho' I should have a Body again, it would not be true that I have had but one proper Body, or have the same again. But the Mind continuing, whether the Body be changed or cease, I must be the same I, or Person. But Mind ceasing, I am not, and *Not-Being* is the most opposite, or distant, or incompatible with *Same-Being*.

Having premis'd these things, we return to the farther consideration of the Proper or Physical Life of the Mind, Continual uninterrupted Thinking, which we affirm an Essential Property thereof, so that for it to *live*, is all one as to *be*; and for it to die, is utterly to cease; the Notion of this Life being included in the very Notion of Mind; but if we exclude this Notion, there is no Notion of Mind left, or of any thing but Body. But tho' this Life is Essential to a Mind, or a Person, on the supposition of the Persons Being, yet there is to be an infinite difference made between the Immortality, or incessant Living of God, and of Creature. For God *lives*, or *is*, necessarily, and cannot be suppos'd to cease. Creatures may be supposed to cease,

Death of Body infers not Death of Mind 91

as they are not necessary *Beings*. Upon which account it can be no sufficient ground for the Immortality of the Mind that it is Immaterial, an Immaterial created *Being* having nothing in it self to necessitate its continuance any more than a Body. Yet as its Immateriality necessarily concludes its Life something distinct from what can be, or be call'd Life in Matter, the cessation of Life in any Matter it may be concern'd with, or joyn'd to, cannot necessarily infer the cessation of the Life of the Mind, *viz.* Thinking. As no Mechanism, or manner of parts laid together, or motion of them, can cause or necessarily infer Thinking; so no Separation of Parts, or the cessation of matter, can cause or necessarily infer cessation of Thinking or Mind. The Separation of the parts of Matter, or cessation of their motion, does not so much as infer the cessation of Body; Much less can it infer, or necessitate the cessation of that which is not Body, nor has any necessary relation to it. And here I may well observe a mistake some have had, who make Thinking to *Mind*, as Motion is to Matter, when it is quite otherwise. For Motion is not Essential to Matter. But Matter, may be considered at Rest. But *Mind* cannot be considered without Thinking, that is indeed without it self. Abstract Thinking from Mind, and the sharpest Materialist cannot tell me what is left. But they might have seen, had they consider'd, that Thinking is to *Mind*, as *Quantity* or *Extension* is to Matter, which cannot be considered as Two Things, but are one and the same Being, So that
if

92 *Ends of Minds cant be unless they continue.*

*i*f you abstract *Quantity* or *Extension* from *Matter*, nothing at all will be left but the meer word *Matter*.

But to proceed in the Business before us, as we have somewhat consider'd the Beings of things as durable on the account of Gods general, and unchangeable Purpose to manifest himself, we shall now come to something more particular, and that shall be the Consideration of the *Last Ends*, and *Determinations of Minds*, or Intelligent Creatures; which we say can never be accomplished without their continuance beyond the Space of this present Life, and even beyond their *Separate State*. Tho' God's Wisdom, and Power is seen in the making and continuing of Things hitherto, yet his Government in the Methods, and Ends of it, is not yet manifested, and accomplished, nor is like to be in this present Life fully, nay I may say, is but a little manifest, nor possible, to be hereafter, if *Minds* cease to be on the death of the *Body*. The Sin of created *Minds* hath so ravell'd, and perplex'd the order of the Creation, that it is not easy to conceive what may be the perfect End and Completion thereof, either in Material, or in Intelligent Beings: It is not sufficiently seen how far God approves the Free-Actions of Minds, and what he *disapproves of*. There has not been such a Judgment, or Decision yet made, as to determine all things beyond dispute, and to assign all Right, and Wrong to their proper Causes, and to manifest and determine the ultimate Events and Tendencies of all Actions, to their proper

The End of things not yet accomplished. 93

proper Objects: Utterly to confound, and silence the persisting Rebellious, and perfectly to free the submissive, repenting, and righteous, from Sorrows, and Temptations. The Wicked have hitherto seem'd to be happy, and the Godly full of Trouble; Persecution and Oppression has been their Lot, and the Ungodly have born a high-hand over them; Honesty and Plain-Heartedness has not thriven, but the cunning Cheater has been rich.

Tho' the Minds of the Wicked have been sometimes in anguish and trouble, yet it does not much appear, nor have they had the full Consequents of their Sins. Tho' the Righteous have been often comforted with inward Joys, yet it has not been seen to all, that they, and not the Wicked, are the happy Persons; nor has Vertue yet appeared its sufficient Reward. The real, and vast difference between him that fears God, and him that fears him not, has not been duly manifested to Angels and Men. If God will vindicate himself from the unrighteous Thoughts, and the bold, and hard Speeches of rebellious Mortals, he must continue them for that Purpose, and not terminate intelligent Beings with the ruin, or dissolution of their Bodies. Generations after Generations, have come and gone, and liv'd and died in Ignorance, — Rebellion, and Impenitence; they have not liv'd to see themselves judged, and rewarded according to their Deeds, nor can they be, if they are Dead and there's an end of them, as some Mortalists say. Living Generations, and those
yet

94 No Rewards, or Punishments if Mind cease

yet to come, are like to come and go as their Predecessors did ; and if nothing remain after Death, that was Righteous or guilty, there can be no Rewards and Punishments, for Righteousness and Iniquity. But Minds, not Bodies, sin or obey ; Wills, not Blood and Bones, can be Righteous, or Wicked ; and if the Minds that wickedly determine their Wills, cease to be, the Bodies can neither suffer by reason of their Incapacity, nor could they justly, if they could be suppos'd capable. And Minds that cease, cannot be again, nor new Minds be justly rewarded or punished, tho' they should have the same Matter given them that once belong'd to some sinful Minds, which are now adnihilated. I know the Materialists are men of mighty Faith, and strong Believers of any thing that seems to favour their Hypothesis, and can make use of the Power of God, as well as the Transubstantiarrians to help them in Absurdities, and Impossibilities. They can believe that *a Thing may cease to be*, and yet the same numerical Thing (that is nothing) may be again the same it was. But I challenge them, and all men besides, to make out the *Personal Identity*, or sameness of a Saint, or a Sinner, to be possible by any thing but the Mind, and its incessant duration, or to make it but seem tollerable to say that *Negation* of Being, or Nothing, can be again. The Creature that *is*, may be changed in whatever is not essential, but if its essential Properties be chang'd, the change must be cessation of Being. A change from not-being to Being, is not a change of a thing,
but

No Rewards, or Punishments if Mind cease. 95

but Creation. If a Thing be chang'd, the thing must be the same in some respects, that it may possibly be changed in others.

The Mind is the Subject of Sin, or Obedience, Misery, or Happiness, which that either may befall it, the Subject of these Accidents must continue, or the Accidents can never have a Being in the Subject they ought to be in, according to the everlasting Laws of Right and Wrong.

So that a Mortalist may say, if consistent to his Principles (which some of them I know are not) let me please my self as much as possible in this short Life, I shall cease and be no more: This Body may be troublesome to some Mind God may hereafter make, but what's that to me? My Portion is in this Life, I will take my Liberty while I may. I know some do not thus consequentially argue, but are better than their Principles, and do not see whether they lead, and so run along with them: But there are others that argue themselves rightly, from false Principles, into their beloved Libertinism.

CHAP.

C H A p. XI.

Of the middle State between the Death of the Body, and the Resurrection. Mortalists deny the Being and Immortality of the Mind from the abhorrence of a middle-state, and that for fear of admitting Purgatory. Purgatory is not necessarily to be believed on the certainty of a middle-state, as they pretend. The probable Reasons why Papists first believed Purgatory, were mistakes about the way of Salvation, and nature of sin, tho' they now maintain it as a means to get Money. Prayers for, or to separate Souls, foolish and not necessary from the Belief of a Separate State, as some pretend. A return from Heaven and Hell, a difficulty with Mortalists. The difficulty removed by giving a rational account of the separate State. Separate Minds in a State, not a Place of Happiness, or Misery. A Double Judgement supposed on the account of a separate State, by the Mortalist, as a difficulty, removed by a rational Account thereof.

HITHERTO we have been considering the Reasons enforcing the Truth of the Minds Immortality, and interminableness

A middle state denied for fear of Purgatory, 97

ness on the Death or Dissolution of the Body, or whatever may happen in Matter. But if the Mind be Immortal, it will of necessity follow that there is a *Middle State* between Death, or the Dissolution of Mind and Body, and the Resurrection, which some Materialists and Mortalists hold. But this *Middle State* is that which they most abhor, 'tis such a fearful thing to them. The Immortality of those that shall be found alive at the Last Day, they cannot but acknowledge; but this Separate State has so many Bug-bears in their Notion of it, that it seems the chief thing deterring them from the Belief of the Minds Immortality, or even of its Being, whatever absurd Consequences must be admitted instead of it. But that we may take away all their fears, we will Endeavour to set this matter in a true Light, and shew that those absurd Consequences do not follow from the truth of a Separate State, which the Mortalists fancy and urge against it. Now the chief thing they object is, a supposed Purgatory; Which they so fear, they had rather die wholly, than fall into it. The unreasonableness of the Popish Doctrine of Purgatory, and the uses, or rather abuses that the Priests make of it for getting of Money, for Masses and Prayers for such Souls they suppose tormented in that fabulous Fire, is what the Materialists cannot digest; they will rather deny their own Being, than swallow this rough and horrid mess of Faith; Nor are they able to free their Minds from it, but upon a worse supposition, that Death frees them from Being and all. But I answer them,

H First

First, That they are a Scandal to the *Protestant Religion*, and abuse the Learned Reformers to suppose them so weak as to renounce one Doctrine as False, tho' naturally consequent on another they hold as true; or to think them so unlearned that they could not see that Purgatory was a plain Consequence of the Belief of a Mind, as a Distinct and Immortal Being. This Character of *Protestants* makes them but blind Reformers, that took and left things as it were by meer chance. But I must tell the Mortalist, whatever the Reformers were, they themselves betray their own Weakness in supposing that the Doctrine of *Purgatory* necessarily arises from the Truth of the *Minds Immortality*, and *Separate State*. The *Mind is in Being after the Death, or Dissolution of the Body*; does it follow, Therefore there is a *Purgatory*? No, The one is not at all Consequent from the other, nor can they tell me of any one *Protestant* that ever turn'd *Papist*, or Received the *Doctrine of Purgatory*, from this Principle; no, nor *Papist* that turn'd *Protestant*, by becoming a *Mortalist*. The Cessation of the Mind indeed is an Infallible Argument against *Purgatory*, for it makes it impossible, as well as it does after wards, and Punishments; and so does *Atheism*, *Spinozianism*, or *Hobbism*. But we are not failing between *Scylla* and *Charibdis*, we need not, to avoid one Error, run into a worse: *Purgatory* we believe a Fable, but *Purgatory* it self, (to suppose such a State) I think is more Eligible than Cessation of Being; and if there must needs be a *Purgatory* of those that Die in their

Submit to God and Purgatory is needless, 99

their Sins a *Separate State* would be much fitter for it than the *Millenian* (in which some hope to be purg'd from the *Peccadillas* they are not fully resolv'd to leave while they Live) as I would undertake to make out, if I could Credit any *Purgatory*, but in this Life, which we believe is the Time wherein *Many shall Purifie themselves*, Dan. 12. 10. *Now is the Accepted time, now is the Day of Salvation*, 2 Cor. 6. 2. This Life we believe the Day in which we may work out our Salvation; which on our part is no more than to submit our Wills wholly to the most Wise and Good Will of our Maker, and to let him choose for us what he knows is best. This is the Mighty Difficulty we make, and count Impossible to be done, whilst we are capable of Thieving the little Allurements of this Life, without God's Approbation. But it is certainly more easie to submit, And if this be done, there is no need of a *Purgatory*. But if Sinners are so stubborn and perverse, that they will hold out in Rebellion, and Oppose their own proper foolish Wills, to the Wise and Good Will of God, for a trifle to the very last, it will be dangerous trusting to a *Purgatory*, which whenever it be suppos'd, will hardly do, could God be thought to use such an improper method of Salvation: For those that have withstood his Love, and Slighted his Grace, would be apt in Torment to look on him but as a Tyrant Revenging himself on them, and hate him the more. But those that are assur'd of the Immaterial, and Immortal Existence of the Mind, can never be so Foolish as

100 Whence Purgatory might first be believed

to suppose Sins can be burnt off from Minds by Material Fire, or any way but by *Reasons* perswading the *Will* to leave its unreasonable Acts. And can God give us greater Reasons for the intire renouncing our Folly, and Unhappiness, than he has already given us? But the truth of a middle state does no more perswade the Truth of a *Purgatory*, than the Truth of a Future state of Happiness does the *Paradise* of *Mahomet*. And it would be very Foolish in a *Christian* to perswade a *Turk* that there is no Future Happiness, in order to perswade him off his unreasonable Notion of it.

The belief of a *Purgatory* could not arise from the Truth of the *Minds Immortality*, but from some False Opinions of the way of Salvation: As, That Men may die in their Sins, and yet not be Damned. Or That some Sins are not Damnable, tho Lived and Died in. As for Prayer for the Miserable Separate Minds, or to the Happy; the Truth of a Separate State of Minds, (tho *Purgatory* it self were not a Fable) cannot induce any one that Reasons freely on the matter, and knows what Prayer is, to use any such Practice. For if the unhappy state of Impenitent Sinners after Death, were not by themselves Determined to be unchangeable, yet there could be no reason of Prayer for them; Because if God does not see fit to alter their Condition, we cannot be suppos'd to inform him of the fitness; nor can our little unapt desires change his Will from what is fitting. No intercessor can inform God what is best to be done, or perswade him to be more willing to

Prayers for separate minds unreasonable 101

to do what is good, much less to over persuade him to do what is Evil: The Reason why Creatures have not all the good they might have, is because they render themselves incapable, by unwillingness to receive. Prayers for others may be prevalent, if they hear them, by persuading them to be willing to receive the good we wish them, according to Gods Will. Prayers for our selves are of no real value, but as they are desires of the Good God is first willing to give, and only waits for our Will, the Condition of receiving. Another's desire of my good, cannot be the condition of my Receiving, but my own; nor the want of his desire for me, the condition of my not receiving, if it be true that God deals with all according to their Work. We need not argue the *Separate Saints* Ignorance of what we would have, to persuade us of the Folly of praying to them. Could they be suppos'd to hear us, it were a Folly to ask them to pray God for us, when we can Pray to him, we are sure is an Omniscient, and Omnipotent Being; and one who is Infinitely more Good and Kind to us, than any little Creature-Mediator. We have no manner of Reason, much less necessary inducement from the belief of the Separate State of Holy Minds, to pray to them, any more than some Mortalists have to suppose it: Or than those that Fancy some peculiar Favourites of Heaven, besides Christ, actually risen long ago have to make their Supplications to them.

102 *Minds return from Heaven an Objection.*

But there is another thing they fancy a mighty Difficulty, and Absurdity, in the Notion of a Separate State of Minds.

Where are these Minds, say they? They must be in Heaven, or in Hell; and if so, then with what Reason can they be suppos'd to come thence, and be Judged again, when their State has bin already determined? It is appointed for all Men once to Die, and after Death comes the Judgment; but we read of no Two Judgments.

Now to Answer this Objection which is the main One some make, and so to come to the Rational Notion of the Separate State, I say, all the Difficulty here arises from their own Mistake, of the Nature of Minds, of Heaven, of Hell and of Judgment. When they argue on the Supposition of a Separate State of Minds, they still Absurdly look upon them as Quantitative, that is indeed Material, and so capable of being here and there, of Coming and Going, now in one place, and then in another; when the Notion of Mind has nothing of Quantity in it, and consequently of Situation, or Motion. But Minds are purely Cogitative.

When Minds Act, and Receive Sensations with Bodies, the Bodies must needs be here, or there, and the Minds may be said to be where the Bodies are, on the account of their Acting about, and Receiving Sensations of Bodies that are here and there, not in other places

ces which is no more, but that the Thoughts are most on their Bodies, and on those material Objects that are where their Bodies are: But Minds themselves are not here nor there, and when separate from Matter cannot go to this place, nor that, other wise than as Bodily Things in this or that place are Thought of by them. But there is no local nearness, or remoteness to Minds: Their going to God, or Heaven is no long Journey, Nor can Minds that are in God, and God in them, *John* 17. 21. (which is the highest Heaven conceivable) ever come thence, I mean out of that Happy state, wherever the Bodies they are to reassume, may be. Heaven is in separate Minds rather than they in Heaven, that is the perfect Love of God, and the mighty Sense of his Love to them, filling their Thoughts with Peace, and Joy unspeakable, with Satisfactory Reflections on their good choice, in denying Self. And should God be the sole Object of their Constant Thoughts, they would be Happy enough tho they should have no Sensations of any part of Bodily Nature, and so be free even from any objective Locality. God may give them, if he sees fit, an intuitive and pleasing Knowledge of the Creation, mental, and Bodily; but whether he has, or how far he may, we cannot see to determine. But they can need no Labour, or hard Marches, as we now do to attain the knowledge of Things. Their coming again is but reassuming Immortal Bodies, and so appearing again in Bodily Nature. The Hell of Separate Minds, is a miserable state
of

104 Two Judgments objected by Mortalists.

of Sin, and Disorderly Passions, as Fear, or Dispair, Violent Discontent, Wrath, Malice, Self-Love, Furious unsatisfied Desire, &c. which Hell does not consist in the Furniture of a place, to which Minds have no necessary Relation, nor need they the perceptions of Bodies to make them most miserable; they may be said to bring Hell with them, rather than to leave it when they come again to receive their Old beloved Matter they once thought the Ground of all their Happiness. But the return of Separate Minds, from nothing, or from what they never were, to Re-Existence (the Fancy of the Mortalists) is the most difficult return of all, being not next to, but even the same as impossible, as we have shewn before.

As for a Double Judgment, which our Mortalists look upon as so absurd a thing, it is their own Fancy of it that has all the Absurdity, if it has any in it; while they look upon the Judgment of God as a Formal Convention before a Tribunal, and a Sentence past of Salvation, or Damnation, and thence Execution; but we hold no such Two Judgments, but think a holy Mind freed at Death from all Temptations, and perfectly adhering to God by Love, received by him in a Discovery of his Unchangeable Good Will, and Kindness to him, has his State Determined actually in himself, is acquitted in his own Conscience, or rather Experience of his Union to God; and as he has now no Object capable of Deceiving, and En-

How Two Judgments may be understood, 105

Enticing him from his chief "Good now Enjoy'd, with Satisfaction incomparable to whatever he found in Creatures, he can sin no more, and cannot be suppos'd to want a Sentence past to inform him what will afterwards become of him. But the wicked Mind freed from the Body, finds himself **Condemned** in himself; he is cut off from a Capacity of being Diverted by sensual Delights, he has lost his beloved Objects, and the Body by which he receiv'd them; he loves not God, but his Poor, Empty, Vain, Wretched Self, in which he finds no power to comfort or Relieve; and what needs he be told he is in a bad condition, or that he does not love God, when he thinks not of him with Delight? What need he hear it pronounced that such a one must be lastingly miserable. But tho there be another Judgment, and this be call'd a Judgment also, what Flaw would there be in the Divine Oeconomy by Two Judgments?

The *First* is what results from the very Nature of Things, and the Scripture saith, *He that Believeth not, is Condemned, or Judged already.* But the *Last Judgment* is for the manifestation of Things to the whole Intelligent World. The other is **Secret**, perhaps known to none but to God, and every ones self. God does first reward his servants in **Secret**, in the Satisfaction of their intimate Desires; but at last he will reward them openly, and declare them Blessed. Then the Wicked shall appear to be what they are, tho they went for Saints in the Eyes of Men, then shall they be publicly rejected from

from the happy Presence of God and Christ, and Company of the Saints, and left to try by lasting, and miserable Experience, whether they can find Happiness in themselves, in their own Imaginations, and others their once beloved fellow Impenitents, where they Foolishly and unjustly sought it: Whether their own Wills, and Understandings are sufficient or no, or whether they have not bin wretchedly mistaken. But this Judgment also, is not to be taken with any good Reason for a particular Hearing of all past Actions, and a formal Sentence pronounced, singly upon the Actors; That would take up vastly more time, than the World has lasted. But the Judge, we are told in Scripture, shall make a Separation of the Two sorts, and shall send away the Bad; which General Sentence will be a Decision sufficient. We are told that *He is Blessed and Holy that hath part in the First Resurrection, on such the Second Death hath no Power, but they shall be Priests of God and of Christ, and shall Reign with him a Thousand Years; and that the rest of the Dead live not again until the Thousand Years are Finished, Rev. 20. 5, 6.* So that Saints are Raised a Thousand Years before the General Resurrection of the Wicked, and what can be a greater Decision than such a Separation as this; when the *Come ye Blessed, Inherit the Kingdom,* is a Thousand Years before the *Go ye Cursed into Everlasting Fire.* The Devils are said to be *Reserved in Chains of Darkness to the Judgment of the great Day.*

Objections about the Resurrection, 8107

Day: Yet no doubt they are already Condemned to that Dark, and Unhappy State; and yet they are to be Judged, more fully hereafter, tho first to be Bound a Thousand Years in Hell, and loosed again for a while.

And this brings me to the Consideration of the Resurrection, about which our Mortalists fancy mighty Difficulties.

C H A P. XII.

Mortalists Objections and Difficulties about the Resurrection, as that whole Man sinned, and whole Man must Die, and be Raised. Their Objections Answered. Death not properly a Punishment of Sin. What Death, and Resurrection, and Immortality are, according to Scripture and Reason.

TH A T which is rais'd, say they must be that which Died; that which Died, was that which Sinned; whole Man sinned, therefore Whole Man must Die, and be rais'd again. I Answer, They discover here nothing but Ignorance, and Inconsiderateness; Materialists

alists should not say *Whole Man*, unless they grant Man to consist of Two parts, *Mind and Body*; for the Question between them and us, is not whether the whole Body Die, and be Rais'd, but whether Mind and Body both Die, and be Rais'd? But if Mind be not a Substance or Thing, it cannot make a part of the whole; if it be only the Life or Motion of the Body, (a Fancy some have bin mightily pleas'd with) it is not a part of the Man, but only an Accident, without which the whole Man may be; Motion is not the part of any Body, but the Change of Situation of parts of matter one with another. That Flame that some of them Fancy so much to be their Life, or Soul, or Mind, were it more than a Fancy would not be a part of the whole, but only the rapid reverberating Motion of some of the parts, capable of such Motion; as Sickness, or Health, or Pain, is not a part of the Body, but a State or Condition of the whole, or the Parts. But this fancy of Fire in the Body, has been examin'd, and exploded by Physicians, as may be seen in the Dialogue of *Alkali*: and *Acid*. But methinks if Life, Soul, or Thinking, consists in Fire, a Candle may have a Soul, and Think as well as the best of them: And I wonder any of them should be afraid of Purgatory, or Hell Fire, which would only put the Parts into a brisker motion, and on that account but give them a greater degree of Life, and make them think more briskly. But as for the *Whole mans sinning*, if by *Whole man* be meant *Mind*, and *Body*, I deny that the whole man sinned. For if

Sin

Sin be the Transgression of the *Law of God*, and the *Law of God* be his Will made known, sinning is but *Acting*, that is, willing contrary to Gods Will, and the *Mind* only can do so; Volition is an *act of the Mind*; not of the *Body*, Which is purely passive, and has nothing essential to it but quantity; and motion is a meer accident, which may, or may not be in it: Motion being but the shifting of place of the parts of matter. But here is something worse, say the Mortalists; what, Mind only sin, and Body only die. Where's the Justice of this? I answer, The Mind only is capable of sinning, so the *Mind* only is capable of suffering. It is the *Mind* only that suffers by the loss of its beloved *Body*, when unwilling to part with it. But Death is not properly a punishment of sin, but a consequent thereof. That in *Rom.* 6. 23. *The wages of sin is Death*, seems to make it so indeed; but the word *opsonia* does not signifie a punishment, but a purchase, or *Salary*, or *Provision*, that which sin procures, or rather the Sinner provides, by his sin. But the Gift of God is *Eternal Life*. For man was not at first created immortal, but was to have been made so upon his standing his Tryal; and to have had Immortality seal'd or continued to him, by eating of the Tree of Life, as is apparent in the Text. That Death is not a punishment of sin, is manifest, in that Christ, and Infants who have no sin, nevertheless have died; and that to punish the Innocent as Innocent, or yet for the Guilty, or one for anothers sin, is against plain Scripture, all good

110. Death with Mortalists least Punishment.

good Reason, and the Notions of Justice common to Mankind.

The Bodies of men were never built Immortal, but of such a contexture as they might be broken, or worn out, as other Systems of Matter. A Clock, for Instance, or a Coat may. Now man having sinned by inordinate desire of Pleasure by bodily Things, it was not convenient that his Body by which he receives forbidden Delights, should be made Immortal, and so the Mind always subject to the same temptations, or capable still to enjoy its disorderly Pleasures. But to suppose Death a Punishment, as nothing but Mind is the Subject of Happiness, or misery, pleasing, or displeasing Perceptions, the Death of the Mind, or if you will, of the man, in the Mortalists Notion, would be the most unsuitable Punishment imaginable, it being impossible to be more than momentary. For that Punishment which ceases in a moment, is the least that can be imagin'd, and that which is not, is no more punishable; if the Mind ceases, all Punishment ceases; for the Dead Corps cannot suffer misery, as the Mortalists will grant. The ends of Punishment are either *to make amends what is amiss, to make the Offender sensible of his Fault, or to deter others from Offending*: But none of these ends can be answer'd In such a punishment as ceasing to be; Here is no amends made, God gets nothing by the Sinners ceasing, or loses by his continuance: And the Offender can be sensible of his Fault only while he is in Being. Cessation cannot deter others, because all Minds are supposed so to lose Being by Death. And

if

Ends of Death if Mind be Immortal. III

if all thoughts cease, and so the Mind die, and there be but a moment (as Mortalists often inculcate) from Death to Judgement; I do not see what end God can have in either causing, or suffering men to die, or to what purpose this moments cessation can be. But if the Mind continue in Death capable of reflecting, there may be an excellent purpose of God accomplish'd by leaving man to fall into a Separate State, *viz.* That as man has not only been apt to suppose himself, and God and all, to be *Body*, but to adhere to, and be fond, and most pursuant of, Bodily things, and enticed to sin by their means, he now separated by Death from all Bodily Nature, may see the difference, and be convinced of his former Folly; that he may be assur'd that *Mind* is more excellent than *Body*, and things meerly in *Mind*, as Reason, Vertues, &c. are preferable to the most pleasing Sensations; and that he may be confirm'd in the goodness of his Choice who in Life overcame the Flesh, and chose Spiritual things; And that he that wholly, or chiefly adhered to, and prosecuted Bodily goods, may be convinc'd of his great folly. As to the momentary change at the coming of Christ, it is only of the Saints then alive, and they are an exception not only from a separate state, but Death it self. But it may be oppos'd, That as Death is call'd a Sleep, and Sleep we know is a State of very little Sensibility, so the Dead are most likely to be insensible. I answer, Death is call'd a Sleep from the Similitude of the Bodies lying when dead, as if asleep, and Death is thereby

112 Whole man cant rise if Mind be Mortal

thereby express'd in the softest Sense; but if the Mind in death should have no more Sensation than is possible in sleep, and what we find in some very vivid dreams, it might be enough: For I have known a man in sleep in an excellent frame towards God. But in sleep the Mind is subject to some of the Laws of action and Passion with Body, and so not so free as in a wholly Separate State, when the Mind will be capable of more vivid and clear Spiritual Cogitations.

But as to the Resurrection of the *whole dead man*, or of the dead Person, or Mind, it cannot be true in the Mortalists Sense.

For that there may be indeed a Resurrection, there *must be something to rise*: It is that which *is*, tho' dead, which can possibly be rais'd, not that which is not. But there remaining no Being after Death, according to the Mortalists, but the Matter of the Body, nothing but the Body can be rais'd, and the *Body* is not the man but only a part of the man, and nothing of the Person, which is the Mind, only. But now if by Death we may mean the Dissolution, that is, *Separation of Mind and Body*, according to the Apostle, 2 Tim. 4. 6. the time of my *departure*, or *Dissolution*, as the Greek word *Analusis* signifies, *is at hand*, so Phil. 1. 23. *having a desire to depart*, *Analusai* to be Dissolved, or loosed, from the Word *Luoo* to Unloose, or untie, oppos'd to abiding in the Flesh, *verse 24.* which was more needful for the *Philipians*. I say if by Death we may mean this *Dissolution*, or *Unloosing the Union of Mind and Body*, with what Alterations may hap.

The true account of the Resurrection. 113

happen to them upon the Bodies being rendered wholly unfit for the Mind to perform the business of this Life with, and to receive Sensation of Bodies by; Then the Resurrection will be nothing but refitting the Body, that is, giving it its Mechanical Life, and giving it again the Mind so far alter'd, or new Modified, as to render it capable of an Incorruptable duration, and so of being a fit Instrument for the Mind to those Wise and Good Purposes God has design'd it in the Blessed, or of remaining a lasting occasion of the greater Unhappiness in that Miserable State to which the Wicked have Determined themselves. The Apostle giving us an account of the manner of the Resurrection 1 Cor. 15. compares it very aptly to the growing up of Corn, and very agreeable to the Word *Anastasis*, that is, a *Standing up again*, wherein these things are Observable. That that which is Quickned, first Died, *verse* 36. That that which is Sown, is not the Body, that shall be, *v.* 37. But that God gives a Body, and an own, or proper Body to every Seed, *v.* 38 That, there are different Kinds of Flesh, and Celestial, and Terrestrial Bodies, *v.* 39, and 40. Differing in Glory. 41. So is the Difference of the Body Sown, and that Rising; the One Corruptible the other Incorruptible, the One Dishonourable, the Other Glorious, the One Weak, the Other Powerful, *v.* 42, and 43. and that which I would chiefly mind, That it is sown a *Natural Body*, and rais'd a *Spiritual Body*, which concludes, that it is the Body he

114 *What a Natural and what a Spiritual Body*

has bin Discourſing of, as *mortal* that is to be rais'd. It is Sown a *Body*, and rais'd a *Body*, *verſe* 44. It is the Body with which the Separate Minds ſhall be United and appear again, that ſhall be rais'd, and it is to be a Body ſtill, tho' a Spiritual one; not a Spirit, but a Body, another thing altered from what it was Sown, *viz.* From a Natural, or rather Animal Body to a Spiritual One. And if I may venture to tell my Opinion of the Difference of theſe Two Bodies, I do not conceive that the Animal Body only is an Organical System of matter, whoſe parts lie cloſe together, but the Spiritual an Aerial, or Inorganical Body, a Phantaſm, or ſuch a Body as ſome fancy, and call the Vehicle of ſeparate Souls: I dare not venture to cut out the Stomach, and Guts and I know not how many other parts, becauſe I can find no uſe for them in the Life to come. But I think that beſides the Perfection of Shape and Colour proper to the End of the Body the chief property of a riſen Immortaliz'd Body conſiſts in this, *That it is no longer ſubject to the Common Laws of Motion, but is wholly ſubject to the Mind that owns it:* Which Mind being freed from Sin, and being perfectly Informed in, and Conformable to, the will of God, can never Ignorantly, or Wilfully deſire any thing that tends to its Deſtruction, and being Exempted from all external force, there is no reaſon why it ſhould ever be alter'd. But to return from this Digreſſion: As the Ceſſation of the proper motions and diſſolution of the parts of an Organical Body, may be well call'd its Death, ſo
it

if a Mind have a certain Union of Use, or Action and Passion with such an Organical System of Matter, the Cessation of that Use, and Dissolution of that Union, may be very well call'd a Death; and tho the Organical Body should retain its Figure, and Motion too, after Separation, it would be but a Brute, not a living Man. But as Dissolution of the Union of *Mind* and *Body*, by the Appointment of God, does not happen but upon the Cessation of the Mechanical, or Brutal Life of the *Body*; the Termination of that *Bodily Life*, and thereupon Cessation of Union, is most properly call'd the Death of Man: But the Cessation of the Being of either Mind or *Body*, the parts of the *Noosomatical* compound can never be the Death of a Man capable of a Resurrection, or is ever found to be meant in that Sense in Scripture.

But we shall say no more here of the Resurrection, because what we have farther to say may come in better in the Chapter of the Scripture Light in these matters; to which we shall come as soon as we have Answered some few Objections more of the Materialists and Mortalists.

C H A P. XIII.

Some more Objections of Materialists, and Mortalists, Answered.

Object. The Seeming Impairation of the Mind by Age, by Sickness, Madness, Strokes, &c.

Object. That it has not appear'd, that Minds Act when Separate.

The Actings of Separate Minds Historically Proved. An Account of an Ecstasy, the Separate States Possibility thence Argued.

Object. That the Immortality of the Mind is Paganism.

Object. That some Sinners would Suffer Unjustly before others.

Obj. That Brutes are only Matter, and yet Think.

Answ. That Brutes do not think, proved.

TH A T we may not be wanting in any Thing necessary to the clear Determination of this Controversy, we will here Answer some more Objections of the Materialists and Mortalists, which they think of mighty moment to them against the Substantiality

Mind Impaired by Diseases objected, 117

ality, Immateriality, and Immortality of the Mind.

And the First I shall mention is this.

First. That Mind can't be Thought a Substantial, Immaterial, Immortal Being, and Independent on the Body; because tho we cannot be supposed to have the experience of its Total Cessation on the death of the Body, yet we have undoubted and manifold Experience of its being Diminished, Impair'd, and Weakened by Divers Alterations of the Body; such as Diseases, Age, &c. For Instance, *Madness* say they, takes away the Reason, that principal Faculty of the Mind. Age makes Men Dote, and become as Children again, by which Thinking seems to be almost worn out with the Body, a Lethargy Stupifies, and renders the mind as it were Thoughtless, yea, a small Knock on the Pate sometimes is known to Confound, and diminish the Understanding; so that we may well think, that Death the Extream of all Diseases, and Wounds, puts a Total Period to the very Being of the Mind.

To Answer this *Objection*, I think it as needless, as it would be Tedious to give any particular Physical Account of the Reasons of Diseases, or to examine what Alterations are made in the Body, in this, or that *Morbois* Affection, and how the Mind is affected and Alter'd thereupon; but I say it has never appear'd by any Just Observation, that any thing Essential to

118 *Nothing essential to Mind lost by disease,*

the Mind has bin took away or diminished by Disease: But Incessant Cogitation has actually bin under all, however it may have bin altered as to its Objects, and manner of Application to them. And if we speak considerately, and properly, one Mind cannot be said to think more than another (I mean of Men) tho one may think to more purpose, or on better Objects than nother. A Child truly thinks as much, that is as constantly receives the Sensations of Objects, and acts as incessantly about them, as the Wisest Man; tho its Objects, and manner of Acting about them, may vastly differ. Now where there is a perpetual perception of Objects and Acting of Will about them, there is whatever is Essential to a Created Mind, as to its *Being* unchanged and undiminished. But it may be convenient to consider a little the Instances given, as Arguments for the Diminution of the Mind.

And *First*, As to *Madness*, it is but a Vulgar Error and Say-so, that a Mad Man has lost his Reason, for if we observe the Actions of Mad Men, we shall find that they Argue, or Reason as constantly, tho not so Regularly, or Indifferently on all Subjects, as others do; but having so fixed their *Minds* by some Extravagant Passion, on some particular Object, they think on little else, and are hardly diverted from their Passionate Thoughts, and so for want of Attention can't reason about other things; and perhaps do not much Reason, or not Regularly, about that they think on, the Actings of their Wills, being

being chiefly employed; but yet they reason more or less, better, or worse; and so do other Men that are not Mad. And if we consider Madness, I believe it will be found in most Instances to be a Disease of the *Mind*, or beginning there, rather than a Distemper of the *Body*, and that not at all a diminution, or incapacity of Thinking; but rather a Thinking too much on some Things, or an intemperate Desire, or Violent Self-Will. The *Bodies* of *Mad Men* are most commonly found to be strong, and Vigorous, their Digestions Good, and Senses Quick, which I think not likely to be signs of ill Humours, vitiating the Animal Spirits (if there be any such) and so disordering the *Mind*; nor does the disorder of the *Mind*, which I take to be at least the first thing in *Madness*, much impair the *Body*; *Mad Persons* commonly living long in that Condition, if they are not kill'd by Cruel Discipline. But it will be Objected, If Madness be a Disease of the *Mind*, or Beginning there, how is it that it is Cur'd by Medicines, yea and caused sometimes by Poysons, and Feavers, &c. I Answer, That as the *Mind* receives Sensations by occasion and means of the *Body*, those Sensations sometimes by lying long, and heavy upon the *Mind*, at length divert it, and bring it off from its particular furious Desire; as Purging, Bleeding, and Slender Diet, Affecting the *Body* with Weakness, and Consequently the *Mind* with unease, that uneasiness now and then proves enough to divert the other *Mad Passion*, but some sort of Stratagems raising on a Suddain some contrary Passion to that of the *Mad Person* might

more often, and speedily divert and take away the Furious Passion. As for those *Deliria* caus'd by Poysons and Feavours, they are another kind, and they are but short, and either Kill, or go of quickly and are Nothing but grievous Impressions on the Body, of which the Mind is so very sensible, that it is, while they endure much divested from all other Objects; and such madneses are cured by taking away those Impressions.

As for Age, it is likewise to be denied that Old men are less thinking than others; but the Organs of Sense, which are the Conditions of the Perceptions of outward things, being much impair'd, it is no wonder that their Minds are not affected with, and act about what their Thoughts used to be employed in, after the same manner they were wont; yet this is no Interruption of Thought, the very Sensation of the Decays of the bodily Organs, were there nothing else, is enough to show the Mind as much in Being as ever. But it is much to be observed, that Old men under all their Decays are never found to have their wills by age impaired, but covet still as much as ever, or more, either what they should, or should not: Their moral, life or else their Life to sin does not decay by time, but as the one may grow against the other. A Good, and Righteous man would be but in a wretched Case, if that the wearing of his Corps would weaken his love to God, or wear out his Morality, he'd be a Sinner then against his Will which is but little better than a Contradiction. But this is never seen; but as the

Lethargys & wounds diminish not mind 121

the Body does decay, the love of God, and Heavenly things, and reason for that Love grows stronger still. So in the wicked we may observe, the greatest strength of stubborn, ill, self-will, and Self-esteem, and many sinful Passions much increas'd; which if Old Age would wear away, old Sinners might be good and turn'd to Saints against their Wills, or become vertuous, un beholden to their Choice, which is a Paradox: But no such thing is seen, but that desire encreases rather than decays; no Pain, or Grief of Body abates the Will, but rather strengthens it, and makes it more intense, at least in wishing Ease, and freedom from the occasion of its trouble. A Lethargy is but a morbus Sleepiness, locking up as it were the Organs, whereby Sensations of external things are received; under which there always is a Sense at least of the Indisposition, which is Thinking tho' remiss: But this dull Malady being took off, leaves a man as awakened out of Sleep, perceiving the same Objects, and acting about them as before; or if not cur'd, at length by Death releases the Mind, as other mortal Diseases do, from any Obligations to Sensations, or any hindrance of them by the Body. As for Wounds, or Bruises on the Head or other Parts, it is to be observed, that whereas the Author of Nature, in order to the Preservation of the Body, conjoyns a mighty quick and much displeasing or very painful Sense, to any Breach or Wound that tendeth much to spoil the proper Mechanism of that tender Frame, All great and dangerous hurts affect

affect the Mind so much, that taken up as it were with one such mighty Passion, it lets go other thoughts almost, and nothing thinks but Pain and Horrour, and yet it thinks: The most confounding Sense is Sense, and Sense is the Perception of some Object, and the perception of an Object is nothing else but thought, however quick or dull, it matters not, *Thinking is Thinking*, and *Thinking* still remains.

Another Objection that some Mortalists do urge (they think, with mighty strength) is *That we can give no certain Instances of Separate Minds thinking, or acting, when the Body is dead.* They never gave, say they, the Living any account of that Invisible, and Separate State. *Lazarus, when rais'd, told us no Tales of the other World, or where he had been, or how it had been with him, &c.* I answer, It is a very easy thing to give a large Historical Account of Facts that cannot be ascrib'd to any thing but Separate Minds, altho' perhaps it may be hard enough to give them Faith, who will believe no eyes, or Ears besides their own, in things against their own Opinion. But to satisfy those that are wiser than to deny matters of Fact tho' ne'er so well attested (and so render themselves unworthy of all Trust) I shall give a few Relations, instead of very many that might be given of Minds acting when separate from the Body; and then shall answer what Objections may be made by Mortalists against this Head of Argument.

And

An hystorical account of separate Minds. 123

And the first Instance of a *Minds* acting when separate from the Body, shall be the Account of the discovery of the *Murderers* of one *Mr. Stockden*, who was a Victualer in *Grub-street London*, and was murthered 13th of *December 1695*. which Account was published by *Mr. Smythies*, Curate of *St. Giles Cripple-gate 1698*. with the Certificate of the Bishop of *Gloucester*, who with the Dean of *York*, Master of the *Charter-House*, and Dr. *Alix*, had the Particulars from one *Mrs. Greenwood*, to whom *Mr. Stockden* appear'd divers times in Dreams, and shew'd her the Persons who had a hand in his murder, and the places where they were. So that she was able afterwards to go to the Places, and find them out, knowing them again, as they had been shewn her by *Stockden*, who when he came to shew her *Bevil* the man that kill'd him, he said, *Elizabeth* come I will shew thee the man who hath murther'd me; by this means he and two more were apprehended, confess'd the Fact, and were executed. The account was printed in a Paper by it self, and sold by *A. Baldwin* in *Warwick Lane*.

A like Instance we had of one *Mr. Beacon* a Person I was acquainted with when living, and bewail'd the loss of, for his considerable Parts, who appear'd to his Brother *Joseph Beacon* the 2^d of *May 1687*, at *Boston* in *New-England*) having just then died at *Lendon* of a Wound he had sometime before received) and told his Brother he had been barbarously, and injuriously

riously butcher'd by a debauch'd drunken Fellow, and describ'd the Murderer, and told his Brother that the Fellow changing his Name was attempting to go over to *New-England* in *Boy*, or *wild*; and desir'd him at his Arrival to seize him and indict him for the murder; and so he vanished: the Confirmation of the truth of which account he received about the latter end of *June* following, but the Murderer was taken endeavouring to escape, and Prosecuted, but found Friends that bought him off. This Relation may be seen in *Mr. Cotton Mathers Wonders of the Invisible World.*

Another Instance we have in *Saddutismo Triumphato* of the Apparition of *Major George Sydenham* to Captain *William Dyke*, both of *Somerset-shire*, attested by *Mr. Thomas Dyke*, and *Mr. Douch*, to whom both the Major, and Captain were intimately known. The Major and Captain had many disputes about the Being of a God, and Immortality of the Soul, in which points they were not resolved, therefore it was agreed, that he that died first, should come the third night after his Funeral betwixt 12 and 1 to the Little-House in the Garden joyning to *Major Sydenham's* House at *Dulverton*; the Major died first, the Captain waited at the time, and Place appointed, but there was no appearance; but about 6 Weeks after he appear'd to the Captain at *Dulverton* in the Chamber where he lay, and drew back the Curtains, and said Captain, Captain,

Captain, I could not come at the time appointed. But am now come to tell you, that there is a God, and a very just, and terrible one; and if you do not turn over a new Leaf, you will find it so.

I shall mention but one more Instance, which was sent to Dr. *H. More*, from Dr. *Fowler* the present Bishop of *Gloucester*, and is to be seen more largely related in *Sad. Triumphato*.

That the Wife of Dr. *Bretton*, late Rector of *Ludgate*, who formerly lived in *Herefordshire*, appeared to a Woman that had been her Maid, who seeing her, said, were not my Mistress dead I should not question but you are she. She replied, I am the Same that was your Mistress, and she added, She had Business of Importance with her, and she must go with her. The Woman desir'd to be excus'd, and entreated her to go to her Master, who must be more fit to be employed. She said, she had a desire rather to make use of him, and had in order thereto been several times in his Chamber, but he was still asleep, nor had she Power to do more than once uncover his Feet towards awakening him. The Woman objected, she had none to look to her Child, and she fear'd it would cry it self to death. She reply'd, the Child shall sleep till you return. So the Woman follow'd her over a Stile into a large Field. She said, observe how much of this Field I measure with my Feet, and when she had took a large Compass, she said all this belongs to the Poor, and is gotten

gotten from them by wrongful means, and charg'd her to go and tell her Brother (who had the Land at that time) that he should give it up to the Poor again forthwith, as he lov'd her and his deceased Mother. (This Brother was not he who did the unjust Act, but his Father.) She added, That she was the more concern'd because her name was made use of in some Writing relating to this Land. The Woman ask her how she should satisfie her Brother that this was no Cheat? She Replied, Tell him this Secret, *He* and *I* are only Privy to, and he will believe. The Woman having promis'd to do what she desired, she proceeded to give her good Advice, and entertain'd her till Twilight appear'd, with Heavenly, and Divine Discourse, and then Disappear'd. The Woman did the Message, and the Land was Restored to the Poor.

I might refer my Reader to many such Relations, and could give what I my Self have had from the mouth of the Person that has had such an Apparition, but will not pretend any greater Certainty to my Reader on that account, tho the matter of Fact be as plain, and positively Asserted, as any. Anothers Testimony is as good as mine. But I shall now Consider a little what may be Objected against this Argument for the Actings, and consequently real Existence of Separate Minds? The Question cannot modestly be, Whether the matters of Fact be true, there are so many such, and so well attested. But it may be said these Appearances were but Bodies, and the Voyces, but *Motions of Matter*. I
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Objections about apparitions answered, 125

Answer, Tis very right : For that Separate Minds may converse sensibly with Living Men, the use of Matter is necessary to signify who the Persons are, and to communicate their thoughts; but the Appearances, and Motions of matter cannot be without the Agency of Mind. But then the Mortalists will say, If ever there be any such Apparition, it is the Devil that acts the part of the Dead Person. I Answer, There are some that are very apt to attribute any thing that is Great or Strange, to the Devil, whether Bad, or Good; but I think the Devil is very oft Belied, and is not necessary to so much either Good, or Evil, as some, who have a very great Opinion of his Devilship, believe. But it is unreasonable to think that the Devil would be so divided against himself, (as Christ Argues it with the Jews) as of his own Accord to do these Things contrary to his own Kingdom, and Inclination, being no Friend to Justice, Mercy, or Truth; Nor can that be urg'd with any good Reason, which is the only Objection some Mortalists make to these instances, *That the Devil does all this, how good soever it seems, to this one End, to Establish the Error of the Souls Immortality.* For were it an Error what Advantage is there like to come to the Devils Kingdom by this Notion, or less by the suppos'd Mortality? Are those that Believe the Souls Immortality consequently more Wicked than the Mortalists? Or do they less fear Damnation because they suppose they shall be assur'd of it as soon as they Die, if Impenitent? No, If the Two Opinions be impartially weigh'd against one another, I believe that of the Mortalists

talists, will rather incline to the Devils side, and we shall find more *Hobbian*, and *Spinozian*, *Libertines* in a like number, than in so many Immortalists. But the Abuse of the Notion of the Immortality, is not in the Notion it self, where it is abus'd, any more than the Abuse of Christianity is in the Religion Christ taught. Nor can God be suppos'd to force the Devil to these things: He has no need of his Ministry. And God himself, I suppose, none will think assumes a Shape, and Personates his Creatures. It remains only a doubt whether an Angel is Employed in such Matters. I Answer, To Employ one Being to personate another, who will hardly fail of being mistaken for him he personates, is very unlikely to be the method of God, who cannot be suppos'd to need any such deceitful Methods to manifest Truth, and promote Justice. He cannot be suppos'd to Suffer, much less to force a Good Angel to deceive Men; to make them believe a Separate State, if there be no such thing. And, how can an Angel say I am such a One. Such a one hath Murthered me, or say there is such a Secret between me and such a Person. I think there can be no fair Account of these things, but on a Supposition of the Existence, and separate State of Minds, and their Acting in these Appearances; God concurring with their Wills to cause Appearances like their Bodies, and Voices to satisfy their Earnest Desires, for some good Purpose he is pleas'd to Prosecute by them, which, if it had bin so proper to have done by Angels, or Devils, might have bin done

done without Personating Dead Men. As for those Appearances themselves, it is most likely they are some Aerial Bodies acted at the Desire of the Minds, or some strong Imaginations impress'd upon the Minds of the Persons to whom they are made, as perhaps it might be in that relation of *Stockden*; but I can hardly think they are what some call *Vehicles*, because they suddainly disappear, and not march off, as consistent Aerial Bodies tho ever so subtle, would do; and because we are certain that there is no need of any Body at all to belong to a Mind, from the Nature of the things, the one being very well conceivable without the other.

The End of these Apparitions, if the Circumstances be considered, appears to be good, and I would challenge the Mortalists to prove any real matter of Fact here that has tended to Evil. As for the Immortality, we must be convinced 'tis an Error, before the Proof of that can be offered as an Evil End; but if the Mind be Immortal, as we Assert, and the belief of it a good Motive to Gospel Obedience, as some Mortalists have confess'd, the Apparition is good to prove it, as well as for the promoting of Justice, Truth, Mercy, Goodness, &c. which have appear'd to be the main Ends of these Actions in all the Well-Asserted Instances I have met with: I say well-Asserted, for I question not but there have bin many false Stories of such things, which when found to be untrue, have much discredited the business of Apparitions, and Existence of Separate Minds, whereby the Devil, who is the

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Father of Lies, by his Agents, the deceivers among Men, hath done more to discredit the Immortality of the Mind, than by those Appearances the Mortalists pretend he makes to persuade us to believe it : How ready will a Materialist be to decry all as Fable, for one Cheat in this matter? So that the Devil must be very Foolish to be the Author of these things, if God would permit him so far to deceive us.

But it is expected by the Mortalist that if there were a Separate State of Minds, when they Act in Appearances, or when Persons have bin rais'd from the Dead, as *Lazarus* was, they should have given us some *Historical*, if not *Cosmographical* Account of the other World, but we have none ; or they should have told us something of their Separate State. I Answer, I might have given an Account of some Instances where the Deceased Minds have declared themselves Happy, or Miserable, as they are to be found in Divers Authors ; but for any Curious Discoveries, they seem foreign to the Purpose, for which those Appearances have always bin made : God has not seen fit to give us more that way than what we have in his Word. Besides, should one come from the Dead to these Men ; I question whether they would believe him, it would be all a Fallacy of the Devil with them, to make Men believe that suppos'd Pernicious Error of the Minds Immortality. But I will give one Instance of a Mind's Acting without the Body, which to me is of as much force to persuade the possibility, and probability of a Separate State, as any of those given, and more instructive

Instructive as to the nature of that State. I knew a Man some few Years ago, who tho I cannot say he was Dead, was so far loosed from the Body, that he had no manner of perception thereof, or thereby, for sometime (I know not how long) neither Seeing, Hearing, Feeling, nor having any other Bodily Sensation, or Notion of any, his own, or other Body, being quite Abstracted from the Material World; and yet he was so far from being Thoughtless, that he never thought so intensely, and regularly in his Life. This a Materialist says, *was giving over all Thinking upon the things which they know, and Thinking upon they know not what, and so becoming distracted*, or it was a fit of Enthusiasm. But I Answer, it may be it was Thinking on what Materialists know nothing of, and being abstracted from matter. But however *they* being Men of Curiosity, may be Inclined to ask what Discoveries did he make? Where was he? What did he think upon? I Answer, I have leave to tell as far as it is speakable. He was not Absent from his Body by any local Distance, or remove, he was in a World that has no here nor there, nor are the things in it capable of any Situation, or Stowage: A Heaven where Materialists, if they are in the Right, can never be. And he thought on that which *Non prius fuit in sensu*, Let Philosophers say what they please. That which *Eye had not Seen, nor Ear Heard, nor had it ever entred into his Mind before, so much as to Conceive*, as he then conceived it, and yet he thought on that which *Is*, and will be confess'd to be the most Glorious and Entertaining Object, even the All-

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perfect Mind: And he thought on him with unspeakable intense Desire, which Desire he found intensely satisfied by Gods approving, and receiving it. He then understood himself in a very good Condition, being fill'd with Joy, and and Pleasure unspeakable, from the intimate perception of the Highest Object. He had then no need, as well as no Thoughts, of his Body, or a Bodily World, or any Desire, or Power of Returning to it. And had he continued in this Condition, he believes he had bin as much dissolved, or separated from the Body as is possible: And how the Body was then any way subservient to his Being, or Happiness, any more than if it had bin Rotten in the Grave, he sees not. And tho he perceived God then better than he ever did before, he had no quantitative, or Local Notion of him, nor had he any Vision of a Glorified Christ, or other Saint, or any need of any Creature Company, or sight of Globes, or Chambers full of Light, or any such Material Pleasures: But found a Mind, one single Mind, might be, and be satisfactorily happy, without any Object but God; so little is the Almighty beholden to *more* Creatures to make *one* Happy; so very well may a *Mind* exist blessedly independent on any thing but God; all other Objects were then nothing to him, nor he to them, nor thought he need, or means, or yet desire to receive them. Nay, he forgot himself with all his good, and evil deeds, and a hell of anguish he had but lately had in him, when that he thought on God some time before as not his Friend; I say he forgot

forgot himself as far as was possible under such extream sensibility. But how long in this state he was, he cannot tell, nothing successive than was thought upon. What the Materialists may think of this discovery I know not, or whether they may deny the matter of Fact, as they use to do, when they know not what to say to a thing; or say as one once falsely did, *he declares he was distracted*. They may say he was mad, and had a Devil, and would fain deceive them into the belief of the wicked Notion of a Spiritual, Immortal *Mind*, when *They* are nothing they are sure but organical matter, with mechanical life adnihilable by a knock or two. But whatever they may say, I know he was no whimsical, or melancholick Person, Enthusiast, or one that loves, or ever allow'd himself to lie, nor had his rapture any but a good Effect upon his Life and Conversation. He never was forward to discourse of it, (thinking it *not expedient for him to glory*) or would have had it mentioned now, but from a hope of doing good. Such a happy State may *Lazarus* be suppos'd to have been in when dead, and yet to have been united to his *Body* again wthout the difficulty of coming from Heaven some make, or any injury done him, by leaving that happiness, when it was to confirm the Gospel.

Another Objection that the Mortalists do make, is, That the Faith of Separate, and Immortal Souls, or *Minds*, is pure Paganism, or an Opinion that the Heathens held, and that he must needs be a Pagan that first broached it. I answer, This objection is so weak, I should not

134 *The Minds Immortality not Paganism.*

have mentioned it, but only to shew the Weakness of some men of confidence enough to entitle their loose Arguings Demonstrations. But Paganism 'tis evident did not consist in this Belief, any more than Christianity does in the contrary. But that a Pagan (yea if all Pagans) held it, therefore 'tis false, is such a *nonsequitur*, a Pagan man would have been asham'd of. They should have proved a Pagan first, can hold nothing that's true, and then they might have proved there is no sin, because the Pagans held there was. But that this Notion has been held by the generality of Mankind, I mean the Best of them, Jews, Pagans, Christians, Turks, is rather an argument that there is a Truth in it, tho' they have most of them had but a too material Notion of it. But I remember one saying of a Pagan, that seems so clear, that I am tempted to mention it tho' I value none but infallible Authorities and that is *Cicero in Som: Scipionis. Sic habeto te non esse mortalem, sed Corpus hos: Nec enim is es quem forma ista declarat: Sed mens cujusque is est quisque, non ea figura que digito demonstrari potest.* So count your Self not mortal, but this Body: for neither are you *He* which that *Shape* declares: but the *Mind* of every one, is the *Person*, or *Self*, and not that Figure which may be pointed at with the Finger. It is also an Objection some of them do make, that if the *Mind* be Immortal, the Wicked that begins to suffer 5000 or 6000 Years before his fellow-Sinners, has a greater share of suffering than they have, and so Divine Justice is not equal to all. I answer he that begins

Objection from thoughts suppos'd in Brutes 135

gins to suffer sooner, began to sin sooner, and might have been happy sooner, as well as miserable, had he repented. Besides unhappiness is the Effect, or consequence of every ones own Actions, in choosing that wherein Happiness cannot possibly be, and not a thing caused by a positive act of God's Will. And he that has suffer'd ever so long, has not suffer'd a minute longer than he has been sinning, and working his own unhappiness by the unreasonable and Wicked Acts of his own Will.

Another Objection that some Materialists do urge against the Immateriality, and Immortality of the *Mind*, is, That Brutes, which we acknowledge to be wholly material and mortal, do think and reason too, tho' in a lower degree than men; and why, if thoughts can be in Beasts meerly Machines, may not Thinking also result in Men from certain configurations, and motions of matter? *Answer*, It is not yet proved that Beasts do think: No Mortal has demonstrated the thing, as we can find; and I'll engage to him that shall, farther to prove these bestial *Minds* Immortal to, and justly capable of lasting Happiness, and Wo. Whatever Creature thinks (unless he could be thought to think of all things by a perfect intuition, as God himself does) must needs be thought capable and needy to infer Knowledge from Knowledge, which is to reason; and reason it self, tho' by some so admir'd, is but a Note of Creature and Imperfect Knowledge: The more the Mind by intuition knows, and the less it needs to argue, and Infer, the perfecter it is; so that a

136 *Brutes if they think, capable of duty or sin*

Beast I do Confess, may well be thought to reason, if it thinks at all. Some believe the difference between a Beast and Man is not that this is Rational, the other not, but that a Man is a Religious Animal, the Beast not such. But I should think that if Brutes can reason at all, they may make the easiest inferences, viz. From the experience of their Insufficiency, so sensibly found by daily wants, they may conclude they must be caus'd, and so dependent on some other Being to whom they owe whatever they have, by whose good will they are obliged to Humble Acknowledgments: And to the same Good Will to others like themselves, Sincere Obedience also in willing others good, And here is the ground of Duty to God, and one another, and of Sin. Where-ever there is Will (and most think 'tis in Brutes) that Will is free (or else a *Will* is not a *Will*) and capable to choose, or to suspend its Choice, or to refuse. Wrong choice; that's hastily made; unreasonable; that is without Gods leave; is Sin. And I can't easily think God would make Beings capable to know, but not to know himself; That would lay them under a necessity of having some other their chief good, and not him. But who can think the Envious Dog, that sees his little Hungry Brother feed on what his Master gave, or that to which good Chance a Title made, can tear his Throat, and take his Food without an unjust Cruelty? Or who can think that God can make a Thinking Being under no Law, or give a License to his furious Will to do as he would not be done by? For my part, I must think that
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Reasons to prove no Thoughts in Brutes. 137

whatsoever God made capable to act, must act according to a natural, or revealed Law, or else continue to find, and to abide Gods just resentment. If a Beast thinks, he must needs desire to have what his necessity requires, and Gift makes his; and if another takes it away by violence, why does he not amiss as much as a man that robbeth a man? The Reason of Right and Wrong, Rewards, and Punishments, must needs be the same according to their degrees, to all free Thinkers, whether Men, or Beasts. The greater Knowledge makes but the greater fault, and Punishment. But this Life don't requite, or set to right the Wrongs done in it. Therefore there must be time to come, to pay, and to repay to all that good or evil do. But I need not argue farther here: Whatever has been said for the Distinction, and Dependance, Immateriality, and Immortality of other Minds, will hold for Brutal ones but I won'targue, now on that supposition; because I think there is most reason to conclude Beasts are but meer Machines, and have no thoughts at all. I shall therefore (to take off the whole force of what the Materialists do urge from a supposition of thought, in Brutes) give some of those reasons that have induced me to deny all thoughts in them and to leave the vulgar Opinion which all that have almost, had from their Childhoodg, rounded but upon unconsidered Appearances. And I say in the first place that we neither have nor can have any Experience of thoughts in Brutes, unless we could be conscious of them, which none ever was: And as we do not know
that

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that they think, so neither have we any sufficient ground of Faith to believe it, from the Figures, and Motions of those Brutal Bodies, or their resemblance to those in men; for it does not follow, that because my Machine is moved at my particular Will, that another sort of Machine must needs be moved at the desire of a *Mind* particularly belonging to it; or that because I perceive my *Body*, and others by it, therefore there is an Intelligent Being belonging to every Locomovent Organical Body. We rationally conclude that Humane Bodies, are the Instruments of *Minds*, because we have a method of Communication of Thoughts by them to one another. But we having none with *Brutes*, so as that it could ever be said by any man, this Horse or this Dog &c. had this or that particular Thought, we cannot rationally conclude they have any, on the account of those Motions we see in them.

Again, As we have no certainty or grounded Faith of *Minds* belonging to brutal Bodies, so we are absolutely sure that they may be but *Machines*, and all that is done in them may be done mechanically, and needs no Intelligent Agents to act them, any more than the Sun, Moon, and Stars; but the Author of Nature whose Wisdom and Power may well be thought sufficient to make, and act these little *Machines* to all their Ends and Purposes, as well as the grand one, the World, without the help of a *Mind to every one*, or a none knows what, call'd Instinct. And indeed there are things done by *Brutal Understandings*, and so very regularly, certainly and also cunningly, that it is not easy to think

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think them done by Brutal foresights, unless they have *Minds* much superiour to *Mens*. We need not instance in many; it is well known how some even Insects, as *Bees*, always work regularly, and seeming providently; how *Birds* make their Nests always after the same manner, of the same matter, and as well the first time, before they saw any such thing done, as ever after. So that it is easier to believe them acted by a Superiour *Mind*, and a wisdom above what we can suppose in them, or in our selves, a Wisdom and Power that may be allowed sufficient to make Automata, or Engines, as much beyond what man can do, as a *Beast* exceeds a *Watch*. But the reasons that conclude the matter with me, are not that we are wholly uncertain that they think, or that we are certain that it may be otherwise, or meerly from the unreasonableness of judging by conjectures, and appearances, but from the consideration of the Goodness and other Perfections of God, and of his Oeconomy. And I had always rather venture to believe that which may argue me singular, or less wise, with others, than that which would argue God less good, and perfect. But now if we consider Beasts these three ways, as related to Man, as related to one another, and as related to God, I believe it will sufficiently appear that they have indeed no thoughts, nor ought to be suppos'd to have any. In the first place to consider Brutes as related to Man, it is certain not only from the Grant to *Adam*, and to *Noah* but from Experience, that man has Dominion over them; and if they have thoughts,

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Thoughts and Consequently are capable of Happiness, or Misery, Man can, and does, in his best and usual use of them, make them Unhappy, or take away their Happiness. But it is unreasonable to suppose that the Fountain of Goodness, Power, and Wisdom, should allow one Creature to make another Miserable; much less lay them under a necessity of Being made so by one another.

That Man should be made a Lord over his fellow Creatures, nay have a License, or Necessity to be a Devil to them, who if they are Agents at all, act more regularly and according to their kind, and end of being, than Man, cannot easily be thought becoming the Divine Government. That the most Irregular, and Wicked Creature should have the Innocent at his Cruel Dispose; or if you take Brutes also for Sinners, should be permitted to satisfy his Lust, or if you will, to lay a Capital Punishment, and Execute it on the whole Race of the less Harmful Sheep and Cows, &c. rather than Prosecute the bloody Lion, or Cruel Bear, &c. and to crush the poor little Insect because it is small, what Humane Heart can think Just, and Good; or that Right is grounded thus in Might, and Craft, or that he that is most Defenceless, and Harmless ought to be the greatest Sufferer?

Who can think that Man should be either a Permitted, or a Licensed Enemy so long to make War and Prey upon his Brethren of the whole Creation? I profess if I thought Brutes Capable of Happiness or Misery, (as all Created Thinkers must be) I should think my self Cruel,

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el, and Unjust to take away the Life, or Ease of the least of them, on any other account than I might that of a Man.

• Again, If we Consider them as related to one another, what a discordant Creation have we, upon the Supposition of Brutes being Intelligent, not only upon the Account of the Cruelty, and Injustice they must be thought to act, some of them needlessly, on one another, but from the Necessity others are in, of Food; great parts of them having no provision allotted them for their Sustainance, but some other kinds of Animals. But if we Consider them meerly, as related to God, and Sinless; what Miseries are their Minds subject to, that neither they themselves, nor Men have bin the cause of! As some to Diseases, and most to Casual Pains, and Sorrows, that accompany the business of Generation. Besides, how many of them have bin slain for no real need, but to smoke on Altars, as we are Taught by Gods Appointment; when Goodness, one would Think, might have bin atton'd for ones default, or took his penitent Acknowledgment, without anothers Pain; Incense or Senseless Beings Devoted, would have made as much amends, Repentance and Righteousness had bin better Confession of what had bin done amiss. Now to solve the difficulty by the Fancy that they are Cursed, and at Enmity with one another for *Adams* Sin, will not mend the matter; for to make one Miserable for anothers Sin, is as ill becoming Divine Justice and Goodness, as to suppose he made
Creature

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Creatures Unhappy, meerly because he would have it so, or for no Reason at all. But now as none of these Disorders and Miseries can be thought of Gods causing, and they must be thought so to be, if Beasts do think, we may with the best reason give up that Knowledge we but suppose in them, for the Goodness and Wisdom we are sure of in God; and cease to admire the cunningness of our Fox, or Dog, and adore the Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of our God, who hath made Machines so adapted to Mans Use, and which he may use, so as he could not his fellow Thinkers, without Injustice and Cruelty: As some to carry him, others to Feed him, and Cloath him, and others to move great Weights, &c. And I think it is most likely that there are no Animals, but are design'd for some use to Man, or for Food to them that are capable of being profitable to him; and perhaps the most seeming Disorders (those which must be suppos'd sinful on the truth of Beasts having thought) might be some way or other instructive to Man; may be as Emblems, shewing the Ugliness of what should never have bin seen in Rational Creatures. But some perhaps will be so Inconsiderate as to say, should this *Opinion Prevail*, *That Beasts are meer Machines*, Men would be apt to be Cruel to them. I Answer, it would be so far from that, that there would be no ground for Cruelty. For who is Cruel to a *Beast*, or to a Man, but on a Supposition that he can hurt them? Does any Man fight his Watch, or beat his Wind-Mill? No Man would do any thing that looks like Cruelty, to spoil any
Creature,

Scripture Light concerning the Mind. 143

Creature, but supposing it hurts it, or puts it to pain. A Man would Whip his Horse no more than is necessary to excite those Motions in him that he is designed for, and is capable of, if he thought him but a Machine.

C H A P. XIV.

Of Scripture Light, in this Controversy. Materialists Objections from Scripture, Answered. Beasts Thinking Objected from Scripture.

BUT there is still one Objection in this matter, which some of the Materialists, and Mortalists urge (I say some, for Deists who are commonly Materialists, and Mortalists will not pretend to it,) and that is, *That the Holy Scripture is against us, and that it appears thence that the Mind is not an Immaterial, and Immortal Substance, that has a Separate Being after the Death or Dissolution of the Body; But that Death puts an End to all Cogitation; so that Man is wholly Mortall.* I Answer, whatever God has decided by a Revelation, we are Bound, and ready to believe; as soon as we are sure that he has said it. But that he has decided this Controversy against the Distinction, Substantiality, and Immortality of the Mind, we deny; and don't Question, but we shall make out the Contrary, viz. *That the Mind is a Distinct and Immortal Being, from Scripture self.* If we could
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not, I know we should do nothing at all with some Persons, who if it could but be made, appear probable from Scripture, *That Minds are not Distinct Beings*, or that they wholly cease on the Death of the Body, the plainest Demonstration to the Contrary that Reason is capable of, and whatever we have said, will be of little force with them. Whatever Things they happen to believe to be said in Scripture, tho' they really infer Contradictions, or the greatest imperfections in God, they can believe and see plain and easie. And what they once believe to be said in the Bible, you can hardly ever perswade them to be not said there. And we find by Daily experience that there is nothing so absurd any way relating to Religion, yea, and to other things, but some Men will believe it, and find it revealed in Scripture as they are perswaded. But all Men that are skill'd in any Languages besides their own, especially in the Dead ones, in which our Scriptures are Written, know that the Design of the Writers of those Books is that which is properly Scripture, and not whatever the Grammatical Sense of the Words or Translation will bear, or may be some way infer'd therefrom. And that all Languages, especially the *Hebrew*, that imperfect and barren one, have divers Words, that are Ambiguous and used in various Senses, more things being express'd by one Word, and one thing by more Words, on which account unskilful Men especially those that have an Hypothesis to serve, may be easily mistaken. But we shall now come
to

to Scripture, and search Impartially with the most rational Rules of knowing the Writers sense, and shall see if we can find any such Design, and meaning in the chief Texts *Mortalists*, and *Materialists* urge, or whether we cannot find the contrary in them, or some others, the chief we can think on. But we shall not pretend, as some them have done, to run over all the Texts from the beginning of *Genesis* to the end of the *Revelations*, that may seem to have something Relating to the matter in them, knowing whatever is indeed proved to be true by any one Text, if it be Gods word, cannot be false, or disapproved by another: And that Texts are not to be oppos'd one to another, and carry a point meerly by a Majority.

Now before I come to Answer the *Materialists* and *Mortalists* chief Texts, I shall Observe in the First place,

That neither *the Separate, nor the Future State of the Mind*, was so clearly manifested in the *Old Testament Time*, as in the *New*, according to that *2 Tim. 1. 10*. Where Christ is said to have brought *Life and Immortality to Light through the Gospel*.

And again, *2ndly*, I take Notice that the *Mortalists Proofs* (as they call them) as far as I have found are mostly taken from the *Old Testament*, when it is apparent to all that *Impartially* read the *Bible*, that the *Writers of the Old Testament*, had most of them but a small Light in the *Future State of Men* and that the *Promises and Threatnings* made to the *Hebrews*, were mostly of *Happiness, or Unhappiness in the present Life*, and in some places a *Future*, as well as a *Separate State*, seems to be doubted of, if not denied, as *Job. 7. 7. Mine Eye shall*

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shall no more see Good ; and verse 9. *He that goeth down to the Grave, shall not come up.* So *Psal. 30. 13.* *O spare me that I may recover strength be fore I go hence, and be no more.* And tho we have made *Job* speak, *Chap. 19. 26.* As if he had some hope of a *Resurrection*, thus, *And tho after my skin Worms destroy this Body, yet in my Flesh I shall see God.* insisted of *And after they have destroyd this my Skin yet in my Flesh I shall see God.* Some *Learned Men* understand *Job* meant only he should be Happy again after his Afflictions.

Again, 3dly, It is Observable that the *Moralists* and *Materialists* think it much to their Purpose that the *Hebrew* and *Greek* Words Translated, *Soul*, or *Mind*, are often us'd to signifie *Body*, or *Breath*, or *Life*, and are sometimes spoken of *Beasts* as well as of *Men* ; when the various and Ambiguous use of the words is rather an *Argument* that no certainty can be had of the truth of the matter meerly from words, but the *Design* and *Scope* of the *Writers* are to be taken not only from whole *Sentences*, but sometimes from the *Context*, but yet we will consider these words a little.

First, The Word *Nephesh* is indeed used to signifie the *Breath*, and *Bodily*, or *Mechanical Life*, of all *Animals*, *Man*, and *Brutes* ; and sometimes even our *Carkass* without the mind, is call'd by this name ; but I must tell the *Mortalists* it is most commonly used for the *Mind*, or what belongs alone to *Thinking*. As when it is used for a Person, for the *Will*, the *Appetite*, *Desire*, *Affection*, &c. And I have found it in near Two Hundred places, where it must be taken for what is *Spiritual* and *Immaterial*, and cannot be taken for
any

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any thing that belongs to the *Body*, as (not to trouble the *Reader* with *Citations*) in all those places where it is spoken of Man morally considered, which he can be only as a *Mind*.

So *Neshamah* is sometimes used for *Breath*, and sometimes for the *Mind*, and sometimes for the *Body*, and sometimes for the whole Compound, *Mind and Body*, sometimes for the *Wind*, the *Breath* of the *Animal*, and sometimes for *Speech*. It is not used much above Twenty, or Twenty Four times, and Nine or Ten times where it cannot be taken for any thing but the *Mind*, or what belongs only to *Mind*.

Ruah is used to signifie any *Spirit*, either *God*, *Angels*, or the *Spirit*, or *Mind* of *Man*. And it is used for the *Will*, or *Inclination*, for *Pride*, for the *Wind*, the *Air*, *Breath* of *Man*, or *Beast*; and I have found it in above One Hundred and Thirty places where it must be understood of the *Mind*.

The Word *Leb*, which properly signifies that *Bowel* we call the *Heart*, (and might be brought at the rate of some *Mens* Arguing, to prove that *Round piece of Flesh* to be the *Soul*) is taken for the *Mind*, *Understanding*, *Wisdom*, *Thought*, *Council*, *Will*, and is spoken sometimes of the *Beasts*; but in above Three Hundred places where I have found the Word, there are not above Six where it can be taken for any thing but *Mind*, or what belongs to it.

The Word *Psuche* in *Greek* has the same significations, as the *Hebrew* *Nephesch*, and *Pneuma* as *Ruah*, and their particular Senses are to be taken from the particular Place

they are us'd in, but the Greek Word *Nous*, in *English Mind*, I have not found used for any thing but *Mind*, or what belongs meerly to *Thinking*. And I have used the word *Mind* all along in this Discourse, being the most free from *Ambiguity* as the fittest word to expresse that *Being* that is distinct from *matter*.

I might have put down the places where these *Hebrew* and *Greek* Words are used, had I thought it worth the Time I took to look them, much to the purpose, or needful; it being apparent from the Scope of the places in what Sense words are to be taken which by use have various Significations, and by Nature none.

We shall now come to Consider the *Chief*, or *Strongests Texts* we can find, that the *Materialists* and *Mortalists* have urged against the *Distinct Separate and Immortal Being of the Mind*.

First, It is urged that Man is wholly *Material* and *Mortal*, from *Gon. 2. 6.* God formed Man of the Dust of the Ground, and *Chap. 3. 19.* Till thou return to the Ground, for out of it wast thou taken, for Dust thou art, and unto Dust shalt thou return.

I Answer, That it does not follow, because God made *Adam* the Dust of *Adamah*, or *Red Earth*, That Man is wholly *Material* and *Mortal*. For Man is call'd *Adam* on the account of his *Body*, and its *Original*, a part, and that the worse for the whole; and by this word his *Low*, and *Ignoble Condition* as to his *Material part* is Represented, as his *Sickly*, and *Mortal State* by *Enosh*, *Psal. 49. 2.* Both *Low*, and *High* is in the *Hebrew*; *Bene Adam*, and *Bene Ish*. And it
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is of this *Adam* or *Product* of *Red Earth*, the things in the Text are spoken; but we read that after God had made such a Thing, he did more *viz.* Breathed into his Face the *Breath of Lives*. Which God is not said to do in making of any other Creature. He first formed *Adam* of the Dust of the Ground and then afterwards inspired the Breath of Life, which was not made of the Ground as *Adam* was, but came immediately from God, who is said Chap. 1. 27 to have created man in his Image, which Image could not be material, unless God be material, which can't be suppos'd without the greatest absurdities, as we have shew'd before. It is also observable that where man is said to be from the Earth, it is said he was *formed*, fashioned as a Potter does his Vessel, but where Man is said to be made the Image of God, he is said to be *Created*, that is, *Being* given him, so that he was both formed, and Created; that is, his *Body* formed, and his *Mind* which is the *Image* of God, and that whereby he had Dominion, and rules other Creatures, was created, and consequently distinct from his *Body*. It is by Knowledge, and Understanding not by Matter, that man represents his Maker, most and rules under him. But that man who is apt to be proud like *Lucifer*, may be humble before God he is bound to a *Body*, and spoken of sometimes by the Name of that worst part, as to which he is but little superiour to the Beasts, But that is also urged by the Materialists which we find Ecl. 3. 19. *What*

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befalleth the Sons of Men befalleth Beasts, as the one dieth, so dieth the other, yea they have all one Breath; so that a man hath no preheminence above a Beast. I answer, This was only what Solomon was thinking in his Heart, verse 18. concerning the Event (as the Hebrew word signifies) of Men, and Beasts, in relation to the present short Life; that the Bodies of Men and Beasts go alike to the Earth. But then verse 21, he asks a Question, rather than ventures to determine what he thought about the Spirit of a Man, or of a Beast, which he seems to suppose different as to their tendency, one going upwards, the other downwards: *Who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth upwards, and the Spirit of a Beast that goeth downwards to the Earth? Or who knoweth whether the Spirit of a man goeth upwards, and whether the Spirit of a Beast goeth downwards,* as the Sept: and vulg: Lat. read it. Which is a Question and insinuation I think none can build any great matter upon as to the Immortality, or Mortality of the Mind, when if by Spirit is meant Air drawn in, and breath'd out, as he seems to mean when he saith they have all one Breath, there cannot be thought any such difference when they die, as here is insinuated. And if we suppose he means Mind, by Spirit. it is not capable of Motion, nor were Beasts ever yet proved to have Minds. But there are some other Texts that seem to favour the Materialists Notion, *That Matter can think*; And if we have such a revelation made us, there is no need to suppose

suppose Immaterial Minds. If matter be sufficient we need not multiply Beings. John 1 13. which were born, or begotten not of the Will of the Flesh, &c. Gal. 5. 16, 17. This I say then, walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the Lusts of the Flesh; the Flesh lusteth against the Spirit and the Spirit against the Flesh: So Eph. 2. 3. Ye walked as in time past fulfilling the Desires of the Flesh and of the Mind. To which I say, that the Will of the Flesh, the Lusts of the Flesh, and Desires of the Flesh; as also the Law in the Members, Rom. 7. 23. is nothing but the inordinate desire of those Gratifications, or Pleasures which come by means of the Body or Flesh, when Reason, or the Mind duely considering, would see them irregular, and inconvenient. I say this is meant, and not any Principle distinct from Mind, or action thereof in man differing from the Mind, when Matter cannot think, and consequently can't have a Will, or Desire.

But they urge the total cessation of Thoughts which we must needs call the Death of the Mind, if it be true that Thinking wholly ceases on the Death of the Body, and they endeavour to prove this from divers Texts. As Ecl. 9 5, 6. The Dead know not any thing, neither have they any more a reward, for the memory of them is forgotten, Their Love and their Hatred and their Envy is now perished, neither have they any more a Portion for ever in any thing that is done under the Sun, and verse 7. The Preacher bids us eat and drink and be merry. 8. and 9. adorn our selves, and enjoy our Wives, as our

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Portion in this Life, and verse 10. tells us *there is no Work nor Device, nor Knowledge, in the Grave.* Not much unlike that

Ede, bibe, lude, post Mortem nulla Voluptas.

I answer, in these verses Solomon speaks according to the sense of Things he then had, or he tells what he had bin thinking: The certainty of future Rewards and Punishments being not clearly manifest to him, else he could not have said they have *no more a Reward*, neither have they any more a Portion for ever in *any thing that is done under the Sun*. The clear revelation of future Rewards, and Punishments, and of the 1000 Years Kingdom, was kept to be made to, and by a greater than Solomon. But it may be granted that the dead, (unless on special occasions) that God reserves to his own wise Pleasure, have no Knowledge of the affairs of this World. And their Love, and Hatred &c. may well be said to perish, as to the Effects and manifestations of it to the Living; but that the *Mind* that knows, and loves God, should cease so to do, for want of a little organical Stuff, and that God who approves of the Knowledge and Love of himself, should cause a *Mind* that knows him and is in love with him to cease, and so disapprove of his own work, I see no necessity from this Text to believe, or that the Wicked should be necessarily, and by force cured of their *Ill Will*, or exempted any time from finding the unreasonableness, or ill Effects of it. That there is *no Work nor Device &c. in the Grave*, is
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most certain; for there is nothing but matter there. Or if by Grave be meant the State of the Dead, it is but that the Works of this Life are not to be done in that State. But that departed, or separate Minds, do nothing, cannot be true but by their cessation, which how inconsistent with good reason, we have shewn before. But what is urged from Psal. 6. 5. *In Death there is no remembrance of thee, in the Grave who shall give thee thanks?* and Psal. 88. 10. *Shall the Dead rise, and praise thee?* And that of Hezekiah Isa. 38. 18. *The Grave cannot praise thee, Death cannot celebrate thee, they that go down to the Pit cannot hope for thy Truth.* Cap. 2. 6. 14. *They are dead, they shall not live, they are deceased, they shall not rise, therefore hast thou visited, and destroyed them.*

I say what is in these Texts, is very easily understood, without a supposition of the *Minds* being mortal: We need not say in the Grave comes nothing but the *Body*, but with the Dead there is no Commemoration, or publick Thanksgiving, or *Confession* of God, as the Hebrew words import, *who shall confess thee?* That in Pal. 88. 10. is but a Question, but will be better translated, *If the the Dead arise*, they will praise thee; but while in that State of Death, they have not a Capacity of declaring Gods Wonderous Works. That of Hezekiah Isa. 3. 8. praising God, and celebrating him is declaring or speaking of his Goodness to others, which those that have no Converse with men cannot do. They that go down to the Pit cannot

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cannot hope &c. must either be took as in the vulg: *Lat. the Bodies that go down*, which certainly cannot do any thing, or else it must be meant of the Wicked that die, who have no hope in their Death as *Solomon saith the just man hath* Prov, 14. 23. That in *Isa. 26. 14.* if taken as it lies, without considering the Context, might be urged against the Resurrection, rather than the Separate State ; but it seems to relate to the other Lords beside God, the false Gods which had ruled over *Israel*, and it was they who should never live, or rise again to have Dominion over them: Which Lords were either wicked men, or Idols, which last might very well be said to be dead, and never to rise, and to be destroyed. And such Idols the *Hebrews* have been said sometimes to serve. But there are some other Texts urged for a cessation of Being at Death, as *Job. 10. 18, 19, 21. Wherefore hast thou brought me forth out of the Womb? Oh that I had given up the Ghost, and no eye had seen me I should have bin as though I had not bin, I should have bin carried from the Womb to the Grave. Before I go whence I shall not return.* All the Stress of this for the Mortalists lies in the words *I should have bin as the I had not bin, and go whence I shall not return.* But as for the First, to be as if one were not, is not to cease, or not be, but not to appear; and if an untimely Birth should cease to be, it could not, be said it would not have been as so, or so. But some Mortalists are concern'd mightily for all the little Souls of untimely Births, and
 Infants

Infants that die young, what becomes of them they know not, nor what to do with them, but destroy them utterly; but that Concern I think very needless while there is an Omnipotent, All-wise, and good God to dispose of his Creatures; whose least works will not be in vain, tho' we don't know how he disposes of them. As to the other words, *Go where I shall not return*, Job might possibly doubt of a Resurrection (against which it can only be urg'd) or not then, have any Notion of it: or he might mean, that he should not return to his present Condition any more. Again, Job. 7. 21. is also a Text the Mortalists bring *For now shall I sleep in the Dust, and thou shalt seek me in the Morning but I shall not be*. To which I say, it would be very strange that he should be asleep and God should seek for him, if he were not in being, or if he were not to be found. But the word *be* is not in the Hebrew, but, *and not I*: But what Job lays before, is to be considered, *why dost thou not pardon my Transgression, and take away mine Iniquity?* and if God would do so, then he should not be in Trouble, but at rest in Death. The Text which they bring from Psal. 39. 13. *Spare me, that I may recover Strength before I go hence and be no more*. They may rather urge against the Resurrection, than for what they bring it: the word *be and more*, are here wanting in the Hebrew, it is, *I go hence, and not I*, which may be well supply'd, found among the Living.

That which is brought from Mat. 2. 18. *Rachel weeping for her Children, and would not be comforted*

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comforted because they dre not ; has nothing in it, being plainly to be understood because they are not Alive. As for that Text *Ezek. 18. 20. The Soul that Sinneth it shall Die*, It has nothing in it but that he that Sins shall Suffer ; one shall not Suffer for anothers Sins as appears plain from the Context. But *Psal. 146. 4. Is brought as the most Invincible Text for the Total Cessation of Thoughts, or the Life of the Mind, and is the main Pillar of their Doctrine. His Breath goeth forth, he returneth to his Earth, in that very Day his Thoughts Perish.* But this is very easie to Answer. It is not said all his Thoughts Perish, and besides the *Heb.ew* Word *Heshthonoth*, Translated Thoughts, is but a Metaphorical Word for some sort of Thoughts, Denoting Thoughts of Beneficence, or good purposes, coming from the Root *Hashhath*, hath bin Candid, or Bright, and if we read the foregoing Verse, *Put not your Trust in Princes*, or as the *Hebrew* has it, the Munificent, nor in the Son of Man in whom there is no help, or as the *Hebrew* Salvation, the full import will appear. He that Hopes for Help, Salvation, or Benefits from Princes, or the most Munificent, may lose his Expectation, but he that trusts in God shall not be deceived ; but tho Man has never so good purposes to do Good to those that trust in him, they may be deceived, for the Man Dies, and in that day his Good, or Fair Purposes Perish, cease, are at an End, not all, his Thoughts. The Verbis *Hashhath* used *Jonah 1. 6. Call upon thy God if so be God will think upon us that we perish not*, that is think on us with Thoughts of Salvation from the Danger ; for it could not be suppos'd that God did not

not at all thiuk upon them. So Dan. 6. 3. The King thought to set him over the whole Realm, That is, had those Fair and Friendly Thoughts for Daniel, he thought to confer great Dignity upon him. So that this perishing of Thoughts, is nothing but the Frustration of the splendid or fair Purposes, or Promises of a King or Munificent Person for one that trusts in him, when he lives not to perform them.

But there is yet a mighty Text, 1 Tim. 6. 16. The King of Kings, and Lord of Lords, who only hath Immortality, Dwelling in the Light, which no Man can approach unto, whom no Man hath seen, nor can see. Now say they, If God only hath Immortality, none else hath, and therefore the Mind is not Immortal.

To this I Answer, It is to be granted, yea and asserted, as we have already done, that none but God is necessarily Immortal, or hath Immortality in his Nature. But it does not follow that Immortality may not be his Gift to some of his Creatures. For it is said, God will give Eternal Life to them who seek for Immortality, Rom. 2. 7. and the very Mortal Body shall put on Immortality, Rom. 2. 7. and 1 Cor. 15. 53. and Rom. 6. 23. The Gift of God is Eternal Life.

There is another Text the Mortalists urge, 1 Cor. 15. 17, 18. If Christ be not raised, then they also which are fallen Asleep in Christ are Perished. From whence they suppose that if there were no Resurrection there would be no being at all. But this cannot be infer'd from the Text, but rather the Contrary; for the word Translated Perished is the same used, Matth. 10. 28. And Translate.

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Translated Destroy; Fear him that is able to Destroy both Soul and Body in Hell, in which Destroy, does not signifie Annihilate but Damn, which in Luke 12. 5. is call'd Casting into Hell, where Mark tells us the Worm never Dieth, nor is the Fire Quenched, Chap. 9. 44. So far is this Perishing from Cessation of being. But if the Context be considered, it will appear that the Apostles design was not to prove that if there be no Resurrection there can be no Being, or Happiness, but if there be no Resurrection, Christ is not Risen; and if Christ is not Risen, they who Preach Him Risen, are False Witnesses, and those that believed them, their Faith is Vain, they have believed Impostors, and those that Died in the Belief, and Propagation of Lies, are Dead in their Sins, and so are undone; not as to Being, but Happiness. And for all that is in this Text they might be, and be miserable in a Separate, State, and be rais'd again to an Unhappy Immortality, with a Body also. For he does not argue If Christ be not Risen the Dead Rise not, but are lost; but if the Dead Rise not, Christ is not Risen, and we shall Perish, or be Damn'd for Preaching that he is, if it be false, and we deceive the World by an Imposture.

Another Text the Mortalists suppose very strong for them is Rev. 16. 3. *Every Living Soul in the Sea Died,* and Chap. 20. 4, 5. *I saw the Souls of those that were Beheaded, &c. and they Lived and Reigned with Christ a Thousand Years.*

But In these Texts there is really nothing to the purpose; for in the first the living Souls that Died in the Sea were not Men there Drowned

Drowned both Body and Soul, no nor Fishes; but the Sea and Death here, are both Metaphorical, and the Vision Emblematical, as appears to any that Reads the Context with any Degree of Understanding, as I could make out, were it needful. As to the other Text, he speaks of the Resurrection, he saw those who had bin Sufferers for Truths Sake alive with the Body again, and they Reign'd with Christ a Thousand Years; not that the Dead Minds lived again: And it is Observable he does not say the Souls that were Beheaded, but the Souls of those that had bin Beheaded, and they lived, that is Body and Soul were United again.

That spoken of Christ, *Acts 1. 13. His Soul was not left in Hell*, is no more than he was not left in the State of the Dead, as *Hades* signifies from the Disappearing of those in that State, but he was raised again.

These are the principal Texts I have met with either in Mortalists Books, or could ever draw from their Mouths, for the total Mortality and *Materiality* of Man.

Some that speak of the resting of the Dead, and the ceasing of the Wicked from Troubling, &c. as *Job 15. 11. Argue* nothing but the Inadvertency of the Mortalists, and may be used in our Scripture Arguments for the distinct and Separate Being of Mind; for that which is at rest, and ease (which is Sensible Being) *Is* We should now come to see what we can find in Scripture on our side, but it will be convenient

First, To take Notice of one thing more, which may seem somewhat to Argue for the Materialists;

That

160 *Texts seeming to prove that Beasts Think.*

That is that *Beasts* which we take to be *Material* and *Mortal Beings*, are said in *Scripture* to think; and why may not *Man* be wholly *material* and *mortal* too, and yet think?

The *Places* urged are the *Speech of the Serpent to Eve*, and of *Balam's Ass to his Master*, *Gen. 3. 1.* and *Numb. 22. 30.* and that of *Isa. 1. 3.* *The Ox knoweth his Owner, and the Ass his Masters Crib, but Israel doth not know, &c.* To which I answer, as for the *Serpent*, it may very well be translated the *Tempter*, for the word *Nahash* signifies to tempt, try, or curiously to observe; and the word *haijah*, rendred *Beast*, an *Animal*, and may comprehend man himself who is a kind of *Animal*, than which the *Tempter* was more cunning; but to take it for the *Natural Serpent* we must suppose it acted by the *Devil* without any *Knowledge*, or agency in the *Brutal Machine*, which might yet be more fit for the *Tempters* purpose than any other *Brute*. So *Balam's Ass* was but an *Instrument* the *Angel* used to reprove *Balam*. Nor can it be thought if *Beasts* have *Knowledge* capable of reasoning, as these *Brutes* are represented, and they wanted only *Speech*, that *God* would have denied That also which would have Been so necessary to their *Condition*, and that whereby we might have had good and useful *Conversation* with them sometimes. But what seems to be affirm'd in some places of *Beasts*, is as much denied in others, as *Psal. 32. 9.* *Be not as the Horse or Mule which have no Understanding, or do not understand.* And tho' the *Ox* and *Ass* are said to know, yet *Israel* in the

Texts seeming to prove that Beasts think, 161

the same Text is said not to know; which cannot be took literally unless we would prove by it that men don't think. And when it is said of *Nebuchadnezzar*, Dan. 4. 16. and 5. 21. *Let them change his Heart, and let a Beasts Heart be given him. And his Heart was made equal with the Beasts.* We can understand no more, than that his Inclinations were changed, so that he ran, or was driven from men, and lived among and imitated, *Beasts*, or perhaps thought himself a *Beast*, as some others have done. But it is also said, *Prov. 12. 10. A righteous man knows, or regardeth the Life or appetite of his Beast;* But this is no more than that a *righteous man*, one that will act as becomes a man, will feed his very *Beast*, and not let it be lost for want of Food. But the *Mercies of the Wicked are cruel*, they will not feed the needy of Men as becomes them. It is said also of the *Sun*, that he knoweth his going down, *Psal. 104. 19.* yet we have no reason to believe that *Luminous Body* so much as an *Animal*, much less a *Thinker*.

CHAP. XV.

Texts proving the Distinction and Immortality of the Mind considered.

BUT we shall now come to see whether we can't find some few Texts sufficient to prove the *Distinct Being* and *Immortality* of the *Mind*. And in the First Place it is to be observed That the *Soul, Spirit, or Mind*, is generally spoken of in Scripture, as distinguish'd, and

M oppos'd

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oppo'd to the *Body*. And the *Body*, and *Mind* are spoken of as Two Things; as Eccl. 12. 7. *Then shall the Dust return to the Earth, as it was, and the Spirit to God who gave it.* Here *Solomon* in his last or own fixed Thoughts of this matter, (as we may well suppose) makes a clear distinction of the *Body* and *Spirit*, and tells us what becomes of both, and seems plainly to refer to Gen. 3. 19. using the same word *Moses* does, viz. *Aphar*, the original matter for the organical *Body*, the decay of which he had been before elegantly describing; and tells us, *The Dust shall return to the Earth*, as what it was, not the whole man; *and the Spirit to God that gave it*; that is, created it; which *Moses* calls inspiring it: And tho' he uses the word *Rhuah*, not *Neshamah* which *Moses* uses, these words are used indifferently, and it cannot be supposed that it is the material Breath, or perpetually-changed Air breath'dout, that goes to God.

Nor need we say much to take off the Objection some make, that wicked Souls can't be suppos'd to go to the holy God; If we but consider what a Mind's going to God can mean; nor need we insinuate that *Solomon* speaks most probably of those who had remembred their Creator; but any Mind separated, may be said to go to God, who is call'd the God of the Spirits of all Flesh, *Numb.* 16. 22. and the Father of Spirits *Heb.* 12. 9. the Father of *Spirits*, in opposition to our natural Fathers, who are but the Fathers of our Flesh (whereby is plainly intimated the man does not beget *Body* and *Mind* too, as we have said before.) I say, if we consider what a Mind's going

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going to God can be, any departed *Mind* may be said to go to God. Now the very notion of God and of *Mind* we hold, and always ought to understand, excludes any supposition of local motion, or Presence. But a holy separate *Mind*, which may be most properly said to go to God, who is Omnipresent virtually, and intellectually, may be said so to do, when God becomes clearly known to it, and the sole, or chief Object of its loving thoughts, and is found intimately to affect it with the Sense of his Goodness, Excellency, and Approbation, which certainly comes to pass when the good *Mind* is freed from all diverting Objects its mortal Body was the occasion of. But the wicked *Mind* may also be said to go to God, when on the loss of its Body it is no more diverted from the Sight or Sense of God, and its relation to God as its Creator, and rightful Lord, and yet finds it self not so in love with God, as to be capable of being happy in contemplating him; and yet that it can never be out of the Presence, or Sight of the Omniscient Being; who cannot be supposed to be defiled by seeing such foul *Minds*, any more than he is by their sinning whilst in the Body, when he was as much present with them, but sees them not with any liking or approbation of their deeds. Nor does he receive them into any Happiness, or Comfort, who have made a Hell in their own Thoughts by Wicked Deeds. Now that that which ceases to be, should return to God is Nonsense, or a Contradiction; unless they suppose God to be nothing, and so that the Spirits return to nothing, and that will be worse. That the Power of Life, or of giving Life should

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return to God, is not much better sense: For the power of giving Life, was and is, and will be always the same with God, and can never be given forth to any, but He is the only giver of Life.

Again, *Matth. 26. 41. The Spirit is Willing, but the Flesh is Weak.* Here Body and Mind are plainly Distinguished. The Disciples Minds, or Spirits, were willing to watch with Christ, but their Bodies, or Fleshly parts, were Indisposed. So *1 Cor. 6. 20. Glorifie God in your Body, and in your Spirit, which are Gods.* That is let your Bodies be Govern'd and Order'd as it becometh them to be Govern'd by Minds that Glorifie God. *Matth. 10: 28. Fear not those that can Kill the Body, but cannot Kill the Soul; but rather Fear him which is able to Destroy both Soul and Body in Hell,* *Luke 12. 4, 5. Be not afraid of them that Kill the Body, and after that have no more that they can do. But Fear him who after he hath Killed, hath Power to cast into Hell.* Here the Body and Soul, or Mind, are plainly Distinguished; the one Man can Kill, the other he cannot; but if Man were wholly Mortal, or nothing but matter, he that Kills the Body, Kills All, or Kills Wholly. And if we should Understand Life by Soul here, as some are mightily pleas'd to Fancy we ought, it must be the Life of the Body, and then Killing the Body would not be Destroying or taking away its Life, for that St. *Matthew* tells us our Lord said they cannot do, and so Killing would no Killing at all, a pretty Revelation! Besides, Killing the Life would not be very good Sense. But some have suppos'd St. *Matthew* spoke vulgarly, or did not Relate what Christ said so accurately as he should, but that St. *Luke* speaks plainer, and is the

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the best Expofitor of St. *Mathew*; which is very odd, that he who moft fully expreffeth the thing fhould be more Dark, and to be Expounded by fomething more Brief. But the Truth is, St. *Mathew* relates the matter moft Fully and Plainly, fo that St. *Luke*, who Wrote after him, might well mention it more briefly. But the defign of both Texts feems to be not fo much for Teaching them what was not known to them before, but to mind them thereof, as an Argument from what they knew, to perfwade them to be Couragious in their Duty, not withftanding the worft of Persecutions. For the Difciples could not be then fupposed to think men could reach their Minds, much lefs that they could not Kill the Body, but he is to be fear'd, who is able to deftroy, or caft into Hell, both Soul and Body: That is, the Soul alone into an Unhappy State; and the Body when United again to the Soul, into a place of Mifery. But we cant fuppose it meant, he who is able to Adnihilate either? for that is no Note of Power as we have fhewn before, or to Deftroy, or make miserable the Body alone, which is not a Subject of Happinefs, or Mifery, much lefs the Mind, which Man is fuppos'd by the Mortalifts to have taken away the Being of. But we need Argue no more from this Text there is fo much to be feen in the bare Reading of it, the Mortalifts have never been able to give any tollerable Answer to it.

The next Text we fhall mention is in *Luke* 23. 43. *Verily, Verily, I fay unto thee, To Day fhalt thou be with me in Paradice.* To get off the force of this Text the Mortalifts make piti-

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ful Shifts; some would understand it so, that to Day should refer to Christs speaking, not to the Thief's being in Paradise. But that would have bin a poor Discovery for Christ, who was actually speaking, to tell him when he spoke, and the Word *Semeron, to Day*, might have bin well spared as Superfluous. But all Bibles agree in connecting *Semeron*, to Day, with *Ese, shalt be*. And it is according to the use of Authors in Discourse, as, *Semeron met'emou aristeson. Dine with me to Day. Aurion su kai, hoj ui oi sou meta sou Persountai, To Morrow thou, and thy Sons shall fall together*. Others say to Day means shortly. But 1700 Years, and God knows how much more, would be but a strang or long signification of *Shortly*: And therefore they are forced to suppose the Thief rais'd shortly. But by what Revelation they have it they cannot tell us. But they say again that Christ spoke to the Person, that is according to them the Body of the Thief, or (to favour us) to the whole Thief; and with *me*, must be, say they, whole Christ who did rise and ascend that Day. I answer, The Person is not the Body, nor is the Body part of the Person. He that speaks to *me*, speaks to my *Mind*, which is that which receives the Notion from his *Speech*, and it is the *Mind* properly that speaks. What is done in, or by the *Body*, is but the sign of the meaning of the *Mind* or *Person*. And so Paul *Heb. 10. 5*. brings in Christ speaking of himself, as distinct from his Body, *A Body hast thou prepared me*: So that the true sense of Christ's words to the Thief is this, Thou Guilty Soul or Mind, whose Body is Dying for thy Crimes, being Repentant, and Believing in me, shalt this Day be in a Happy State with me who have my Body also Dying as a

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Malefactor tho I am Innocent. And here is no need of supposing a long march for these two Happy Minds to seek a Paradise. *Mahomet* might fancy a very distant place, and fable himself traveling to seek it, but Christ could not.

But for the further explaining this Paradise, and Confirming the Existence of the Mind in the Separate State, we will with this consider what *St. Paul* says, *2 Cor. 12. I knew a Man, &c. whether in the Body, or out of the Body, I cannot tell, God knoweth*) caught up, or rather snatcht unto the Third Heaven, caught up or rapt into Paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which is not Lawful, or possible for a Manto utter. This Rapture of *St. Paul* into the Third Heaven, or Paradise, was such, that he says he could not tell whether he was in the Body or out of the Body, that is, Alive or Dead, as *2 Cor. 3. 6. At home in the Body, viz. Alive*, so that he supposes he might possibly be separate from, or be out of the Body; and then I say he could not be carried by local Motion, if his Mind suffer'd the rapture, whether Dead or Alive; and the Mortalists wont, be willing to suppose he was wholly at Heaven, and came so long a Journey back again, that's a Difficulty they cant; admit of, for Souls to come back again to Judgment. This Paradise, or Third Heaven, must be a state of very great Bliss, which was Represented to the Apostle, which Christ, and the Penitent Thief might as well be in that Day, without supposing either of them necessarily rais'd first, and so confounding the Genuine Sense of the Text.

But another Text we shall a little Consider, is *2 Cor. 5. 6, and 8. Whilst we are at home in the Bo-*

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dy, we are absent from the Lord, and we are willing rather to be Absent from the Body, and be present with the Lord. From this Scripture it is so apparent that Minds may be absent from the Body, and yet be; and not only so, but with the Lord; that is, in a State of Joy and Happiness, by the Union of God and the Mind, that much need not be said more than what appears by reading it, and it is as plain that after the Resurrection we shall be with the Body again, and cannot be said then to be absent from it.

Again, The Argument our Saviour uses against the Sadduces to prove the Resurrection, *Luke 20. 37, 38.* has more in it than barely a Proof of that one point, for God could not be now said to be the God of *Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*, if they had no beings, or no Personalities, which their Dust has not; the Dust is not *Abraham*. But Christ tells us, that God is not the God of the Dead, but of the Living, and adds, *For all Live in him*, That is, tho they are Dead to the World, as Men consisting of Minds, and Bodies, yet they are Alive to God; not shall be only, but *are*, that is, in Spirit, or Mind, that they may possibly Live in the Body again to receive the Promises not fulfil'd. So *Moses*, who we read Dyed in the *Land of Moab*, *Deut. 34. 5.* Nevertheless appear'd to be with Christ on the *Mount*, which was an Apparition of which, I hope our Mortalists won't deny the Matter of Fact. Nor can they any way prove *Moses* rais'd from the Dead, if it be true that Christ was the first Fruits of them that Slept, and that those that are, Christ's Rise not till his Coming, *1 Cor. 15. 20.* And that

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that none had Ascended unto Heaven, but the Son of Man, *John 3. 13.*

Another consideration is, that in those Texts that speak of the saving of the *Soul* (which is by Faith in the Gospel, as *1 Pet. 1. 6. Receiving the end of your Faith the Salvation of your Souls;* and *Heb. 10. 39. We are not of them that draw back unto perdition, but of them that believe to the saving of the Soul.*) By the *Soul*, can't be meant natural Life, or the Life of the Body, or the Mortalists *Soul*; for there was no promise of saving that, but of saving from sin, which is a moral Salvation, of which the *Mind* only is capable, and so by *Soul* in all these places, must be meant *Mind*, which if it ceas'd to be at Death, that *moral Salvation*, call'd also Regeneration, would also be at an end; which how it can be, according to God's Will, who destroys not any thing he has made especially that it should be disannull'd by a small knock, or a stab of a sorry Fellow, none but a resolute Materialist can be suppos'd to fancy.

Again, We have divers Texts which declare the Dead blessed, or happy, some of which we shall mention, as *Phil. 1. 21. To me to live is Christ, and to die is gain.* Now, it could never be a Gain to die, if Death were a Cessation of *Mind*, the only thing capable of Happiness. And the Apostle (nay, any wise man) could never have been in a straight, as he says verse 23. whether to live in the satisfaction of doing good, by propagating the Gospel, or to die, if Death were a total cessation of Thought; for on such a supposition, he must loose not only a capacity of doing good, but the pleasure of doing it, which to an honest *Mind* is not very small; but the
Apostle

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Apostle supposes that if he departed (which he had a desire to do,) that is, if he died, or was *dissolved*, or *unloosed*, viz. Soul from Body, he should be with Christ, that is, in a State of great Happiness, which was far better. But if being with Christ is to be meant of the Resurrection and State afterwards, as the Mortalists would have it, His wish would be vain, for that would come never the sooner for his dying; and so he had better live, or abide in the Flesh, which he says was more needful for the Church, and so spend some of the time till Christ's coming, in Duty, and a considerable degree of Happiness, which a Mortalists Death is suppos'd totally to take away, unless the insensible Corps can be thought happy.

Again, it is said Rev. 14. 13. *Blessed, or rather happy, are the Dead which die in the Lord, that they may rest from their Labours.* Which could not be true, if there were no sensible Being left them, nor would *rest* be any thing, or truly said of *not-being*, nor of the Body, unless as a meer opposite to motion, for rest from Labour, and Troubles, always suppose a *Sense of Ease*, or else the Rest would be good for nothing, or no rest. Nor can our Mortalist have any advantage if I sometimes call the separate State a Death even to the *Mind*, for I mean no more than the Apostle did in the Text but now cited, viz. a *dissolution from the Body*, or a being *unclothed*, as he also calls it. But it is farther observable that the *Body*, as singly considered, is often said to be mortal, as Rom. 8. 11. but the *Mind* never, unless metaphorically, as dead in sin &c.

Again, once more, In divers places the dead are said to sleep, as 1 Cor. 15. 20. *Christ the first Fruits*

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of them that slept: So 1 Thes. 4. 14. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him; and we which are alive, and remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them which are asleep. Now Death is call'd a Sleep fitly upon the account of the cessation from trouble, or troubling. But that Sleep does not cause a cessation of thoughts, is not only to be demonstrated from reason as we have already shewn; but the Writers of Scripture tell us as much, Job 33. 14, 15. God speaketh once, yea twice, yet man perceiveth, or seeth, it, or rather him, not; that is, that it is God that speaks in a Dream, in a Vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, &c. then he openeth the ears of men, and sealeth their Instruction, &c. So Dan. 10. 9. And when I heard the voice of his words, then was I in a deep Sleep on my Face, &c. and an hand touched me, &c. Cant. 5. 2. I sleep, but my Heart waketh, &c. So Mat. 1. 20. The Angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a Dream 24. And Joseph being raised from sleep, &c. and in other places. But there is one thing more to be touch'd upon, in order to the disengaging the Minds of some from a perplexity arising from some expressions in Scripture, seeming to divide man into more than *Mind* and *Body*, as Deut. 6. 5. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, and with all thy Soul, and with all thy might. And Luke 10. 27. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, and with all thy Soul, and with all thy Strength, and with all thy Mind; or as the Greek rather imports, with all thy Thoughts. And Eph. 14. 23. Be renewed in the Spirit of your *Mind*. and 1 Thes. and

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5. 23. I pray God your whole Spirit, and Soul, and Body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. As to this it is to be granted

First, That the sacred Writers do not any more than others, use these words always in the same Sense, or much regard their Etymologies, but use them indifferently; but nevertheless we must not think that they are used altogether *tautologically*, or impertinently. And tho' sometimes there may be only a redundance of a word or two, to express a thing the more emphatically, or certainly, yet in the Texts mentioned, and in some others, I think we may find very good Sense without supposing any redundancy; for where *Heart* and *Soul* come together they may be very well taken for *Will* and *Understanding*, so also *Spirit* and *Soul*: And tho' Love is properly an act of the *Will*, yet it ought to be according to *Understanding*, that is, we should love God according to what we know him to be; and then with all the *strength*, signifies the utmost intension, or vehemency of desire. But whereas St. *Luke* adds to *Heart*, *Soul* and *Strength*, with all thy *Mind*, it is to be understood always or in all the cogitations or workings of the *Mind*, as the word *Dianoia* signifies, which word is used Heb. 8. 10. *I will put my Laws into their Minds*, that is, they shall always think on them, or Mind them, and not forget them, and *Write them in their Hearts*; that is, they shall be willing to do them. Be renewed in the Spirit of your *Mind*, is no more but have new Inclinations, or *Desires of Mind*. That the whole *Spirit, Soul and Body*, be preserved blameless, is that the *Will* may be Sanctified, that is, set upon things worthy, not common base things; the

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the *Understanding* truly inform'd not Corrupted with false Apprehensions, and so that the Body may not be an Instrument of any outward Evil Action, but Govern'd according to a Sanctified *Understanding and Will*.

I shall but once more observe that the *Body*, or *Flesh* considered singly and distinct from the *Mind*, or *Spirit*, is in Scripture said to Die, to be Dead, and to be Mortal, as we find, *Rom. 8. 11. He that raised Christ from the Dead, shall quicken or Enliven your Mortal Bodies. So 1 Cor. 15. 53. This Mortal shall put on Immortality. 2 Cor. 4. 11. That the Life of Jesus might be made manifest in our Mortal Flesh.* But the *Mind*, as singly considered is never said to be Mortal, or to Die. It is always either the *Body* that is said to Die, or be Mortal, or *The Man*, that is the Compound; so that the Separation of the parts is the only Death of the whole. The *Body* is singly said to Die, and the *Man* in Relation, or as to his *Body* when he loses it, and all the Difficulty lies in stating the Notions of *Life* and *Death*, which I believe will be no Difficulty any longer, if what we have said before shall be well considered.

C H A P. XVI.

The Conclusion, with a Comparative Consideration of the Doctrine of the Materialists, and Mortalists, with the contrary Notion as they may naturally influence the Minds of men.

I Might have mentioned many Scriptures more that give light in this matter; and I might have Answered some other Objections the *Materialists*

rialists and Mortalists make, if I thought they were of any Moment farther than to shew their Weakness, which is not the Thing I much aim'd at, but the Clearing and Vindicating the Truth it self, which on whose side soever it be, it can never be Weak, through the Inability of the Champion that undertakes to defend it. If Man were indeed wholly Material, and Mortal, he would not be the less so, because the Materialists and Mortalists have said very little to the purpose for proving it; as I must needs say, to do them Justice, I could never find any thing they have Wrote but what shews a great deal of Inconsiderateness, seeming to be Discoveries of their *First*, or perhaps *Second* hasty *Thoughts*, inconsistent with themselves, and some of the greatest Truths, with a Zeal enough, were their Opinion that without which there can be no Salvation; and coarse Language enough were their Antagonists, the vilest Miscreants: So little Substance in so many words, that I could never think a Man would much commend himself by formally encountering any one of them.

I might have took notice of their confident, and bare say-so's, were not time and Paper of much more value than a great deal of what they have said. Yet for a Specimen of the very little consideration that some of very great assurance have had, I will recite two or three Assertions of a great Mortalist *As That the Notion of the Soul, as believed to be a Spiritual Immortal Substance, is not consonant to the Principles of Reason, or Religion, and strikes at the very Foundation of Christian Religion. Yet in relation to the main end of Religion, it matters not whether the Life of man be his Soul,*

or a Spiritual Substance united to his Body. He means the mortal Life, or Life of the Body. And if men had an Opinion that their Souls might be damn'd for their Wickedness, it was the same thing as to the inciting them to their Duty, as for them to believe the whole man should be damn'd. And that to feign an Immaterial Spiritual Substance in man which must suffer, or be rewarded, according as the whole man had acted in this Life, tho' erroneous, was a very good motive to the Obedience of Christ. Now that the Doctrine that is not Consonant to the Principles either of Reason or Religion, and strikes at the very foundation of Christianity, should be as good, as to the main end of Religion, or as inciting to Duty, as the Truth; or that a feign'd Erronious Opinion should be a very good Motive to the Obedience of Christ, is so very Inconsistent with the Principles of good Reasoning, that I doubt the Man as little considered, (if he knew) what the Foundation of the Christian Religion is, or what the Principles of Reason, and Religion are, as he did the Inconsistence of his own Assertions. That an Error should be a very good Motive to Gospel Obedience, tho' so great as to strike at the very Foundation of it, is neer as hard to believe, as that the *Being that is not, can be again*. Nor does the Man much commend Christianity, who supposes it ever beholden to Error for its Propagation. But I suppose he thought the Principles and Foundation of Christian Religion, was not that upon which Obedience, the main End of it, was necessarily Grounded. Yet I am perswaded *That the Obedience of Christ, is the Christian Religion*; and if the Christian Religion be good, and true, That which

was a very good Motive to it, must on that account have a very good mark of Truth. And I think it is none of the worst ways to find out whether a Doctrine be true, or False, to Argue as it were a *Posteriori*, by considering the good or Evil influences it may naturally have upon the Believers of it. And I think it will be very convenient for a Conclusion to this Discourse, to compare the Doctrine of the *Materialists*, and *Mortalists* with ours, and see which is like to have the best Influences on the Minds of the Believers, and which naturally leads them most to Evil.

He that believes *Man wholly Material*, and that our Mind is not a *Substantial Being*, *Distinct from the Body*, that *Thinking is but an Effect*, or a *Property*, or *Mode of matter*, or that *matter can think*, may easily believe that there is nothing but *Matter*, yea, they will be very inclinable to such a Supposition, as I have found most of them that I have bin acquainted with. For what need is there of supposing any thing but Matter, if Matter be Sufficient for all we can suppose. If *Brutal Engines* can *Think* and *Reason* in a Low Degree, and *Humane Machines* in that high Degree, we find some *Wise Men* do; Why may not some other *Model of Matter*, or the whole of Matter be capable of the *Highest Understanding*? And if *Matter* be capable of the *Highest Understanding*, why may not *God* be *Matter* as well as we? And if *God* be *Matter*, he must be either a *Part of Matter*, or the whole of Matter; If he be but a *Part of Matter*, he must be limited, or contain'd, and so *finite*, for all parts are so. But if he be not a *Part of Matter*, he must be the whole of Matter, and if he be the whole of Matter, there is no *Matter*

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ter but God, and if there be nothing but *Matter*, all things are God.

And if there be no *Matter* but God, our Bodies, or as a Materialist would say, we, are parts of God; and whatever is God cannot do amiss; and if we can never do amiss, we may do any thing we please, there can be no Sin; and if we may do any thing without Sin, we *Mortalists* may do well enough to Cut the *Immortalists* *Throats*, and kill them wholly, and so God must die in part, and so he will be imperfect, and not be God. Neither could God be really *Infinite*, if he were all the *Matter*, for every whole Consists of *Parts*, and what consists of *Parts*, consists of so many *Parts*, which are such a Number, and all Number is Finite, being Even or Odd, and so capable of Addition. What Monsters are in the Bowels of the *Materialists* Notion! And to what Wicked and Absurd Fancies have some Men actually bin carried thereby! Witness *Hobbs*, and *Spinoza*, and their Disciples (to mention no more) whose Corrupt Doctrines, and Practices were all Built on the Fancy that *There is nothing but Matter*; and if others do not build the same *Hay* and *Stubble*, on this *Material Foundation*, it is because they have not Wit enough to frame a Suitable Superstructure; but I have met with some have actually run to these Extreams.

Again, On the Supposition that we are wholly *Material*, we may come a little below *Spinoza*, and Argue, If we be wholly *Material*, then those Thoughts wherein *Morality*, and *Immorality* consist, are but the *Modifications of Matter*, or are least *Effects thereof*, but these *Modifications of Matter*, we are wholly ignorant of, and so they are

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wholly

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wholly out of our Power, and consequently we cannot alter any of our Thoughts; and therefore whatever we Think, we Think necessarily, and consequently there is no Ver-
tue, nor Vice, and therefore *Quod Liber licet*, we may live, as we list; to be displeased at any thing we have done, is but a Folly, or Weakness of Mind, as *Spinoza* says expressly of Repentance.

Again, If Man be wholly Matter, and Death puts an end to all *Thoughts*, or *Sentiments*, and *Volition*, there is an End of all Capacity of *Happiness* and *Misery*. Because that wherein *Happiness* and *Misery* can only consist, is suppos'd to Cease; and that which Ceases to be, *is not*, and that which *is not in Being*, cannot be again, and then *Let us Eat and Drink, for to Morrow we must Die*, it is best to Enjoy our Pleasure as much as we can while we Live. *Ede, bibe, lude, post Mortem nulla Voluptas*. And, if we once come to suppose an Impossibility of Rewards and Punishments hereafter, (and that we shall, do if Consistent on this Foundation) we must Deny all, Right, or Wrong, or that the *Scripture* is the Word of God; or suppose that God Deceives us, and is not a good Being, for Affrighting us from the Pleasures we might Enjoy. But I only remind my Reader of what I have said before, and therefore will not go on any further with the bad Tendencies of the Opinion of the *Materialist* and *Mortalist*.

Now

No bad Consequence from our Doctrine. 179

Now I Challenge these Gentlemen, or any other, to shew any one ill, or absur'd natural Consequence, to be drawn from our Doctrine of the Distinction, Substantiality, and Immortality of Mind : And whosoever will but impartially consider what has bin said, I do not Question, but he will find it to be a Ground of all Consistent Philosophy and Divinity. How clear will the Distinction between God, and the Creature be? A Self-Existent Mind being the most Distinct, and Singular thing imaginable, and of the Greatest conceivable Perfection. If our Minds are distinct and active Beings, independent on Body, what a Ground of Freedom and Duty is here! We shall not be able to complain, that we do amiss but can't help it; that the Temper of our Body, or Blood is such, that we are unable to be Patient, Chaste, &c. If our Minds are Immortal, we shall not be Tempted, if we do well, to over value Life, fearing no Anihilation, End, or Interruption of our Happiness, but shall part with our Bodily Life, and Enjoyments, but as a Change for the Better. But if we do Ill, we have a ground to fear the Falling into a State of Unspeakable Misery, every Day, or Moment, having no Hope of a Long Rest, or of Adnihilation. The Fanc-y of Purgatory either in a Separate State, or afterwards, are none of the Doctrines of True Christianity, or naturally arising from that part of it, the *Immortality of the Mind*, as we have shewn. Nor can Atheism be possibly built on it, or stand by it, as it has stood (as firmly
as

as such an Opinion can be suppos'd to stand) on the Doctrine that denies the Distinction, Substantiality, Immateriality, and Immortality of Mind, and has its first rise, in all that hold it, meerly from puerile sensuality, and prejudices; and I believe there is not one Athiestical Writer to be found, but who has held, if not grounded his Opinion, on this Supposition, *That there is nothing but Matter.*



FINIS.

ERRATA.

THE Reader is desired to mend these Faults of the Press, or what Mispointings he may find, that the Author may not be farther Abused, or the Reader by mistaking his Sense.

In the P R E F A C E.

Page 8. Line 10. for *hither*, read *hitherto*.

In the B O O K.

Page 8. Line 1. for *Discovery*, read *Distinction*.
p. 12. l. 10. for *pation* r. *passion*. p. 15. l. *last*,
for *Neshemah*, r. *Neshamah*. p. 16. l. 1. for *Pseuche*,
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EXTRACT

THE HISTORY OF THE
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FROM THE FOUNDATION
TO THE PRESENT TIME

BY
JOHN STOW
CITY CHURCHMAN

THE SECOND PART
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